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This study identifies and analyzes the decision making and framing processes for 
selected cases o f armed humanitarian intervention by the United States in the post-Cold 
War Era. It fills a gap in the literature on decision making, focusing on the role of the 
powerful individual leader in national security decision making and the framing of 
interventions to the U.S. public and other stakeholder audiences. An examination of 
extant literature on the subject of U.S. foreign policy decision making, and development 
and implementation of framing strategies is used to determine the role of the individual 
leader in those processes using three case studies, the Bush intervention in Somalia in 
1992, the Clinton intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the Obama intervention in Libya in 
2011.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
In March, 2011, the Obama administration made the decision to intervene 
militarily in the Libyan civil war. While the U.S. had undertaken such interventions 
before, what was unusual in this case was the reasoning set forth for U.S. action. 
Normally, U.S. national security is the chief framing tool for the justification of 
intervention abroad, however, in this case, security threats to the U.S. were not mentioned 
as fundamental causes for the intervention. Instead, the growing humanitarian crisis, and 
the threat that Muammar Al-Gaddafi posed to his own people was given as the reason. 
This was not first U.S. intervention to be couched in this terms, but it was rare for the 
language o f human rights to be applied as the primary motivation to enter into an open 
militarized conflict, and not to a natural disaster or manmade disaster such as starvation, 
as had been the case in Somalia in 1992. The intervention which followed took place 
under NATO and United Nations auspices, and was aimed at securing the people of 
Libya from the depredations of their leaders. A further facet to the intervention was the 
purposeful vilification o f Gaddafi as an attempt to create a media frame and support for 
the intervention. While such vilification o f enemies is nothing new in history, it is less 
common in the realm o f humanitarian assistance in intervention, in which the enemy is 
customarily the symptom, such as famine, sickness, or homelessness, rather than the 
cause, or perceived cause.
2How did such a change in U.S. policy making and political reasoning come 
about? What was the decision making process which led to the decision to intervene, and 
to explain that intervention in humanitarian, rather than U.S. security terms? Was it the 
result o f a deliberative staff process, or that o f the influence o f a few key individuals? 
Furthermore, if  the process recommended armed humanitarian intervention in Libya, 
does it always work? How does the decision making process used in the Libya 
intervention compare with earlier cases o f armed humanitarian interventions, such as the 
Somalia intervention under Presidents George H.W. Bush, the 1998 Kosovo intervention 
under President William Clinton, and the decision o f the U.S. not to intervene in the 
Rwanda crisis o f 1994? How could some crises be shaped as U.S. national security 
problems, while others could not? Current theories on national security decision making 
and framing do not bridge the gap between the two, but it is a key aim of this study. It is 
clear that senior leader engagement, and not a bureaucratic, interagency process per se, is 
at the root o f these decisions, and that point is the hypothesis for the research which 
follows. This study will examine extant literature on the subject o f U.S. foreign policy 
interagency decision making, problem framing, and development and implementation of 
framing strategies to determine the role of the individual leader in those processes. In 
each o f the empirical case studies the research will seek to identify the decision making 
process which led firstly to the decision to intervene, and secondly to articulate that 
particular intervention in humanitarian, rather than other security terms.
The role o f leadership in determining and framing humanitarian interventions is 
rising in importance as the United States has chosen to involve itself in an increasing 
number o f such interventions in the decades since the end o f the Cold War. While the
3notion of armed intervention seems to be out o f favor at the present, this is does not 
obviate the need for research on the subject, since these sorts o f interventions also fell out 
of favor twice before, after the perceived failure of the intervention in Somalia, and the 
success of intervention in Kosovo. The value in this research is in tying together the 
major armed humanitarian interventions and non-interventions to determine 
commonalities, both in how the intervention was planned and advocated in the 
government, but also how the issues were framed to broader audiences. The 
characteristics of successful interventions appear to include a small number of inspired, 
powerful, leaders who could not only influence the decision making process but also 
public opinion in favor of their desired outcomes. When no powerful leader or 
spokesperson emerged to carry a message forward, intervention either did not take place 
or else lost support or failed.
One part o f the academic study o f international relations tends to focus on the role 
o f state actors and how they interact with each other. The idea that the unit o f analysis 
for international relations research should be the state was reasserted by Kenneth Waltz 
in 1979 into what came to be known as the Neo-Realist school. Numerous schools of 
thought have risen to dispute parts o f this approach, which basically posits that anarchy 
alone shapes state actions.1 However, the processes by which the armed humanitarian 
interventions researched in the case studies points to a significant role for actors below 
the level o f the state to influence international relations and communications, which is an 
interesting contrast to the Neo-Realist paradigm in which great powers are solely swayed 
by the need to balance against the strongest in an anarchical world. The nature o f these
1 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory o f  International Politics. Long Grove, 1L: Colombia University Press, 1979. 
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4interventions points to dynamics beyond the basic tenets o f Neo-Realism to explain, since 
two of the three interventions, regardless o f what was argued at the time, had little to do 
with threats to U.S. Security, and only one, Kosovo, threatened U.S. security 
arrangements, in the form of the NATO alliance, if not the U.S. itself.
Furthermore, this research attempts to tie framing together with decision making 
as processes, since they seem, on the surface to be linked together, and often involve the 
deciders as the chief framers o f action. In other words, this study proposes to use armed 
humanitarian interventions not just to see how the decisions are made, but how they are 
sold, and how the process o f synchronizing actions and word, or strategic 
communication, can develop into issue framing and have repercussions for the decision 
making process. These dynamics are of use across the gamut o f foreign policy decision 
making practices, and need not be limited to military actions or the use o f force.
This study utilizes a wide, cross disciplinary set of sources on the topics o f U.S 
foreign policy decision making, armed humanitarian interventions and the issue framing 
processes utilizing the intellectual frameworks developed by Graham Allison, Robert 
Entman, and others to illuminate the reviewed literature and verify the gaps in research 
that the dissertation will fill. Critical works reviewed include Allison’s “Essence of 
Decision,” Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond’s, “Rethinking A llison’s Models, ” 
Steve Yetiv’s Explaining Foreign Policy, and others; as well as the Strategic 
Communication development process with Robert Entman’s Projections o f  Power and 
Manuel Castell’s Communication Power and moving into three case studies which will 
bring both the decision process and messaging cycle into focus. The case studies were 
developed using a combination of memoirs and first person accounts o f events, selected
5studies o f events by other researchers, most particularly when underpinned by previous 
policy involvement and subsequent interviews with the participants, and through other 
sources such as polling data and journalistic accounts.
Armed humanitarian interventions have come in and out o f fashion in a cyclical 
fashion since the end o f the Cold War, hand in hand with updated concepts of human 
security and the place o f human security in a world which is still focused on the non- 
violability o f state sovereignty. The first such intervention after the Cold War, in 
Somalia, is one of the case studies examined in this study. In that intervention, combat 
troops were deployed to secure food deliveries and to ensure supply routes in Somalia, 
which was at that time an ungovemed area. Following the success o f the initial effort to 
feed Somalis, the mission was changed into a political one, o f peacemaking and nation 
building, which ultimately led to its failure in 1993. That failure led to a rethinking o f the 
concept and a temporary abeyance of militarized interventions.2
The next major armed humanitarian intervention, in 1999, took place in Kosovo 
and looked much more like traditional combat operations than had been the case in 
Somalia. The effort, undertaken exclusively by air forces, was designed to compel the 
Serbian government to stop atrocities in its province o f Kosovo, and to simultaneously 
degrade its capability to do so. While Kosovo was generally seen as a success, it was not 
seen as a model to replicate in future armed humanitarian interventions. However, the 
lessons learned from it, combined with the lessons of a failure to intervene in another 
crisis, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, dovetailed into a serious international discussion 
on the meaning of state sovereignty and the rights owed to the citizens o f a country by its 
political leadership. As after Somalia, there was a down time after Kosovo in which the
2 Weiss, Thomas. Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. 8.
6appetite o f the great powers for militarized interventions ebbed. Meanwhile the 
international community, considering Rwanda and Kosovo, developed the formal 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which specifically exhorted the world community to 
consider national sovereignty to have been abrogated in countries which waged genocidal 
warfare on portions of their populace, or acted in other ways to violate the human rights 
o f their citizens. Although the concept, which became known as R2P, was not fully 
adopted by the UN Security Council, especially in a lack o f agreement on when force 
could be used, it survived challenge in the UN General Assembly in 2009,3 and remains 
an implicit policy, becoming the measuring stick for future interventions.4
Whereas the gap between Somalia and Kosovo, approximately seven years, took 
place over the course o f a single presidency, that of William Clinton, the next armed 
humanitarian endeavor would wait twelve years. This is primarily due to the fact that 
humanitarian interventions were replaced both by conventional and unconventional 
traditional warfare following the September 11 attacks on the U.S. While the U.S. flexed 
its hyper power, R2P was working its way through the UN, and influencing key thinkers 
and former foreign policy practitioners from the Clinton era as they considered how they 
might act differently if given the opportunity.
That opportunity came in the form of a new President, Barack Obama, who 
brought the aforementioned scholars and practitioners into his government, and a new 
crisis which occurred just as one of the two major wars o f the post 9-11 world, in Iraq, 
was being wound down. Starting in late 2010, a series o f popular uprisings known as the 
Arab Spring swept across the middle east like a tidal wave stretching from Tunisia to
3 Bellamy, Alex J. G lobal Politics and the Responsibility to  Protect. New York: Routledge, 2011. 42.
4 Ibid. 162.
7Egypt and as far east as Bahrain and Yemen. There was violent repression in many of 
these countries, but when the eastern half of Libya joined in the risings in February, 2011, 
that country’s leader threatened, and began to implement what amounted to genocide 
against his own people. With the urging of regional groupings such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and the Arab League, as well as European partners, the U.S. 
initiated airstrikes in Libya with the purpose o f alleviating the suffering o f the rebel 
groups and disrupting Gaddafi efforts to attack them with his military. The U.S. slowly 
withdrew from the front lines o f the effort, turning the lead over to NATO. In spite of 
this, however, the U.S. was involved to the end, which occurred after the death of 
Gaddafi in late 2011, brutally killed in a combined coalition air attack and rebel ground 
attack on his vehicle convoy.
While the operation seemed like a success at the time, later events, most notably 
the murder o f the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other American citizens on 
September 11, 2012 cast the operation as a tragic failure.5 In similar fashion to the 
pattern which followed Somalia, the U.S. is in another out cycle in terms o f armed 
humanitarian interventions, actively choosing not to engage in one in Syria in 2013. It is 
always possible that the age of armed humanitarians is over, as the western world focuses 
on its economic woes, the U.S. moves toward conventional military engagement with the 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and the rise of China and a militarily resurgent Russia 
draw U.S. attention. However it is more likely that within the foreseeable future, another 
crisis which requires U.S. military forces to fight in defense o f human rights and security 
will occur, and it is that likelihood which makes this study more than a look back at
5 The Washington Post. “What Obama botched in Libya.” May 5, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-obama-botched-in-libya/2014/05/05/3aef7176-d47a-11 e3- 
95d3-3bcd77cd4e 1 l_story.html. Accessed May 5, 2014.
8history, but a means to help predict how such a future intervention might come to pass. 
Furthermore, there is no reasons why the findings of the research cannot be applied to 
other types o f interventions and even other fields o f government decision making.
Problem Statement
Current theories of foreign policy decision making and issue framing do not 
adequately explain the role that powerful individuals have on both processes. As Pollack 
notes, one reason for this problem lies in the preference o f political scientists to look at 
systems, governments, and other phenomena that are easily observable and quantifiable, 
as the actions of individuals most usually are not, generating an aversion against the 
possibility o f significant individual impact.6 The filter o f armed humanitarian 
interventions provides a useful prism through which to observe these processes and to 
demonstrate the centrality of the powerful individual to both of them. The two key 
research questions, then, focus on the role of the individual in the process, and whether 
that process has issue framing as a focus, or simply the reaching o f the decision to 
intervene, with framing taking place later, or separately, if  at all. To answer these 
questions, traditional foreign policy decision making models and framing models will be 
used, while a new model, the Decide/Explain model, which takes into account the role of 
the individual, decision making, and framing will be tested.
6 Pollack, Kenneth. "Let Us Now  Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." International 
Security, 2001: 107-146. 3.
9Structure
This study follows a traditional research format. After discussing the relevance of 
the study, a literature review on the subjects o f humanitarian intervention, decision 
making, and framing will define armed humanitarian intervention and set parameters for 
the research. The methodology will describe in detail the plan for examination o f the 
case studies which follow it, leading to the research findings and the conclusion. The 
case studies to be examined include those mentioned above as well as the decision not to 
intervene in Syria in 2013. In each case study the specific and world historical events 
will be provided, as well as an examination of the key players in the decision making 
process, what processes produced framing and intervention, how they reflect the models 
examined, and what implications the intervention had on future thinking on the subject, 
and future decision making efforts. The two non-interventions, Rwanda, and the review 
o f the Syria case provided in the findings section of the work, show how the decision and 
framing processes fail when there is no powerful leader pushing for presidential notice 
and approval for operations, or the ability to frame such operations to stakeholder 
audiences, namely the media and the American people.
Preliminary Results o f the Study
In reviewing the case studies, the preliminary result o f the research is that 
personality is always at the center o f the decision making process for U.S. involvement in 
armed humanitarian interventions. With the exception o f the Somalia intervention, each
10
of the interventions studied showed the influence of a powerful agent or agents who 
pushed for the cabinet, and ultimately the president, to decide on combat as a better 
means than diplomacy to solve the crisis. In the cases where this was true, Kosovo and 
Libya, the powerful agent, or actor, was the secretary of state. In both cases it was she 
who ultimately convinced the president o f the need to act. Where the cases differ, 
however, is that in the case o f Kosovo, Secretary of State Albright was at the forefront o f 
the decision making and framing efforts from the beginning. On the contrary, in the case 
o f Libya, Secretary Clinton had to be personally convinced of the need to act, and once 
she was became the decisive voice in recommending intervention to President Obama. 
The rapid onset o f the Libya crisis versus the slow unfolding o f the Kosovo intervention 
is also a significant factor in the decision making and framing processes for each, as well 
as the other case studies. The research shows that rapidly unfolding crises had 
significantly more difficult decision making and framing processes than slowly 
developing crises.
In terms of framing, the research shows that the same powerful actors who 
pressed for intervention also had a key role in framing the need for intervention to the 
American people. This was particularly true o f Secretary o f State Albright in Kosovo 
and Secretary o f State Clinton in Syria. What is less clear from the empirical data 
available is if  there were direct ties between the decision making and framing cycles, and 
if the need to construct frames to build stakeholder support for intervention was a key 
factor in any of the decision cycles examined. The only intervention which appears to 
show direct and lengthy framing, tied into the decision making process, was that in 
Kosovo in 1999, which saw systematic framing efforts over a period o f months before the
11
intervention, clearly tied in with ongoing diplomatic efforts, preparation for combat, and 
continued decision making. In the case of Libya, the reason for this is the rapid onset of 
the crisis, in Somalia because there was no solid enemy to frame against, and in a third 
case, the tragedy in Rwanda, it occurred because o f the rapidity in which the crisis 




The purpose of this review is to provide a comprehensive overview of the relevant 
literature to the topics o f U.S foreign policy decision making, armed humanitarian 
interventions and the media and issue framing processes utilizing the intellectual 
frameworks developed by Graham Allison, Steve Yetiv, Robert Entman, and Manuel 
Castells to illuminate the reviewed literature and identify the gaps in research that the 
dissertation will fill. Ultimately, the review both suggests and validates research 
questions for the dissertation, including the hypothesis and thesis statement.
The methodological approach o f the dissertation this review is intended to 
underpin is: A definition o f armed humanitarian intervention for the discussion, derived 
from an examination of the key sources in the field, including Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving 
Strangers. This is followed by an examination o f U.S. government foreign policy 
decision making processes, with examples provided by Steven Redd’s “Policy 
Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy Decision Making” and Robert 
Putnam’s “Diplomacy and the Diplomatic Process: The Logic o f Two-Level Games” as 
well as others. This continues into an examination of bureaucratic decision making 
theories, particularly those proposed by Graham Allison in Essence o f  Decision, Jonathan 
Bendor and Thomas Hammond’s, “Rethinking Allison’s Models, ” Steve Yetiv’s 
Explaining Foreign Policy, and others; as well as the strategic communication 
development process with Robert Entman’s Projections o f  Power and Manuel Castell’s
13
Communication Power and continues into three case studies which will bring both the 
decision process and messaging cycle into focus. The case studies selected reflect 
humanitarian crises which ultimately led to military intervention by the U.S., including 
Somalia in 1992, Kosovo (former Yugoslavia) in 1999, and Libya in 2011, in each case 
showing the development and implementation o f the decision making and 
communication processes, including the statements and memoires o f key involved 
persons and theoretical as well as historical records o f the relevant events. Two mini­
cases of non-intervention, in Rwanda in 1995, and Syria in 2013, are also examined to the 
same criteria in order to show processes that did not lead to armed humanitarian 
intervention.
Theme One: Armed Humanitarian Interventions
The purpose o f this portion o f the review is to determine a definition for armed 
humanitarian intervention in order to provide a baseline to the discussion o f the decision 
making and framing processes as well as the case studies. By their nature, such 
interventions seem to be what Richard Haass would call “Wars o f Choice” rather than of 
necessity, so establishing that definition will also feed into the discussion o f how wars o f 
“Choice” can be framed to build public support for them.1
Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving Strangers is a central work on the subject of 
humanitarian intervention, and with Andrea Talentino’s Military Intervention after the 
Cold War describes the major military and non military interventions o f the first decade
1 Haass, Richard N. War o f  Necessity, War o f  Choice: A Memoir o f  Two Iraq Wars. N ew  York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2009. 3.
14
of the post Cold War era, with a strong focus on the decisions to military interventions 
with an increasingly humanitarian focus; Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Kosovo.2 Both also 
discuss various reasons why the great powers failed to intervene in other humanitarian 
disasters, such as Rwanda, and the impact that has had on the development of 
humanitarianism as a cause for international action. Wheeler posited four circumstances 
in which humanitarian based violations o f sovereignty could successfully occur. First, 
grievous humanitarian harm must be evident without intervention. Second, armed force 
must be used as a last resort. Third, proportional force to objectvies must be used. 
Finally, there must be a reasonable and high chance that force will actually solve the 
problem.3 Each of these factors is assumed in the broader definition of armed 
humanitarian intervention for this study. Taken together, these two works provided a 
general background on the reasons for the various interventions, as well as the political 
debates which surrounded each individual intervention and the political idea o f armed 
and unarmed humanitarian interventions.
Taking a theoretical approach, Martha Finnemore utilized the then newly 
developed theories o f constructivism to analyze the issue o f humanitarian interventions in 
a U.S. foreign policy context. Finnemore’s point is that a definition and justification for 
humanitarian intervention cannot be found in traditional liberal and realist visions o f the 
world, but that the context under which the interventions occur. Her basic definition of 
armed humanitarian intervention is use o f the armed forces to intervene in the territory o f 
a sovereign state for purposes which are related to the human security o f the inhabitants
2 Talentino, Andrea. 2005. M ilitary Intervention after the C old War. Ohio University Press: Athens, Ohio. 
1-4.
3 Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003. 488.
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of the area but not directly to the security of the intervening power. These types of 
intervention are not new, and she traces the history of such interventions through the 19th 
and 20th centuries, noting that before the end o f the Second World War, most 
humanitarian interventions had to do with protecting Christian minorities from some act 
or another by the Ottoman Turks. This frames a discussion as to the definition o f what 
human and therefore human security means. To westerners, she argues, the definition of 
human is one that has expanded considerably over the last century, to the point that the 
definition o f humanitarian is not debated to the extent that the concepts o f legitimacy is in 
terms o f interventions.4 Finally, she notes that the armed humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia was a watershed in this wider understanding of the definition of interventions 
and sovereignty, as seen when Secretary General Boutros-Gali critiqued the United States 
for intervening in Bosnia but not Somalia, a statement which helped push the Bush 
administration to its decision to intervene militarily there later in 1992.5
Finnemore’s work helped to establish the definition for armed humanitarian 
interventions, as did “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian 
Intervention," in which Robert Pape focused on a revision o f the basic tenets of 
humanitarian intervention following the Libyan intervention as well as the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, each o f which had an element of humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief/reconstruction in spite of the fact that neither was couched in humanitarian terms.6 
Most useful to the research is Pape’s specific definition for armed humanitarian 
interventions, which he describes as “an extraordinary military remedy that temporarily
4 Finnemore, Martha. “Constructing Norms o f  Humanitarian Intervention,” ffom The Culture o f  National 
Security, Peter Katzenstein, ed. Columbia University Press: N ew York 1996, 153-185. 175.
5 Ibid. 184.
6 Pape, Robert. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f  Humanitarian Intervention." International 
Security, Summer, 2012: 41-80. 43.
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sets aside norms of state sovereignty to prevent the imminent death and permanent 
impairment of people resulting from deliberate actions by their government.”7 This is 
supported, though stated as a negative by Micah Zenko, whose work on discrete military 
operations specifically excludes humanitarian affairs missions, since they were not 
undertaken “to create casualties or cause damage.”8
Pape notes that humanitarian intervention has been most closely associated with 
acts o f genocide, which in itself became a critical issue in the aftermath o f the Second 
World War. Genocide, as defined by the 1948 convention for its prevention and 
punishment, set out its definition as acts “committed with the intent to destroy... a 
national ethnic, racial, or religious group.”9 He notes that this set too high a bar, causing 
the Rwanda and Darfur genocides to go unchallenged. On the other hand, he decries the 
current trend toward Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as setting the bar too low. While 
Pape’s proposed solution is beyond the scope of this dissertation, his work also provides 
all of the case studies with a wealth o f supporting data. Pape’s definition offered the 
most succinct, but broadly based definition for humanitarian interventions, and forms the 
core o f the definition which will be used in this study.
Stephen Wertheim offered a critique of Ambassador Samantha Power’s post 
Kosovo work A Problem from  Hell, a work with which Wertheim has significant 
difficulties. In this work, Wertheim looks at the history o f U.S. humanitarian 
interventions, with a particular focus on the post-cold war era, from 1991-2003. Key 
interventions discussed are Somalia and Kosovo, however Wertheim also delivers a
7 Pape. 44. Holzgrefe , J. L. and Keohane, Robert O. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and  
Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. 1 and 18.
8 Zenko, Micah. Between Threats and War: U.S. D iscrete M ilitary Operations in the Post-C old War 
World. Stanford Security Studies. Stanford, California: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010. 6.
9 Pape. 41.
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useful counterfactual case study o f how an intervention in Rwanda might have played out 
had the U.S. and international community felt the need to do so.10 Tellingly, Wertheim in 
no way assumes that such an intervention would have been timely or successful, and, of 
greater use to the overall argument o f the dissertation, spends some effort to show that 
there was no interest on behalf of either senior leaders, the media, or the public for such 
an intervention.
Wertheim notes that humanitarian type interventions were already part o f the 
rhetoric o f U.S. foreign policy before the end of the Cold War, but that their 
implementation afterward, with an emphasis on armed military action, became a sign 
both o f American triumphalism and a measure o f its great power status, particularly with 
the rise of the neo-conservatives in the late 1990s.11 Unsurprisingly, he notes the 
negative impact that the perceived failure in the Somalia intervention had on future 
efforts and the dampening effect it had on them for some time after, the 1994 Haiti 
intervention notwithstanding. Power became a key player in the Libya intervention, and 
her work and Wertheim’s response were necessary to build an understanding of the 
Obama administrations attitude toward armed humanitarian intervention.
In Humanitarian Intervention, from 2012, Thomas Weiss also offers a definition 
coined from Adam Roberts: “A coercive action by one or more states involving the use 
o f armed force in another state without the consent o f its authorities, and with the purpose 
o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.” 12 Further, Weiss 
offers insights into the constraints imposed on framing efforts for Somalia, Kosovo, and
10 Wertheim, Stephen. "A solution from hell: the United States and the rise o f  humanitarian intervention 
1991-2003." Journal o f  Genocide Research, 2010: 149-172. 154-155.
11 Wertheim. 150-151.
12 Weiss, Thomas. Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2012. 6.
18
Libya, particularly when the stakes in those operations rose, for example, with the 
infamous death o f eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu which brought the Somalia 
intervention to a close, and created what Weiss called a drought o f U.S. armed 
humanitarian interventions in its wake (with significant impact for Rwanda in 1994).13
Turning to international organizations and their impact on humanitarian 
intervention, Aidan Hehir discusses the history and progress o f humanitarian 
interventions, with some emphasis on how the U.S. became involved in each o f them, 
with a discussion of the major U.S. post-Cold War interventions, such as Kosovo, with a 
particular emphasis on the Libya intervention. Hehir describes the role o f key individuals 
in pushing for intervention and helping to frame it, in the case o f Libya, this includes 
Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the UN at the time.14 Furthermore, Hehir argues that the 
issue of humanitarian intervention calls for a “fundamental restructuring” o f the UN in 
order to take into account such operations and their impact on sovereignty.15
Hehir’s work dovetails into a specific discussion o f armed humanitarian 
intervention and R2P by Alex Bellamy, who argues that peace operations, in other words, 
the efforts by UN and other forces to maintain and enforce peace in war ravaged areas, 
began in the Cold War area as a “vision-less” reaction to international crises.16 As the 
author notes, however, in the Post-Cold War era, thinking at the UN and in the 
humanitarian aid community has added peace operations to those activities which 
proponents argue would ultimately lead to a so called liberal peace. A key part o f this is
13 Weiss. 8.
14 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012. 13.
15 Ibid. 11.
16 Bellamy, Alex J. "The Responsibility to Protect." In Security Studies:
An Introduction, /"  Edition , Paul D. Williams, editor. New York: Routledge, 2008. 422-437. 422.
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a significant change in the interpretation of sovereignty. In contrast to the Westphalian 
state system, a liberal peace would, according to the author, put the international 
community in charge of the sovereignty of those states it deemed to be weak or failing. 
R2P, which posits that the International Community has the right to intervene when states 
fail to protect the human security o f their people, is included in this expanded assumption 
of power. R2P was part of the foundation for, but not specifically cited as, a justification 
for the Libya intervention.
Reforms to peace operations were suggested by then Secretary General Kofi 
Annan and Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi o f the United Nations. Brahimi 
suggested that peacekeeping needed to become more robust and flexible, that more input 
from troop contributing countries was needed to ensure commonality, and that mandates 
should reflect existing capabilities, requiring, if necessary, that the same forces which 
performed peace keeping would also stay for peace enforcement operations.17 One 
product of these suggestions was the formalization of the idea o f R2P, which calls for UN 
members to intervene either to prevent serious suffering, stop genocide, war crimes, or 
crimes against humanity, or to rebuild societies which have been devastated as a result of 
such actions or failures.18 This went so far as to place the concept o f human security 
higher than that o f the nation state.19 This utopian desire, however, was not specifically 
endorsed by the UN Security Council, in part because of its implied “Responsibility to
17 Pugh, Michael. 2008. "Peace Operations." In Security Studies:
An Introduction, by Paul D. Williams, editor. New York: Routledge, 2008. 407-419. 413.
18 Pape. 51. Further tenets were that the mission must be achievable, and be as small (tailored) as possible 
in its execution.
19 The ICISS states that, after the host country, the Security Council has the primary responsibility to act.
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Prevent,” abridgements o f human security rather than simply reacting to their 
occurrence.20
Criticisms of peace operations and R2P include sensitizing peace operators to 
gender roles and human rights issues, particularly in light o f widespread abuses during 
the Yugoslav Civil War and related conflicts o f the 1990s, in which aggressors and 
peace-warriors alike were accused of violations. As noted by Pugh, in the decades since 
Somalia the UN is leaving such operations to groups of like-minded states, and staying
91clear of combat operations. Finally a proposal to use paramilitary and police forces (the 
example given is the Italian Carabinieri) into a peace operation in order to lessen the 
“war” image and militancy o f the peacekeepers is under consideration. What is unstated 
in the writings is a way to ensure that such operations neither are nor are perceived as 
simply a new way for imperial powers to get away with interventions and violations of 
the sovereignty of small states.
Definition: Based on this review o f the literature and the numerous definitions provided 
by the authors, the definition for armed humanitarian interventions for this study is: “A 
Coercive action by one or more states, in the legitimate context of an international 
organization, involving the use o f armed force in another state without the consent o f its 
authorities, and with the purpose o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the
*%>y
inhabitants.” Furthermore, “It is an extraordinary military remedy that temporarily sets 
aside norms of state sovereignty to prevent the imminent death and permanent 
impairment o f people resulting from deliberate actions by their government.”23 This





section set out to determine a definition for humanitarian interventions as a framework 
for case study selection and analysis. Each of the following sections will look at gaps, 
where they exist, in the literature in order to provide focus for the study.
Theme Two: The National Security Decision Making Process
This theme examines the specific processes used by the National Security 
Council, the wider foreign affairs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief 
communities, the intelligence community, the military, and the White House to drive 
foreign affairs decision making.24 Specific themes focus on the disparate powers of 
several key organizations; the National Security Council (NSC), the Department o f State 
(DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of 
Defense (DOD), and the Intelligence Community, to advise the president on decisions.
A valuable resource for understanding the U.S. national security interagency 
process and the NSC is provided by Whittaker, Brown, et al., in an annual report on the 
subject for the National Defense University based on interviews with relevant leaders and 
other extant scholarly work on the presidency and leadership. This document describes 
the interagency process from top to bottom, noting the various committees that comprise 
both the NSC and Homeland Security Council (HSC) from their inception to the present 
day. The authors note the composition o f the NSC and its staff, in which the leads are 
generally political appointees, but the subject matter experts are provided by the cabinet 
agencies. Based on the author’s personal experience, this system of permanent and
24 The military terms the wider government community, except for the Department o f  State and the 
intelligence community, the interagency.
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temporary staff does little to enhance interagency cooperation. A key point is the 
discussion of presidential preference in decision-making style. Presidents Eisenhower, 
Clinton, and others wished for their staffs to present them reasoned courses o f action 
based on consensus among themselves.25 Others, such as Presidents Kennedy and 
Obama, preferred to hear the direct opinions of interagency leaders, which Whittaker 
referred to as a “gladiatorial arena,” to hear the why and wherefore o f disagreements, and 
then make their decisions. This work was useful because, while not primary source 
material, it showed the history and framework of the national security decision making 
apparatus and how it grew up to serve the needs o f the various presidents.
In their 2000 contribution to Keeping the Edge regarding strengthening the 
national security process, former senior leaders John Deutsch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent 
Scowcroft discuss the current state o f the process as well as then current issues, and the 
potential for reform of the interagency decision making process. In their view, an 
ongoing process o f “information gathering, decision making, and implementation” 
underlies government operations, positing that the right organization is central for setting 
the appropriate information requirements on which to base decisions.27 A key point for 
them is the ongoing gap in training, outlook, and expectations between the two most 
significant stakeholders in the interagency process, the DOS and DOD. Further, the two 
departments (as well as the other members o f the interagency process) are highly 
dissimilarly funded, particularly in terms of short term crisis management (the three to
15 Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f  the O val Office: Profiles o f  the National Security 
Advisors and the Presidents They Served - from JFK to George W. Bush. N ew  York: Simon and Schuster, 
2009. 250.
26 Whittaker, Alan G. "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and 
Interagency System Annual Update.” Washington, DC: Industrial College o f  the Armed Forces, National 
Defense University, 2011. 10.
27 Deutsch, John. "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in Keeping the Edge, edited 
by Ashton Carter. Harvard: Kennedy School, 2000, 276-84. 269.
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five year budget cycle for most agencies precludes this), so that interagency processes 
can be difficult to implement. This concurs with Whitaker’s assessment o f the DOD as 
a greater than equal partner, with some missions that usurp the DOS’ traditional primacy 
in diplomatic affairs.29 It further reflects the seminal findings of Samuel Huntington in 
The Soldier and the State, in which he explains in great detail the factors which make the 
military officer (and the departmental ethos) stand out from other government servants 
and leaders.30 Further, none of the authors discuss the framing and support building 
processes for the decisions they make.
As noted in Donald Drechsler’s “Reconstructing the Security Process after Iraq,” 
the most famous example o f the breakdown of interagency cooperation in recent years 
was the by-design failure of the DOS and DOD to work together on post-kinetic 
operations planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, which had far reaching consequences 
since key measures in the rebuilding effort that should have been identified in planning 
were missed and had to be dealt with on the fly.31 Drechsler advocates reforms to the 
process to force the two agencies to work together more consistently as a preventative 
measure for the recurrence of such failures.
Deutsch et. al. offered three models for NSC reform to remedy these weaknesses, 
including greater centralization of control of the security apparatus in the NSC, a
28 Deutsch. 270.
29 Whittaker. 52.
30 Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  Civil-M ilitary Relations. 
Cambridge, M assachusetts: Belknap Press o f  Harvard University Press, 1957. Deutsch, Whittaker, and 
the others cited posit key differences between DOD and DOS including things like time views (DOS takes 
a long view, DOD a short term view), scope (broad for DOS, Narrow for DOD) and workload (wealth and 
manpower strength means that a DOD desk officer can often focus on problems that the cash and personnel 
strapped DoS can not.) Marcella (2004) adds differences in mindset on training (needed by DOD, not by 
DOS) and ambiguity (welcomed by DOS, disdained by DOD).
31 Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq." Journal o f  Strategic Studies, 
2007: 3-30. 6.
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regionally focused system, and the creation of a separate homeland security structure. 
They also advocated for a strengthening of the position o f CIA Director, a step which 
was, to an extent, taken with the establishment o f the Office o f the Director o f National 
Intelligence in 2005. What is interesting about this is that many of these options were 
adopted by the Bush Administration to create the HSC and the Office o f the Director of 
National Intelligence. This article and the Drechsler work serve as a background for 
understanding the decision making body, and process, of today.
One of the problems in implementing the type o f interagency reform is that noted 
by Richard Doyle for Public Administration Review in 2007. Namely, there are no hard 
and fast rules for how the interagency process is to work.32 The NSC of course has 
principles and deputies committees, but it relies on individual relationships and 
personalities to get the work done and for decisions to be reached, which brings the all of 
the differences in culture and funding back into focus. The congressional requirement for 
the executive branch to create a periodic National Security Strategy (NSS) is also 
inadequate as a function for forcing cooperation in planning issues and crisis 
management.33
Michele Flournoy, who would later become Director o f Defense Policy Planning 
under President Obama, echoed these sentiments in, Strategic Planning fo r  National 
Security: A New Project Solarium in 2006, decrying the fact that there was no formalized 
process for national security planning, even a decade and a half after the end o f the Cold
32 Doyle, Richard B. "The U.S. National Security Strategy: Policy, Process, Problems," Public 
Administration Review , 2007: 624-9. 626.
33 Ibid. 626.
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War.34 Her solutions include a requirement for a Quadrennial National Security Review 
much like those performed by the Departments o f State and Defense, a pan-government, 
inter-agency process including the intelligence community to handle issues from the 
information state to plan implementation, and a reformed budget process capable o f 
allocating funds according to the policy guidance of the president rather than the
-> c
competing department needs. This is reinforced by Marcella’s 2004 contribution to the 
Army War College’s Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy and its call for a 
dedicated National Security staff with its own incentives, professional standards, and 
rewards, as is the case in the DOD Joint Community.36 Flournoy’s call for a specified 
budget is echoed in Brook’s 2012 “Budgeting for National Security, a Whole of 
Government Approach,” in which the author argues that the whole o f the non-DOD 
portion o f the security apparatus is underfunded, even under normal conditions, and that a 
redesign or re-imagining of interagency roles and responsibilities would have to be 
accompanied by a rethinking of the budgets allocated for those activities.37
Flournoy’s recommendations were echoed in the early days o f the Obama 
Presidency by a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the specific subject of 
interagency cooperation. They add the need for the creation o f specifically collaborative 
organizations, and a workforce trained to support those organizations, to the basic 
recommendations made by other contributors to this review. A key example o f the 
failure o f agencies to align on each other is the unresolved example of the misalignment
34 Flournoy, Michelle. "Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium," Joint Force 
Quarterly, 2006: 80-6. 80.
3 Flournoy. 81.
36 Marcella, Gabriel "Chapter 17, National Security and the Interagency Process," in U.S. Army War 
College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 
2004, 239-60. 254.
37 Brook, Douglas A. "Budgeting for National Security: A Whole o f  Government Perspective," Journal o f  
Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial Management, 2012: 32-57. 37.
26
of areas o f responsibility between the DOD’s regional combatant commands and the 
DOS’s regional bureaus.38 The Fiscal Year 10 National Defense Authorization Act went 
some way toward fixing this issue, as it required the president to designate a commission 
to develop such a system.39 In the 2010 Government Accounting Office report, John 
Pendleton noted a lack o f clarity on which agency might lead what type of effort as a key 
failure o f the current system, which ties into the overall criticisms raised by Flournoy, 
Deutsch, and others in this study.40
Writing after the Vietnam War, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew O ’Meara’s Civil 
Military Conflict builds on Huntington’s analysis from The Soldier and the State, noting a 
series o f divisions between military and civilian leaders which bleeds over from a purely 
defense perspective into the national security realm. He emphasizes the very different 
training and skill sets o f the military officers, as well as a different set o f role 
expectations, claiming that the senior military leader expects, and is dismayed, when he 
finds himself out o f control, while the civilian leader is inculcated with the principle of 
tightly controlling the military.41 Further, differences in governance style between liberal 
and conservative administration can also cause significant consternation among military 
leaders, who find themselves alternately empowered or undercut depending on which 
party is in power.42 Further, modem communications allow all senior leaders, including 
civilians, unprecedented levels of access and control over the slightest minutia of
38 Pendleton, John H. "National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency 
Cooperation" Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, 2010. 7.
39 Ibid. 1.
40 Pendleton. 5.
41 O ’Meara, Andrew. “Civil Military Conflict within the Defense Structure.” Parameters, Journal o f  the 
Army War College, 1978. 85-92. 87.
42 Ibid. 88.
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operations, to include combat, a trend which is most famously seen in Vietnam, but has 
increased in pervasiveness in the decades since.43
A countervailing opinion, and one which may well reflect the realities o f the post­
cold war paradigm, is provided by Deborah Avant, who noted in “Conflicting Indicators 
o f “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations” that the 1990’s saw a swing in the 
opposite direction, toward an expansion of military roles and influence, to the point 
where military leaders are said to have negatively influenced policy. One example 
provided is that of Colin Powell’s interference in policies on the Yugoslav Civil War, 
which saw the military focusing on its desired tasks rather than the goals proposed by 
civilian leadership, and Powell actively influencing outcomes beyond the expected role of 
trusted advisor.44 Indeed, as will be seen in the case studies, the military stood, in the 
main, against each of the interventions undertaken. Avant proposes several fixes for this 
separation o f goals, primarily focused on reversing the military’s separation from civil 
society both in physical proximity and in mindset, possibly through a reinstitution o f the 
draft,
In National Security and the Interagency Process, Gabriel Marcella discusses the 
development o f the interagency national security decision making since the Second 
World War, noting its beginnings as a means to achieve total wartime mobilization.45 
According to Marcella, the NSC serves to provide information and policy advice to the 
president, manage the policy coordination process, monitor policy implementation, 
manage crises, articulate the president’s policies, perform long term strategic planning,
43 O ’Meara. 89.
44 Avant, Deborah. “Conflicting Indicators o f  “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations. Armed  
Forces and Society, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1998, 375-388. 376.
45 Marcella, 2004. 239.
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liaison with the U.S. Congress and foreign governments, and coordinate summits and 
international visits.46 With this in mind, Marcella notes that the interagency environment 
is a process, rather than a place, and embodies more than the narrowly defined mission of 
the NSC. Further, such a process, to perform optimally, must have such factors as perfect 
goal setting, complete intelligence, flawless articulation, etc., in other words, a utopian 
perfection which is impossible to achieve in the real world.47 Finally, he notes that a 
central problem with the whole process is its lack o f centrality or central control. This 
means that things work when personalities mesh, and they don’t when they don’t.48 
Marcella’s findings are mirrored in those o f “Institutionalization o f the National Security 
Staff, 1949-2001,” by Matthew Dickinson, who noted that the national security staff 
assists the president with mitigating uncertainty both in in foreign policy planning but 
also in mitigating what he calls “bargaining outcomes” including domestic politics. 
Dickinson reviewed the roles o f powerful advisors in the 1970’s, but also how the 
embarrassment of the Iran Contra Affair led to a more curtailed role for the Council 
under President George H.W. Bush, and how President Clinton expanded the NSC’s role 
to address international economic issues, but largely kept the Bush model in place.49
John Burke’s work is in agreement with the general responsibilities o f the NSC 
and interagency leaders as articulated by Marcella in his concept of the need for a Neutral 
broker in the decision making process. He focuses on the necessity for the national 
security advisor to act as an “honest broker” to make the system function effectively. 
This “managerial custodianship” requires balancing actor resources, bringing in new
46 Marcella, 2004. 243-244.
47 Ibid. 245.
48 Ibid. 253.
49 Dickinson, Matthew. “Institutionalization o f  the National Security Staff, 1949-2001.” 2003 Meeting o f  
the American Political Science Association , 38, 2003. 12.
29
advisors to advocate for unpopular decisions, making sure that there are always multiple 
channels o f information to assist presidential decision making, and monitoring the system 
as needed.50 The article discusses the development o f the national security advisor in this 
role, starting with President Truman and Eisenhower’s national security advisors, who 
focused narrowly on their duties as described above. This o f course changed with the 
appointment of Henry Kissinger, who set the bar for activist advisors. The broker, versus 
activist role has been seen with Brent Scowcroft, and to a lesser extent Sandy Berger 
among recent presidencies, and this fact bears significantly on the quality o f the decision 
making process and the outcomes of that process, something that is borne out in the case 
studies.51
Concluding the look at the NSC structure and interagency issues is the CSIS 
report “Beyond Goldwater Nichols” Clark Murdock notes successive failures to achieve 
whole of government solutions, a problem which has hindered success in intervention 
missions. He makes a series of recommendations for improvement o f the decision 
making process, including the creation of an assistant on the NSC staff with the specific 
job of integrating agency plans and strategies, mirrored by similar bodies in the relevant 
cabinet agencies. Deeper presidential review of complex operation planning procedures, 
and designation o f on the ground interagency leads for complex operations are also 
mandated, and this stands in agreement with Ross’s support o f Richard Holbrooke’s role 
in Yugoslavia discussed below.54 The general agreement among writers on the NSC and
50 Burke, John P. "The Neutral/Honest Broker in Role in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: A 
Reassessment." Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2005: 229-258. 230.
51 Ibid. 236.
52 Murdock, Clark A. Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Defense Reform fo r  a New Strategic Era Phase I 




the interagency is that the DOD is not structured or intended to go it alone in foreign 
policy planning and implementation, just as DOS and the other key members o f the 
interagency, such as the FBI, the Department o f Commerce, USAID, and others cannot 
achieve their maximum capability without working in concert.
Peter Rodman, focusing directly on the office of the presidency, generates a series 
of insights on what makes a successful presidency in terms o f foreign policy 
development. His work, based on his personal experience and interviews, is one o f the 
primary foundations for the development o f the case studies because of its broad scope 
and specific detail on relevant decision making and decision makers. Rodman’s chief 
observation is that a president must know when and where to apply his personal will to 
issues, while successfully managing his staff such that that will gets applied even when 
the president himself cannot do so.55 While Rodman casts a wide net, the most useful 
sections o f his work deal with the presidencies o f George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. 
Rodman details the workings o f each presidency, from the unified team of Bush to a 
Clinton team that was chosen in some ways to reflect the new president’s lack o f interest 
in foreign affairs, evidenced by Warren Christopher, or to prevent threats from the 
Defense Department, which lead to Les Aspin’s appointment there, since he was 
perceived to be weak.56 The work does not specifically address the Bush decision to 
enter Somalia, however, significant time is spent discussing the Clinton decision making 
process and how it bore on the decision not to intervene in Rwanda, but to do so in 
Kosovo.
55 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making o f  Foreign Policy from  
Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 140.
56 Ibid. 205 ,207 .
31
In his recent work on presidential leadership, Joseph Nye examines how a series 
o f U.S. presidents contributed to what he calls the U.S. primacy o f the 20th and 21st 
Centuries. Nye characterizes leaders as transactional or transformational, depending on 
their motives and personal styles. O f greatest interest to this dissertation is Nye’s 
description o f President George H. W. Bush as a transactional leader, so called because 
his motives were good, and he did not seek fundamental change to the world system.57 
O f value to the overall theme of the dissertation is Nye’s assessment that presidential 
leadership was, indeed, pivotal to the development o f foreign policy and the framing of 
strategic communication messages.
Based on the personality o f a given president, and the constitutional seniority of 
the various cabinet members, the interagency process can be dominated by a powerful 
cabinet member. The most recent example of this is the role that Vice President Cheney 
and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld played in the Bush administration. These types of 
relations can limit the effectiveness o f the NSC and the interagency community to get
f  o
their plans cleared through the president. In Statecraft: How to Restore Am erica’s 
Standing in the World, Dennis Ross engages in a discussion of interventions in the post- 
Cold War Era, and notes the success in Bosnia when a single trusted agent (in this case, 
Richard Holbrooke) took the lead in formulating and implementing policy.59
Supporting the “One Man” argument, Gordon Craig focuses on Kissinger’s role 
as a “great man”, moving the focus o f power and decision making down one level from 
the president to a trusted advisor. This was a unique situation, since Kissinger often
57 Nye, Joseph. Presidential Leadership and the Creation o f  the American Era. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013. 6.
58 Ibid. 29.
59 Ross, Dennis. Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World. N ew  York: Farrar,
Straus and Giraux, 2007. 135.
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operated independently from his presidential masters, but always had to reason with their 
personalities.60 Kissinger centralized the foreign policy apparatus, juggling, and, when 
necessary deceiving, both his international and domestic interlocutors, including, on 
occasion, his bosses.61 Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served Carter as Kissinger had served 
Ford and Nixon, adds weight to the discussion of foreign policy decision making. He 
emphasizes his personal relationship with President Carter, and how others, who did not 
share the same level of personal connection, were increasingly less able to get their 
opinions heard and policies implemented. This was most clearly exhibited with Secretary 
o f State Cyrus Vance, and the series o f conflicts he and Brzezinski had with each other 62 
Moreover, a system of decision making that was highly centralized in the White House 
under a dominant president created a situation in which the National Security Advisor 
was increasingly the bureaucratic beneficiary of active presidential predominance. In 
their history o f the NSC and the National Security Advisors, Ivo Daalder and I.M. Dester 
also note the unique role that one man, such as Kissinger, could play, recognizing that 
specific steps would be taken by subsequent chief executives to limit the power o f the 
National Security Advisor, or any other single person, to control events.63 They concur 
with assessments o f other relevant players such as Brent Scowcroft as completely loyal to 
George H.W. Bush,64 and Anthony Lake’s Council, per Bill Clinton’s design, as focused,
60 Craig, Gordon. The Diplomats, 1939-1979. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994., 571. “ ...h is  
mercurial yet morbidly suspicious chief. This meant accommodating him self to N ixon’s distinctly odd 
working habits; it also required unquestioning support for questionable policies.”
61 Ibid. 580.
62 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs o f  the National Security Adviser 1977-1981. New  
York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. 524.
63 Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f  the O val Office: Profiles o f  the National Security 




at least in the beginning of the administration, on de-prioritizing foreign policy,65 but 
steadily forming a decisive, problem solving partnership, especially after transitioning to 
the leadership o f Lake’s former deputy, Sandy Berger.66 In the same vein, Burke 
advocated for a return to the honest broker role for the National Security Advisor, noting 
that this choice is ultimately up to the president who makes the choice o f advisors and 
roles.67
Eugene Wittkopf and James McCormick turn our attention to the role of domestic 
factors on foreign policy decision making. In their compilation o f articles, the 
author/editors examine the sub-unit level actors who impact U.S. foreign policy, namely, 
the media, the Congress, the public, and others. The authors spend significant time 
discussing the armed humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Kosovo, reaching similar 
conclusions to the other authors cited in this review. The authors emphasize the self­
view of the U.S. as an idealistic power, how this plays out domestically, and how left 
over pressures and predilections from the Cold War era impacted U.S. interventions.68 
They also note the growing education, motivation, and understanding gap between the 
U.S. defense establishment and the civilian national security apparatus, a factor which 
has contributed to misunderstandings as borne out in the case studies. Emphasis is also 
placed, as in other cited works, on what personality traits the president brings to decision­
making, how he chooses to staff his national security apparatus, and who he chooses to 
lead it in terms o f their impact on the decision making process. This work specifically 
reinforces Robert Putnam’s view of foreign policy development as a “two-level” game in
65 Daalder. 215.
66 Ibid. 207.
67 Burke, 2005. 250.
68 Wittkopf, Eugene and McCormick, James. The Domestic Sources o f  U.S. Foreign Policy: Insights and  
Evidence. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 15.
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which the role o f different domestic political groupings exerts direct influence on, and is 
directly influenced by, foreign policy decisions.69
Literature Gaps Revealed: The most significant gap that has been revealed in the works 
reviewed is a lack o f connection between the national security decision making process 
and the process of framing the decisions resulting from it to stakeholder audiences, in 
other words, through the media and other communications tools to the American people. 
While the media are mentioned as an influencer on policy, policy as an influence on the 
media is not covered. It is this gap which the dissertation proposes to fill. While there 
are a variety o f structures in place to facilitate decision making, there appears to be no set 
mechanism or process to achieve a similarly strong level o f information dissemination to 
relevant stakeholder audiences. This can result in a lack o f support or even resistance to 
decisions o f if  and at what level to launch armed humanitarian interventions.
Theme Three: Decision Making Theories and the “Powerful Leader”
The purpose of this section is to review extant debate on rationality and the 
decision making process and drawing relevant conclusions on that process and how it fits 
in with the larger discussion on humanitarian affairs and framing. Furthermore, the 
definition of “powerful leader” in foreign policy decision making is discussed.
The foundational work on crisis decision making is Graham Allison’s Essence o f  
Decision, as updated in 1999 with Phillip Zelikow. Essence o f  Decision uses a discussion 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis as the background for a deeper analysis o f the methods used
69 Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic o f  two-level games.” International 
Organization, Volume 42, Issue 3, Summer 1998: 427-460. 434.
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by leaders to reach decisions in times of peace and crisis, although notably without 
significant attention to the issue of how the decision making and framing processes 
interact. One o f the main contributions o f Allison’s work is the Rational Actor Model 
(RAM) of government politics, decision making, and group dynamics. The RAM posits 
that actors “consider problems o f policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models 
that have significant consequences for the context o f the thought.”70 The first section of 
the work considers the definition o f rationality, as well as a discussion of the first, 
implicit conceptual model (Called the Classical Model). Its core concepts are: A ranking 
of objectives, discussion of alternatives, attachment of consequences to the alternatives, 
and a rational selection of the alternatives to act upon based on required goal completion. 
This model’s assumptions are: Unitary states are the key actors, states act rationally, 
calculating costs and benefits for actions, and that the world is a “Hobbesean Jungle,” or 
anarchic in the neorealist sense in which there is no higher authority to moderate state 
action. In such an environment, it is assumed that states will seek to increase their 
security and power.71
Further expanding on the concept o f rationality is “The Rationality o f Rational 
Choice Theory.” In this article, Stephen Quackenbusch defends rationality by noting that 
it is not a unified theory, and that a lack o f understanding o f rationality has created 
confusion as to its ultimate value, since it is actually a cover term for a series of different 
theoretical arguments.72 In order to rectify this, the author seeks to clarify instrumental 
rationality, focusing on the role o f assumptions (both provable and improvable) in
70 Allison, Graham, and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis, Second  
Edition. Longman: N ew York, 1999. 18.
71 Ibid. 37.
72 Quackenbush, Stephen. “The Rationality o f  Rational Choice Theory.” International Interactions, no.30, 
2004. 87.
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71rational decision making. He claims that assumptions should be judged by their 
usefulness rather than their veracity, and that conflating rational decision making with 
economic choices, as early analysts did, is fraught with danger, since rationality must 
encompass more than economic awards and outcomes.74 This argument on assumptions 
and rationality supports the implementation of a rational actor model, in that key 
assumptions must be made and the resultant conclusions acted upon in the decision 
making process, without normative judgment on the good or bad nature o f decisions.75 In 
other words, a decision need not be perceived to be good in order to be perceived as 
rational.
Furthering the discussion of rational decision making, Catherine C. Langlois and 
Jean-Pierre P. Langlois discuss the issues that rationality causes in behavior. The authors 
present behavior and rationality from a game theoretical standpoint, providing a series of 
examples, concluding that neither evolutionary nor classical game theoretical arguments 
are adequate to explain changes in strategic behavior.76 Their vision o f a “rational” 
strategy would utilize a combination o f strategies designed to hold opponents to a single 
pattern o f behavior while deterring them from harmful moves.77 They claim that their 
process roughly mirrors diplomatic and political discourse, because decisions can be 
made without plans being fully revealed to the other player.78 This seems to be relevant 
to the issue o f foreign policy decision making in that each party to the decision must 
engage in these thought processes in order to negotiate bases for action.
73 Quackenbush. 89.
74 Ibid. 91.
75 Ibid. 95. This instrumental rationality, or the rationality o f  rational theory as alluded to in the title.
76 Langlois, Catherine C. and Jean-Pierre. “Behavioral Issues o f  Rationality in International Interaction.” 




Returning to a discussion of Allison’s models, the second model developed is the 
Organizational Process Model (OPM), in which leaders tend to break down problems 
along organizational lines, and are therefore often limited to reacting to crises with pre­
existing plans because o f the time required to develop new plans. This conforms to Peter 
W olfs work on the American bureaucracy, which posits that role of the any federal 
bureaucracy, regardless o f its location in the hierarchy is significant in the barriers that 
can be erected to discussion, and implementation, o f any agenda, even that o f the 
president. This is well represented by the change of focus which fundamentally altered 
the calculus in the Somalia intervention.79
The third model, and the one most applicable to the interagency process as it 
applies to the Libyan intervention, is the Governmental Politics Model (GPM). In this 
model, these decisions are viewed as “outputs of large organizations functioning 
according to standards o f behavior.”80 Key here is that organizational, not individual, 
dynamics and cultures influence outcomes. Bureaucracies serve themselves first, then 
their higher authorities. Large gaps form between the choices o f leaders and the 
implementation capabilities and priorities o f subordinate organizations. Organizations do 
not easily or efficiently share information, resulting in potentially incomplete information 
for decision makers. The OPM and GPM provide a basis for enhanced explanation and 
predictions. The authors argue that their expanded models can also be used to analyze
decision making processes in extra-governmental fields such as law, economics, or 
81business. In these models even a shared goal can cause conflict because o f the differing 
views of leaders based on the points o f view of their parent organizations, personal
79 Woll, Peter. American Bureacracy. New York: Norton, 1977. 206-207.
80 Allison and Zelikow. 143.
81 Ibid. 7.
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interests, and backgrounds. In such an environment, even a paramount leader, such as the 
president, must seek consensus with his subordinates, if  for no other reason than to 
prevent misunderstandings.
Because o f these limitations, the personalities o f key leaders and their propensity 
to fight for their views or acquiesce, even to the paramount leader, are central. This is 
witnessed in the case study discussion o f the Somalia and Libya interventions, when key 
senior leaders such as the U.S. Ambassador to the UN and the Secretary o f State appear 
to have been pivotal in swaying President Obama both to intervene, and to do so under 
humanitarian auspices. The Governmental Politics Model takes the perspective that 
government behavior is not unitary at all, but made up o f a wide array of actors, each 
pulled by numerous priorities which may not be central to the issue at hand. Crucial to 
the model is the idea that “the leader’s initial preferences are rarely a sufficient guide for 
explanation or prediction.”83 Bargaining takes place amongst agencies o f varying relative 
power and interests, sometimes crippling the ability to make rational choices.
Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond take a critical look at the three major 
models postulated by Graham Allison in the first edition o f Essence o f  Decision.*4 They 
recognize the importance o f Allison’s work and its centrality to the study o f the impact of 
bureaucracy on decision making. However, it is that centrality o f importance which 
causes their concern, as they describe the models as largely descriptive rather than 
prescriptive or theoretical. Part o f their critique lies in the fact that they are writing 
nearly two decades after the release o f Essence o f  Decision, with much history, including
82 Allison and Zelikow. 7.
83 Ibid. 259.
84 Bendor, Jonathan, and Hammond, Thomas. “Rethinking A llison’s Models. ” The American Political 
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new perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, between them. It was this type of criticism 
as well as a desire to update the model that led Graham Allison to team up with Philip 
Zelikow to rewrite Essence o f  Decision in 1999.
Four typologies are developed by the authors for use in examining Allison’s three 
models. The first focuses on the number of actors. Unlike states, which are viewed as 
unitary actors, decision making groups are broken down into constituent groups.85 This 
leads to questions o f similarity o f goals, which is not guaranteed with large groups.86 
Third is the assumption that all players are rational.87 Fourth, rationality notwithstanding, 
is how informed or uninformed the actors are. The authors find the RAM to be too 
simple in its examination o f rationality. In part this is because of uncertainty on whether
o o
rational actors have just one goal or many. Another potential flaw is Allison’s seeming 
presumption that decisions taken at key points in time draw their decision cycles to an 
end. This does not pay adequate note to the ongoing impacts o f decisions, changes in 
circumstances, as seen in Somalia, and the possible need for revisits o f the same topics. 
In part, this weakness is attributed to a lack o f adequate progress in game theory as a tool 
when Allison first wrote the book.
The second model, the OPM, is described by the authors as Allison’s strongest 
work. They criticize it, however, for its core assumption that the actors making decisions 
will follow simple organizational rules or standard operating procedures.89 These rules 
include: Straight lines o f organization, programmed character, and the constraints placed 
on the number and types of choice by these rules. The authors posit that the rationality of






behavior is based on various inputs, including information. Limits on information can 
impact the quality o f the rules and the decisions made. Other limitations o f the model 
include the lack o f acknowledgement of the possible non-linear nature o f crises as well as 
the combined, complex interplay o f multiple actors and choices. In other words, events 
will be far more complex and far less linear that acknowledged by Allison.90 Further, 
operating rules and may be more numerous and complex than individual actors can 
process. Additionally, hierarchy, or how smaller decisions/influencers fit into a larger 
picture, is not recognized in Allison’s work. Furthermore, modem bureaucracies are not 
always as sluggish or staid as Allison proposed. Indeed, organizations can potentially 
bring more cognitive power to bear on issues than individuals.91 Finally, modem 
decision makers are not as uninformed as assumed (and may be quite specialized, 
although sometimes in different ways).
Critiques o f the GPM focus on whether the highest levels o f the government 
actually work in the manner supposed by Allison. The authors question if goals of 
leaders at the cabinet level are actually so disparate, and both whether and why a 
president would have to bargain with his own appointees.92 The authors posit that a 
president would try to avoid bargaining if possible, and that he would be in a paramount 
position unless his subordinates possessed sources o f information and or power/support 
outside o f the executive branch.93 It could be suggested this could be seen in action 
during the Somalia intervention decisions o f the Bush administrations, and far less so in





the Clinton and Obama interventions, with the differences explained by the unique 
personalities in play.
Concerning Allison’s use of the Cuban Missile Crisis as the empirical backdrop to 
his analytical models, the authors posit that, in spite o f Allison’s analysis, the key 
decisions in the crisis were taken by the president and a very small inner group, and were 
not the result o f bargaining or political compromise.94 The author’s claim that the GPM 
is both too complex and inadequately cognizant of the importance of hierarchy in the 
decision making process. In conclusion, the authors conclude with a final warning 
against the kind of devotion to Allison’s model that sprung up after its promulgation.
Stephen Redd and Alex Mintz expound upon the decision making models, 
introducing Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method and bias in decision making.95 
The ADA creates a decision matrix for the user, which focuses on available alternatives, 
decision dimensions, and rates each decision dimension in terms o f the implications of 
that decision. Examination o f decisions according to this rule can help do determine 
which of the processes was used, and therefore how the leader thinks or is influenced. 
This model would be very useful if  applied through systematic interviews with key 
leaders on specific decision making cycles, such as those surrounding the selected case 
studies.96
In Explaining Foreign Policy, Steve Yetiv attempts to broaden the tools 
developed by Allison by use o f a new case study, that o f the decision making process 
which surrounded the U.S. led coalition’s armed rejection of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991.
94 Bendor and Hammond. 314.
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One of his refinements o f the Allison models was a Theory o f Government Politics, by 
which key leaders acted as “pied pipers” and brought others along with them through 
persuasive power, particularly if the outlook o f and relationships among the group
07members were similar and strong. Yetiv’s model appears particularly persuasive for 
explaining the interventions in Kosovo and Libya, in which powerful actors, not always 
at the cabinet level, formulated their positions and dragged other key leaders along, 
ultimately also participating in the public framing of the issues, although this is not 
discussed explicitly. The idea of “pied pipers” provides part of the basis for the 
“powerful leaders” referenced in this study.
It must be noted, of course, that both Allison and Yetiv wrote about unique events 
which are unlikely to recur. This does not render their work merely historical, but 
implies that other theories and narratives can augment their explanatory power. One of 
these narratives is provided by Richard Haass, who, writing about his experience as a 
cabinet official in both Bush administrations, noted that there seemed to be little if  any 
discussion around the decision to begin the second Iraq War in 2002-2003. Rather, it 
appeared that the decision was made nearly unilaterally by President Bush and then
• Q fipushed to the cabinet for planning. This is in contrast to environment under which the 
decisions o f the first Gulf War were undertaken."
Moving from group dynamics to the role of the individual, Byman and Pollack 
begin their engagement o f theory by discussing why other researchers have dismissed or 
under-studied the role of the individual in international politics. The reasons given focus
97 Yetiv, Steve A. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision Making and the G u lf War. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004. 120.
98 Haass, Richard N. War o f  Necessity, War o f  Choice: A Memoir o f  Two Iraq Wars. N ew  York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2009. 6.
99 Ibid. 82-83.
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on the difficulty of crafting theories which can explain individual actions and their 
importance, something that the authors look to rectify with their own work. The authors 
significantly engage other theories, particularly realism. Given their aim, this is primarily 
done through an exposition of Ken Waltz’s seminal work Man, the State and War, and 
the three images o f analysis, man, society, and the international system as well as his 
Theory o f  International Politics.100 They acknowledge Waltz’s inclusion and explanation 
of the role of man, even if they note that Waltz’s dismissal of the role of the individual 
leaves a gap in the overall analysis. Case studies utilized to emphasize the role o f the 
individual include leaders such as Hitler, Napoleon, Saddam Hussein, and Hafez al 
Assad, and the authors take pains to demonstrate that it was their personal actions which 
were the primary drivers for decisions and events. In terms o f the selected case studies, 
less malevolent examples o f seminal leaders are the Presidents, Bush and Clinton, and 
other key leaders, such as Secretaries o f State Albright and Clinton. This emphasis on 
the role o f the individual combines with that o f Yetiv’s “pied piper” to identify the 
“powerful individual” who can sway opinion in decision making.
Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney posit that wars can begin because o f a 
transfer from a deliberate planning mode to an execution mode amongst civilian and 
military leaders.101 Once this transition takes place, it becomes significantly more 
difficult to defuse a situation, or to steer leaders to choose non-combative courses of 
action. Thus, even when peaceful options may be available, leaders stick to their chosen
100 Byman, Daniel L. and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman 
Back In." International Security 25, No. 4 (2001): 107-146. 111.
101 Johnson, Dominic, and Tierney, Dominic. “The Rubicon Theory o f  War: How the Path to Conflict 
Reaches the Point o f  No Return” International Security 36, No. 1 (2011): 7-40. 7.
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path, often toward war.102 This construct seems particularly useful for a discussion o f the 
road to intervention in Somalia.
Through this theory, the authors hope to resolve several key issues. One is 
apparent fear o f war in times of peace and limited tension contrasted with overconfidence 
in the crisis phase leading to conflict.103 A second is that leaders are the primary actors in 
international relations, and that their actions may lose rationality once an implemental 
mindset has taken hold.104 Although not the only example given, the events o f the 
summer o f 1914 and the outbreak of the First World War in Europe form a centerpiece 
for explanation and support for the theory.
Overconfidence is the first component of the argument to be analyzed. A series 
o f historical examples are given to demonstrate that the road to war (in this case the 
Second World War and the 1991 Gulf War) moved from the theoretical to the inevitable, 
feelings o f fear and uncertainty gave way to overconfidence and overestimation of 
capabilities. In the case o f the Second World War, the foreign policy establishment in 
Great Britain collectively could be described as having went through a series o f four 
psychological phases, ending in confidence that the war could be won. Similarly, 
confidence in the U.S. o f a successful outcome to the Gulf War increased as war became 
more likely through the winter o f 1990-1991. The authors hypothesize that 
overconfidence can be traced back to the closed nature o f the implemental mindset, since, 
in both cases, the only variable which changed was that o f time, here described as 
nearness to likely conflict. No important change in military capability took place in




either case. This methodology can be seen in action in all three o f the case study 
interventions.
The implemental mindset is described as unreceptive to issues or questions which 
challenge the chosen course of action.105 Information that is received tends to be 
processed in a way that it supports pre-existing plans, while an “illusion o f control” over 
events can set in.106 O f particular interest is evidence that leaders in the implementation 
mindset even dismiss personal danger and everyday risks such as illness or accidents.107 
Overconfidence and the implemental mindset are brought together as influencers on war 
perceptions. The authors posit that perceptions of war can be traced to three event types: 
Leaders can choose conflict, have it chosen for them (entrapment) or slide into war as a 
result o f uncontrollable turmoil. The “slide” to war can be furthered by the implemental 
mindset and overconfidence posited by the Rubicon Theory of War.
In conclusion, the authors note that an implementation mindset need not be 
completely negative, and state that it can endow leaders with the discipline and will to see 
operations through to completion. However, they caution against allowing such 
endowments to drift into excessive risk taking and refusal to accept information inputs 
which could defuse crises. They posit that leaders, expecting this behavior, should plan 
to both harness and mitigate its effects.108 Notably, the article does not enter into a 
discussion of the processes leaders take to frame and justify their positions during the 
crisis planning events discussed.





Rose McDermott’s Political Psychology in International Relations serves as a 
strong analytical accompaniment to Allison’s work. This book examines the various 
strains o f thought and analysis surrounding political psychology, including 
recommendations on how future research can move the field forward and make it more 
useful to political science researchers. 109 One key point o f this work is that context and 
history are crucial in understanding psychology and its impact on the decision making 
process.
McDermott focuses on theories o f politics and International Relations and their 
impacts on the study of political psychology. Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, the 
domestic policy model, the RAM, Constructivism, and the role o f individuals are 
discussed, leading into a discussion of developmental psychology. In fact, the role of 
upbringing on individual leaders is referred to several times through the course o f the 
book, with attention to specific reference to Hitler, Woodrow Wilson, Nixon, and Ghandi 
among others. Further, discussion of choice and chance, and the impact o f one on the 
other, is discussed.110 As the author notes, chance does not self-correct, in spite o f the 
commonly-held belief that it does. For example, rolling the dice repeatedly still gives the 
same chance for a given outcome as existed in the first roll, in spite o f the human mis­
perception that odds change.111
Chapter four discusses cognition and attitudes and the interaction between them. 
Attitude change, predicted in part by the number of interlocutors around the person 
making decisions, is discussed as a key part o f this process. Similarly, social rules,
109 McDermott, Rose. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor, MI: University o f  




hierarchy/authority, and norms can influence attitudes, while cognitive dissonance, or the 
ability to hold one set o f views for a considerable period while acting in a way which 
may contradict that belief. The power o f context is explained as forcing attitudes and 
drives to change, thus changing perceptions and cognition. This leads into a discussion 
o f behavior, which begins with the role o f crises and how the resultant sub-optimal or bad 
decision making. Crises can cause leaders to omit key data and objectives, fail to 
examine costs and risks, fail to find adequate information, process information
selectively, fail to reconsider previously rejected alternatives, and failure to consider
11?issues o f implementation and monitoring. International terror networks and the 
methods o f recruitment, training, and operation o f terrorists, the military, and other 
groups are examined in this light, focusing on emotion and its role in the decision making 
process. Jealousy, reciprocity, and other traits are derived from this, and can heavily 
impact decision making.
Chapters eight and nine o f the study focus on the role of the leader and the impact 
of group think, respectively. Chapter eight emphasizes the need to understand a leader’s 
history and emotional underpinnings in order to understand that leader’s motivations and
113choices. Chapter nine focuses on Irving Janis’ groupthink theory, and the ways in 
which a group can shape individual choices and learning.114 Graham Allison’s three 
models from Essence o f Decision are specifically analyzed, with the author claiming that 
the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models are not mutually exclusive o f 
one another. Weaknesses of groupthink, which align closely to the earlier discussion of 





and a feeling o f overconfidence as crucial factors, along with the power o f the group to 
coerce.115 This is borne out in the case studies, particularly with the Somalia and Kosovo 
interventions.
In “The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Jonathan and 
Stanley Renshon discuss the development of decision making processes, noting that the 
beliefs and psychological lenses with which leaders view the world will necessarily 
impact their decisions.116 The Renshons base their work on earlier studies by Alexander 
George utilizing psychoanalytic theory, noting the impact o f entry biases, time pressure, 
stress, and threat/security levels can distort or lessen the quality o f decision making. This 
is in line with other cited works, most notably the Rubicon Theory o f War. For purposes 
o f this dissertation, threat will be interpreted as political, rather than military threat, given 
the nature of the interventions to be discussed.
Literature Gaps Identified: The definition o f the powerful leader was discussed, with a 
focus on how informed and motivated leaders who can sway opinion in decision making 
and framing dominate decision making processes. The major literature gap revealed by 
this research concerns the selling of decisions to the stakeholder audience. This audience 
could include foreign countries, partisan political leadership, other key groups, but is 
primarily meant as the public. Little note is given in most o f the works examined to the 
process by which the president, a key leader, or the government convinces these 
audiences, and most particularly the public, of the need to implement the decisions made 
in the processes discussed. This leads to the question o f how intervention decisions are 
justified to stakeholders. Is there a connection between the process o f decision making
115 McDermott. 253.
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and the framing o f that decision? Is framing simultaneous with decision making, or does 
it follow the decision? Is the planning for both concurrent? This is a question which will 
be addressed in the case studies, but the evidence examined in them seems to indicate that 
all o f the aforementioned times for a discussion of framing occur depending on the nature 
of the decision and situation.
A further potential gap, as mentioned in the reviews, is very specific nature o f the 
examples selected by Allison and Yetiv for their reviews. First, the Cuban Missile crisis 
took place in an era of bi-polarity and with a level of threat (nuclear war) that does not 
currently exist, and is unlikely to return in exactly the same fashion. Yetiv’s example of 
the first Gulf War was shaped by a massive U.S. predominance in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, as well as a level o f unity and professionalism in the national 
security team. Both o f these factors are also highly time and personality dependent, and 
may be difficult to replicate. This is an important issue which must be borne in mind 
when developing the methodology of the paper and applying it to the case studies.
Theme Four: Framing Policy and Strategic Communication
Given the demonstrated nature of armed humanitarian operations as non­
threatening to the intervening state, the “War o f Choice” embarked upon must then be 
communicated to the public in such a way as to build and maintain support.117 This 
theme focuses on the methods the interagency community and the government used to 
frame and communicate their themes and messages concerning their opponents and world 
events in connection with their decisions to intervene. It is not specifically tied to the
117 Haass, 2009. 10.
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national security decision making process, and this fact allows for questions to be asked 
linking the two issues.
Robert Entman provides the primary source for the issue o f framing, focusing 
attention on the efforts o f the government to frame key events, and the media’s 
countervailing efforts to “counter-frame” them.118 The theory he develops, the Cascading 
Network Activation Model, describes the process by which frames are used “to generate 
support or opposition to a political actor or policy,” as well as how the stakeholders can 
shape the process.119 Entman uses a series of historical examples to show that the 
government is generally successful in framing when it can call on shared themes and 
ideals and get its themes in “early and often.” Yetiv also adds to this discussion by 
describing the methodology used by Bush in constructing an image o f Hussein as a new 
Hitler, and the overwhelming need to confront him rather than face a “New Munich.” 120 
Manuel Castells’ work focuses on a variety o f communications issues, noting that 
power is based on the ability to form, shape and adjust networks and messages.121 In 
chapter three, Networks of Mind and Power, the author focuses on the development and 
implementation of frames as devices for control o f communication o f messaging, 
including examples on the government media framing of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
2003.122 This section provides a central foundation for arguments on the U.S. framing of 
interventions connected with the Arab Spring. Conflicting framing agendas, as Castells 
describes, are also referenced by Glazier and Boydstun in their 2012 discussion in
118 Entman, Robert. Projections o f  Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2004. 1-3.
119 Entman. 47.
120 Yetiv. 94-95.
121 Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. 3.
122 Ibid. 165-189.
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Political Communication of the conflicting frames generated by the Bush Administration
and the media regarding the War in Iraq, in which the White House, after initial success,
1was increasingly unable to dominate the framing effort to the public.
James Fearon, in contrast, focuses on the perceptions o f the domestic political 
audience and how they can shape national security decsions. According to Fearon, 
leaders will view decisions as having varying “audience costs,” and decisions on when, 
if, and how to pay those costs will impact decsion making.124 This helps Fearon to deal 
with the question of how states choose to engage in conflict when there may appear to be 
other solutions available. The perception o f the leader making the choice, according to 
Fearon, might be that all options have been exhausted.125 Hindrances to the decision 
making process can include perception o f the time and political and economic price of 
mobilization. Questions o f national honor and political price can also come into play, 
and this is borne out in the Kosovo case study, in which it can be argued that the U.S. was 
shamed into its reaction to Serbian attrocities by a failure to act in the case o f the 
Rwandan massacres o f 1994-1995 as well as the previous events o f the Yugoslav Civil 
War.
Lawrence Freedman provides background for a discussion on how to frame 
conflicts with “On War and Choice.” The author expands the concept o f wars being of 
choice and of necessity, reaching back to medieval philosophers such as Maimonides, 
who predated the discussion with his concepts of obligatory and discretionary Wars.126
123 Glazier, Rebecca A., and Boydstun, Amber E. “The President, the Press, and the War: A Tale o f  Two 
Framing Agendas.” Political Communication, 29:428-446,2012. 428.
124 Fearon, James D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation o f  International Disputes.” The 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 88, N o 3., September 1994, 577-592. 577.
125 Ibid. 577.
126 Freedman, Lawrence “On War and Choice.” The National Interest, May/June 2010. 9.
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Freedman takes the view that a humanitarian style intervention would contradict the 
rabbinical concept that wars o f discretion, or choice, would be inherently offensive.127 
The case studies will demonstrate, however, that the rabbis were most likely correct in 
their assumption, since each of the examined studies involved offensive action for 
humanitarian goals. This argument is continued in two presentations for the American 
Political Science Association, in which John Schuessler noted that a war can be justified 
when it can be shown to be defensive in nature (or of such impact to national security that 
an offensive is required), cheap, and easy to win, and that decision makers create such 
perceptions successfully in cases where interventions take place.128 This type of 
salesmanship, according to the author, is particularly difficult for the U.S., which is an 
insular power which faces few threats o f direct attack.129
In Selling a “Just” War: Framing, Legitimacy, and U.S. Military Intervention, 
Michael Butler uses a series of case studies to examine how U.S. national authorities built 
support for both kinetic and humanitarian interventions from the end o f the Cold War to 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. While it most closely supports the Kosovo case study, the 
book provides useful insights to the concept of framing and how it is tied into the 
decision making process. This book is the only work identified in this literature review 
which implicitly ties national security decision making on the decision to intervene with 
the requirement to explain the decision to a wide variety o f audiences, in other words, to 
frame policies.
127 Freedman. 10.
128 Schuessler, John. “When Wars o f  Necessity Becom e Contested as Wars o f  Choice.” Presentation for the 
American Political Science Association, September 2-5 2004. 2.
129 Schuessler, John. “Necessity or Choice? Securing Public Consent For War.” Presentation for the 
Midwest Political Science Association, April 15, 2004. 9.
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For Butler, the crux o f the argument reaches back to just war theories, and the 
ways in which interventions can be framed to play to the core liberal underpinnings of 
U.S. philosophy and foreign policy. Framing an action as just, righting a wrong, or 
protecting the innocent are all tactics that were used in framing the Kosovo crisis as well 
as the other interventions in the case studies. For frames to work, they must be credible, 
salient, and dynamic, and the Kosovo intervention is examined as a series of presidential 
speech actions emphasizing all o f these points.130
Admiral James Stavridis, a noted military advocate o f and expert on Strategic 
Communication (SC), adopts a military approach, noting its power as an enabler for 
operational forces.131 He acknowledged the role o f the national security apparatus and 
entreated leaders to “take an early and persistent role in deciding how ideas and decisions 
are shaped and delivered.132 For Stavridis this need required a shared understanding of 
what SC is and is not, particularly in an international context.133 This is re-enforced by 
Joseph Nye, who in Soft Power, warned that “A communications strategy cannot work if 
it cuts against the grain o f policy,” reiterating the need for coordination of messaging at 
the highest levels.134 Further discussion is provided by Christopher Paul’s Strategic 
Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates from 2011 in which he notes 
that a successful framing or communication strategy calls for synchronizing messages
130 Butler, Michael J. Selling a "Just" War: Framing, Legitimacy, and U.S. M ilitary Intervention. New  
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 156.
131 Stavridis, James G. "Strategic Communication and National Security." Joint Force Quarterly, 2007: 4- 
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with deeds. Mari Eder also echoes this entreaty in Leading the Narrative, the Case fo r  
Strategic Communication.136
In a Strategy Research Project for the Army War College, Colonel Jeryl 
Ludowese examined the interagency process, specifically as it related to SC, and offered 
several relevant recommendations and solutions. He notes that the U.S. Department of 
State sits at the pinnacle o f the SC Project, but echoed the opinions o f other contributors 
to this review, namely that a common understanding o f the term must come before 
meaningful collaboration is possible.137 His recommendation is for some form of return 
to something like the U.S. Information Agency to sit at the pinnacle o f the Interagency 
SC process for all government communications efforts outside the U.S., and be led by a
i
government wide “Director of Strategic Communications.”
Jeff Motter describes the framing of the U.S. relief effort which followed the 2004 
tsunami in Indonesia, noting the Samaritan, exceptional ist identity attributed to the effort 
by the White House.139 For Motter, the case exhibits a wider U.S. effort to identify with 
Muslim populations both in Indonesia and elsewhere, such as President Clinton’s 
comments on U.S. actions in Kosovo and Bosnia as primarily protective of Muslims. 
Continuing the discussion of the tsunami relief effort, Jaime Alvarado’s "New 
Multilateralism in Action for Peace: A Case Study of the US - led Operation Unified 
Assistance in the Asian Tsunami Disaster," describes the functioning of the U.S. led
135 Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Santa Barbara, 
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
136 Eder, Mari. Leading the Narrative, the Case fo r  Strategic Communication. Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press. 2011. 29-31.
137 Ludowese, Jeryl C. "Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War o f  Ideas?" Carlisle,
PA, U.S. Army War College, 2006. 3.
138 Ludowese. 22.
139 Motter, Jeff. "American Exceptionalism and the Rhetoric o f  Humanitarian Militarism: The Case o f  the 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami R elief Effort." Communication Studies, 2010: 507-525. 509.
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international relief effort for Indonesia in light of U.S. efforts to foster security 
cooperation in Asia following the September 11 terrorist attacks on US soil.140 The relief 
effort is described as an overtly hegemonic act aimed at demonstrating that that the U.S. 
was benevolent and could be a valued long term partner for countries in the region.141
Returning to the impact of the media, Babak Bahador examines two factors in 
relations to the U.S. Intervention in Kosovo. The first is the occurrence o f five event 
spikes which inspired significant upticks in media coverage o f the crisis. The second are 
five political events, and Bahador demonstrates the connections between the two sets of 
events, noting that in four out of five cases, it was the media which built the frame for 
intervention. In only one case did the government appear to build such a frame. 
Bahador's purpose is to discuss the “CNN effect,” an argument that the media can 
successfully own the debate on issues through the display of unexpected, shocking 
images which were used by the media to show shortcomings in administration policy 
toward the Kosovo issue and the government o f Serbia.142 Interestingly, the one obvious 
instance o f government framing dominance over the mainstream media networks was 
during Operation “Determined Falcon,” a series o f exercises involving NATO air assets 
in June 1998. This overt act successfully led the debate on the Kosovo issue while it was 
underway.143
Continuing the media discussion, Adam Berinsky and Donald Kinder focused on 
the Kosovo crisis and framing article addressing framing and the American public's
140 Alvarado, Jaime. "New Multilateralism in Action for Peace: A Case Study o f  the US-led Operation 
Unified Assistance in the Asian Tsunami Disaster." G lobal Economic Review, 2007: 183-192. 184-186.
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perception o f government policies and foreign policy.144 The authors quote Gamson and 
Modigliani, who describe a frame as “A central organizing idea or story line that provides 
meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame 
suggests what the controversy is about, the essence o f the issue.145 They also note 
Entman's theory the media have taken on an increasingly independent framing role since 
the end o f the Cold War bi-polar situation.146 These conclusions are based on an 
experiment performed by the authors in which audiences were exposed to a series of 
controlled news articles on Kosovo, with the end result that readers took on the point of 
view that was fed to them in purposefully tailored news stories.
Literature Gaps Revealed: One gap is an explanation for the frequent disconnect between 
U.S. public opinion and that of policy makers and framers. The communication process 
at the national level is also little discussed, as most o f the literature is focused on the 
media as a receiver rather than how the government and elites act as providers of 
information. This study bridges this gap by providing a theory o f the government 
communication process and how the foreign policy community interacts with its 
stakeholder audiences. Butler is the only identified source who implicitly ties in the 
decision making process to the framing or explanation process to try to build a coherent 
picture o f the whole of the process.
While downward information flow is a gap, upward pressure also requires further 
explanation. While the role o f media as receiver is heavily covered in the literature, its
144 Berinsky, Adam J. and Kinder, Donald R. “Making Sense o f  the Issues Through Media Frames: 
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own role in driving foreign policy action is not a focus o f the sources reviewed. That role 
fits into the decision making process as a whole, not the communication process, and will 
be discussed in that light in the methodology and case studies.
Theme Five: The Case Studies -  Somalia, Kosovo, Libya -  and the Non-Interventions in
Rwanda and Syria
The purpose o f this section o f the literature review is to examine key works on 
each o f the case studies to determine what gaps may exist in the writing, and how each 
can shed light on the question of if  and how the strategic decision making process is 
linked to the framing process for armed humanitarian interventions. The case studies are 
based on primary source documents, including media articles and programs, polls, 
memoirs, and testimony. The sources examined in the study include some o f those 
materials as well as analytic works which bring focus to the events examined.
David Halberstam examines the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations 
with a focus on how each reacted to foreign policy issues. He discusses the Bush 
decision to intervene in Somalia and the resultant debacle which followed. He traced the 
development o f humanitarian interventions which began shortly thereafter with Haiti and 
culminated with the Kosovo intervention of 1999. The author detailed the development 
o f the Clinton foreign policy, which was primarily an adjunct to domestic political 
concerns and an effort to capitalize on the so called “peace dividend” following the end 
o f the Cold War.147 Halberstam’s analysis is augmented by that o f William Hyland, who 
focused on Clinton’s political personality, which was primarily domestic focused, and
147 Halberstam, David. War in a Time o f  Peace. New York: Scribner, 2001. 231.
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how that focus played out in foreign policy.148 Conflicts with senior military leadership 
as discussed in theme two, and a relatively hands off Secretary o f State (Warren 
Christopher) plus a prediliction to take events personally and apply an often innapropriate 
domestic political frame were hallmarks o f the administration.
David Phillips provides a useful overview both of the U.S. decision to intervene 
in Kosovo and the interventions which both preceeded and followed it, namely Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Libya. Primarily focused on Kosovo, the book discusses the lead up to the 
Yugoslav Civil War as well as the role of key personalities in pushing for the 
intervention, most notably Madelaine Albright, General Wesley Clark, and Richard 
Holbrooke. This fits with an overall discussion o f the key role o f individuals in forcing 
key decisions to be made. Further, Phillips disucces the impact o f the Somalia 
intervention and the failure to intervene in Rwanda in terms o f the increased pressure that 
placed on the Clinton administration to act in Kosovo.149 Finally, the author establishes 
a rubric for armed humanitarian intervention, positing that there are only a set of 
definable circumstances under which such interventions should occur. He then applies 
that criteria to the Libya intervention to describe how and why the Obama adminstration 
intervened there.
In Waging Modern War, Wesley Clark discusses the development o f the 
humanitarian crisis in the former Yugoslavia, tracing the change in the crisis as time went 
on. While the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was portrayed primarily in security 
terms this changed when Serbia cracked down on the province o f Albania.150 Clark led
148 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. London: Praeger Books, 1999. 
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the NATO response which resulted from the successful framing of the operation in 
humanitarian terms. Madelaine Albright’s Madame Secretary and Richard Holbrooke’s 
To End A War detail their own personal roles in the Somalia and Kosovo humanitarian 
crises, supporting the argument that powerful spokespersons and strong individual 
leaders can both sway the foreign policy process but can also impact the implementation 
and positive framing of armed humanitarian interventions.
In his second autobiography, Secretary o f Defense Robert Gates discusses his 
career, with a focus on his tenure as Secretary o f Defense during the administrations of 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. He provides significant insight into the National 
Security decision making process which is in line with other authors in this review. He 
notes, however, that the Obama White House had a very strong tendency to concentrate 
power at its center rather than distributing decision making and authority outwards.151 He 
goes on to note that this is a trend with antecedents to the Truman administration, 
although that in the Obama White House it reached its peak to-date both in terms of 
power concentration and in military micro management.152 While his autobiography 
focuses on decisions regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, he also notes his strong 
resistance to the intervention in Libya due to a combination o f his perceptions that the 
American people were war-weary and that Libya posed no significant security threat to 
the United States.153 While Secretary Gates did spend significant time on his dealings 
with Congress, and discusses war weariness as a problem, there is little mention made of 
the process o f explaining his department’s decisions to the American people, particularly




with decisions such as the Libyan intervention, and this leaves room for the proposed 
research contribution o f this dissertation.
Nikolas Gvosdev directly examines the use o f humanitarian themes in the Libyan 
intervention as well as the decision making process which led to the decision. He argues 
that there was “little effort to portray twenty-first century Libya as a looming security 
threat to the United States.”154 For them, the administration’s embracing o f humanitarian 
issues as the primary cause for intervention is a significant turn away from traditional 
national security motives.155 In fact, significant administration leaders loudly noted the 
lack of security interest even while the intervention was taking place. This implies a 
serious disconnect amongst the key interagency foreign policy decision makers. 
However, in citing the U.S. reaction to humanitarian crackdowns in Bahrain and 
elsewhere, he does acknowledge that neorealist themes (especially oil resources) still 
resonate,156 a point which would become more apparent when the Obama administration 
attempted to justify an intervention in Syria in 2013. Gvosdev notes that the 
administration elected to portray the threat Gaddafi posed to his own citizens as the 
primary justification for intervention.157 The Kosovo intervention, in particular, was, by 
contrast, framed both in security and humanitarian terms. In fact, for Gvosdev, it is the 
Kosovo intervention which marked the watershed between security focused framing and 
humanitarian focused efforts.158 Gvosdev considers this fundamental switch to be a
move toward increased Wilsonianism and away from realism in U.S. foreign policy 159







Taking a different tack, Pierre Atlas contributed “U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests ” for the Digest o f  Middle East Studies. 
This 2012 work claims that the contraction o f decision cycles caused by the rapid press of 
events in the spring o f 2011 was impossible for policy makers to adapt to.160 The result 
was significant discord between the common threads o f U.S. policy, idealism and 
realism, and a series of decisions made with short term goals in mind161 Ironically, 
according to Atlas, it is the move toward an idealistic approach to Egypt and Syria, rather 
than the realist approach to Syria and Bahrain, which is in discord with traditional U.S. 
approaches in the region. Atlas uses three key speeches by President Obama on the 
Middle East and the Arab Spring to show how far along the idealist path the 
administration has become. The vacillation between realism and idealism is also noted in 
Pinto’s Mapping the Obama Administration’s response to the Arab Spring, which notes 
that the administration eventually came around to the idea that a different policy would 
be needed for each Arab country, and that a one size fits all approach would not work.163
Atlas noted a continuing bi-polar struggle in U.S. foreign policy, between the 
realists and the idealists. This theme recurs throughout the literature, and is most clearly 
revealed by two separate cases, the Libyan armed humanitarian intervention, and the hard 
handed approach the administration took to the spread o f the Arab Spring to Bahrain.164 
In that case the administration gave Saudi Arabia the green light to intervene and 
crackdown on dissent. The authors point out that the inclusion of an idealistic strain into
160 Atlas, Pierre M. "U.S. Foreign policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests." D igest o f  
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U.S. dealings with the Middle East is the incongruity, and represents an ideational change 
in U.S. policy toward the region.
In Exit Gaddafi, Ethan Chorin describes the message development process for the 
U.S. and its foundational claim that Gaddafi was a bloody tyrant who was about to launch 
a massacre on a dissenting part o f his population. The discussion drew heavily on the 
overall UN opinion that Libya’s failure to protect its people was a failure o f its 
sovereignty that could only be rectified by the international community. In her speech of 
March 2, 2011, Secretary Clinton noted her concern of “ ...Libya descending into chaos 
and becoming another Somalia.” 165
Chorin describes the internal gamut in U.S. interagency leadership statements as 
shown by the gulf between the statements o f the White House and the Department of 
Defense as well as a bipartisan group in the NSC, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives who spoke out against the intervention, with oil being a key issue on 
both sides o f the debate. Pro-interventionists noted the threat to Europe’s oil resources 
and the loss of investment opportunities.166 Chorin noted that the interagency conflict 
between the Departments o f State and Defense was a deadlock, as a result o f which the 
will and the plan for Libyan intervention would have to be constructed by powerful 
spokespersons who could trump the bureaucracies, specifically discussing how Secretary 
o f State Clinton became that person.167 The president was convinced over a three day
165 Clinton, Hillary R. “Clinton: U.S. Worried about Libya becoming ‘Giant Somalia.’” Deutsche Press- 
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period to switch his personal effort toward intervention. This hastened the passing of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 within weeks and facilitated the U.S. 
intervention, in contrast with similar efforts which took months to construct, such as the 
Kosovo intervention o f the 1990s.168
Chorin and Bruce Jones, who provided “Libya and the Responsibilities of Power” 
for Survival in 2011, note how the concept o f R2P was invoked in Libya by Washington 
insiders who believed that “The will to humanitarian intervention, destroyed by Bush 
administration actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, must be rebuilt.” Secretary o f State 
Clinton and Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice bore the burden o f selling R2P to the rest 
o f the world as a justification for intervention.169 The two were joined, significantly, by 
NSC Directors Samantha Power and Gayle Smith. Their collaboration seems to be a 
successful example o f interagency cooperation, as they joined Rice and Clinton as the 
leading government hawks on intervention, convincing others to fall into line both by 
appealing to humanitarianism and by noting the benefits that intervention would provide 
to U.S. standing in the Arab world, according to Chorin.170
Mir Sadat examines the overall U.S. approach toward the Syrian revolution and 
potential interventions there. It progresses in a similar fashion to the Atlas article, but 
with a direct focus on the situation in Syria and developing U.S. responses to it. The 
article points out the significantly different operational, strategic, and diplomatic 
environment in Syria as compared with Libya and Egypt, which had completely different 
historical relations with the U.S., and did not have great power support (in the form of
168 Jones, Bruce. "Libya and the Responsibilities o f  Power.” Survival, May: 2011. 53.
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Russia) in the sense that Syria does.171 The authors concur with other contributors in that 
the U.S. has been forced to modify its approach toward each o f the different countries 
impacted by the Arab Spring. Overall, the article recommends diplomatic versus military 
approaches to the problem.
Maria Pinto echoes others in this examination o f the U.S. response to the Arab 
Spring, with a focus on the civil war/revolution in Syria. The U.S. is described as 
ambivalent and reflective o f an overall decline in U.S. power and status in the Middle 
East, and by inference, worldwide. Comparisons and criticisms are made o f the 
ambivalent policies o f the U.S. in Egypt and Syria versus the forceful and violent stance 
taken in Libya. According to the author, the U.S. was forced to realize that a regional, or 
general solution would not work, and that responses to the Arab Spring events would 
have to be done on a country by country basis. This article will be useful in helping to 
explain the variance in U.S. responses to the Arab Spring events. Finally, Emily Parker 
addresses one o f the fundamental issues o f this study, namely, why was the 
administration unable to secure an intervention for Syria when it had previously in
I 7TLibya? Several reasons are given, including the different strategic situation as well as 
the simple fact o f “war fatigue” in a country which is still bogged down in several wars at 
the time o f writing.
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The Review in Review
This literature review brought together a disparate set o f criteria and arguments 
about the decision making process, framing, strategic communication, and the definition 
o f humanitarian intervention. The works have been linked to each other by theme, and 
organized in support o f an interagency examination using the Allison/Yetiv/Brendon 
models to determine when, if, and how the interagency decision making process was 
effective, and, if  not, why. This was combined with an effort to understand issue framing 
and how armed humanitarian interventions were sold to critical stakeholders, such as the 
U.S. public. Extant literature on the interagency strategic communications process was 
examined, with particular emphasis on the efforts o f very senior leaders to sway the 
process. This research also explained the interagency strategic communications process 
and how interagency discussions are used to frame issues for public and international 
consumption.
The result o f this effort is there are few direct observable ties between the 
decision making process and the framing effort in the literature. There are significant 
conflicts between key interagency institutions and leaders which make consistent 
planning and messaging difficult. This appears to enable powerful personalities to make 
their wishes realities in terms of crafting responses to crises. Inferred, however, is the 
difficulty in synchronizing messages, or making “actions and deeds match” in such a 
decision making environment. The case studies, and particularly the primary source 
materials which comprise them are intended to help bridge this gap in knowledge, as will 





The purpose of this research is to examine the decision making and framing 
processes for armed humanitarian interventions by the United States of America in the 
post-cold war era to determine the impact of powerful individual leaders on both. As 
noted in the introduction the study will apply a series o f questions to determine this, 
including: How did such a change in U.S. policy making and political reasoning come 
about? What was the decision making process which led to the decision to intervene, and 
to explain that intervention in humanitarian, rather than U.S. security terms? Was it the 
result o f a deliberative staff process, or that o f the influence o f a few key individuals? 
Furthermore, if  the process recommended armed humanitarian intervention in some 
cases, does it always work? How does the decision making process used in each of the 
selected case studies of armed humanitarian interventions, such as the Somalia 
intervention under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton, the 1998 Kosovo 
intervention, and the 2012 Libya intervention by U.S. forces compare with the others and 
with cases in which no intervention was undertaken? Furthermore, why did some efforts 
to frame interventions through a framing or strategic communications process succeed 
while others failed? And were those processes o f deciding and framing linked?
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As noted in the introduction, the hypothesis for the study is that armed 
humanitarian interventions occur when a powerful leader or small group of leaders 
dominates the decision making and framing process to force and explain such an 
intervention. In each of the empirical case studies we will seek to identify the decision 
making process which led firstly to the decision to intervene, and secondly to articulate 
that particular armed intervention in humanitarian, rather than other security terms. 
Research questions for each o f the case studies are firstly, was the decision to intervene 
the outcome of a deliberative staff process, or that o f the influence of a few key 
individuals? Drawing on the theoretical frameworks provided by Allison and others, 
such as the models o f governmental politics as discussed in Essence o f  Decision as well 
as theories o f framing and strategic communication as discussed by Entman in 
Projections o f  Power, the study will seek to confirm the hypothesis that strong individual 
leaders build consensus for, and frame, armed humanitarian intervention efforts.
Results o f the Literature Review, a Summary
The literature review sought to identify, consider and bring together a disparate 
set o f criterion and arguments about the decision making process, framing, strategic 
communications, and the definition o f armed humanitarian intervention. The reviewed 
works were linked to each other by theme, and organized in support o f an examination to 
determine when, if, and how the interagency decision making process was effective, and, 
if  not, what factors caused the differences for each situation as well as an effort to define 
media and communication framing and how armed humanitarian interventions were
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framed and marketed to critical stakeholders to generate support for intervention. Extant 
literature on the interagency strategic communications process was examined, with 
particular emphasis on the efforts o f very senior leaders to sway the process.
The review highlighted the fact that there is little direct tie between the decision 
making process and specific framing efforts. There are significant conflicts between key 
interagency institutions and leaders which make consistent planning and messaging 
difficult. This appears to enable powerful personalities to make their wishes realities in 
terms o f crafting responses to crises. Inferred, however, is the difficulty in synchronizing 
messages, or making “actions and deeds match” in such a decision-making environment. 
With this in mind, one major task for the dissertation is to help to fill that literature gap 
through the use of case studies on key interventions, as discussed below.
Overview o f Approach
The emphasis o f the research will be on a qualitative study based on primary sources, 
books, articles, public sources, and, where possible, on primary, on the record interviews. 
The methodology o f the dissertation is as follows: An examination o f U.S. government 
interagency foreign policy decision making processes, as well as the framing 
development process; continuing into an examination o f bureaucratic decision making 
theories, particularly those proposed by Allison in Essence o f  Decision; and moving into 
case studies which will bring the decision process and messaging cycle into focus.
The research methods used for this dissertation are primarily qualitative in nature, 
relying on analysis o f case studies for analysis due to the small number o f cases and the
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nature of the data to be analyzed in order to ascertain the impact o f key leader actions on 
the decision making and framing processes. During the course o f the literature review, 
the author looked for the ways in which each author sought to engage the extant literature 
and theories to the work, as well as the purpose of the work and the approach taken to 
achieve that purpose. The design and findings o f each study was examined as well as the 
methods, and instruments used in analysis.
Definitions
Common definitions of key terms such as armed humanitarian intervention and 
strategic communication and framing are necessary in order to narrow the focus of the 
research and provide a common framework for discussion in the context o f this research 
project:
A: Armed humanitarian intervention, as defined in the extant literature, refers to “A
coercive action by one or more states, in the legitimate context o f an international 
organization, involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its 
authorities, and with the purpose o f preventing widespread suffering or death among the 
inhabitants.”1 This could take the form o f the use o f armed forces to enter a sovereign 
territory for the purpose of protection of the human security of the inhabitants. It could 
also be to provide relief after a natural disaster or to protect one part o f a populace from 
another, or from the government o f the territory in question. The author’s addition is that 
wide scale combat operations must be associated with the intervention for it to qualify.
1 Pape, Robert A. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f  Humanitarian Intervention." International 
Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 41-80. 44.
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For example, the Haiti intervention of 1994, while involving forced entry by combat 
forces, did not result in significant combat operations, and varied only in small ways from 
the later 2010 earthquake intervention in the same country.2
B: Framing and strategic communication refer to the processes by which policy
makers explain their actions and build credibility for decisions with their various 
stakeholder groups, but, with a focus for this project on three key groups, Congress, the 
Media, and the American people. Building from the military doctrinal definition of 
strategic communication (since 2013, the term has been changed to Communication 
Synchronization), it is defined as ensuring that words and deeds match, and that cross
•5
government messaging is fully coordinated. Framing is based on Entman’s “Cascading 
Network Association Theory”.4 Since the government remains the primary source for 
information, this creates a system of asymmetric interdependence, but this can only be 
taken advantage o f if  there is unanimity in the message. Further, conflicting frames can 
be provided not only by the media, but by the party out of power and a variety of other 
formal and informal actors.
C: The “Powerful” or “Dominant” individual is someone whom Byman and Pollack
would call a “Statesman.” While the president sits at the peak o f the decision making 
apparatus, and his power is undisputed, the term powerful or dominant, for purposes o f 
this study, refers to a member or group of members o f the decision making process who 
are A: Politically powerful, either because of their position in the cabinet, or other
2 U.S. Department o f  State Office o f  the Historian. “Intervention in Haiti, 1994-1995.” 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti. Accessed on 29 July 2014 at 0942.
3 Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Santa Barbara, 
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
4 Entman, Robert M. Projections o f  Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2004. 9-13.
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unique access to the president; B: Are sufficiently motivated by a particular cause to use 
their position to overcome the resistance o f other members o f the decision making 
apparatus to convince the president o f the need to act; and C: Able to participate in 
framing efforts to build support among the wider stakeholder audience for decisions.5 
Yetiv notes that what he calls “Great Men” are a useful, but simplistic tool for analysis, 
and this study acknowledges that and seeks to place the role o f these individuals into an 
overall decision making context.6
D: Foreign policy decision making: This includes planning and decision making by
the senior most levels o f the U.S. Government. For purposes o f this research, it refers to 
the President o f the United States, the members o f the NSC, most important being the 
National Security Advisor, the Secretaries o f State and Defense, and the Director of 
National Intelligence (or his predecessor, the Director o f Central Intelligence) and other 
lead agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development. It also includes 
key Congressional leaders and the leaders of subordinate organizations such as the U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations, Ambassadors abroad, and military Geographic Combatant 
Commanders (GCCs). As provided by Graham Allison in Essence o f  Decision, two 
primary foreign policy and decision making concepts will be used to develop arguments 
on the role o f the individual in decision making, and the resultant framing of 
interventions:
5 Byman, Daniel L. and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman 
Back In." International Security 25, No. 4 (2001): 107-146. 134.
6 Yetiv. 233.
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1. Rational Actor Model (RAM): Under the RAM, government actors assign values 
to their various courses o f action, and pick the action that had the highest utility or 
payoff.7
2. Governmental Politics Model (GPM): In the GPM, a nation's actions are best 
understood through the prism of the personal politics and negotiations o f key 
leaders. In this model even a shared goal can cause conflict because of the 
differing views of leaders based on the points o f view of their parent 
organizations, personal interests, and backgrounds. In such an environment, even 
a paramount leader, such as the president, must seek consensus with his 
subordinates, if for no other reason than to prevent misunderstandings.8 This 
invites a discussion of the role o f transformational and transactional leaders into 
the discussion o f decision making.
Description o f Data Collection Tools and Study Procedure
As stated in the introduction, the challenge for this study is to demonstrate the impact that 
individual leaders have, or do not have, on the processes o f decision making and framing 
as it pertains to U.S. armed humanitarian interventions. The literature review covered the 
key sources to be used for analysis. The research will consist o f a qualitative study of 
those sources with emphasis placed on document studies, such as books, articles, public 
sources; and primary sources, including on the record interviews if possible as well as 
memoirs, first-hand accounts, and original reports. A review will be undertaken on the
7 Allison, Graham, and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second  
Edition. (Longman: New York, 1999). 19-21.
8 Ibid. 255-258.
73
impact o f public statements on the decision making process to determine the impact of 
framing efforts on the decision making process and vice versa.
Statistics: This study will rely on prolonged engagement and triangulation of 
sources in addition to positive and negative case analysis to ensure academic rigor o f this 
research. The stress is on a deep investigation of the cases, or purposive/specific 
sampling rather than random sampling. This is due to the small number o f cases to be 
examined (Five cases, three interventions and two non-interventions address the 
requirements mentioned previously). With this in mind, a deep dive, or saturation, o f a 
small number of specific cases is more appropriate to the research.9 Each case will also 
be subjected to a negative analysis in which reexamination o f each case will attempt to 
determine if the themes which emerged from later cases apply to all o f them. Due to the 
nature o f the data and the limited number of cases, quantitative statistical analysis was 
not undertaken. The level o f rigor involved ensures that the results o f the research will be 
transferable to other groups o f cases in which similar events and decisions occur. An 
attempt will be made to identify, however tentatively, some of these cases.
Data collection: As previously described, data collection consists o f primary 
source documents, books, peer reviewed articles, relevant media articles, and where 
appropriate and possible, interviews with subject matter experts (non-participant 
observation of conditions and processes relevant to the study) and participants in decision 
making. Archival research included both electronic and hard-copy issues of relevant 
journals, newspapers and other media and similar documents. There is a potential for
9 Padgett, D. K. Qualitative methods in social work research: Challenges and rewards. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1998. 52.
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incomplete records, recollections, and gaps in knowledge, however, the literature review 
the depth o f research, and application o f critical thinking are designed to remove that risk.
Intellectual Models and Frameworks
The following models will be used to test the case studies to determine the validity o f the 
decision making and framing processes while examining the role o f the individual in 
these processes:
Graham Allison's Refined Models
Graham Allison contributed two models for decision making which are most relevant to 
the research and were used to test the case studies. Allison’s work relies on the Rational 
Actor Model (RAM) of government politics, decision making, and group dynamics.10 
The RAM posits that actors consider problems o f policy in terms o f largely implicit 
conceptual models that have significant consequences for the context o f the thought. Its 
core concepts include: The ranking o f objectives, discussion o f alternatives, attachment 
of consequences to the alternatives, and a rational selection o f the alternatives to act upon 
based on required goal completion.11 Under the RAM, it is assumed that other world and 
domestic actors will follow the same rational system of decision making.12 Further 
assumptions include the primacy of unitary states as actors, and the perception of the
10 Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vol. 2. 
New York: Longman, 1999. 13-16.
11 Ibid.
12 Bradford, Jeffrey Peter, “Political Aspects o f  Strategic Decision Making in British Defence Policy.” PhD 
Thesis, Cranfield University, Royal Military College o f  Shrivenham, 1999. 9.
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international environment as a self-help based “Hobbesean jungle,” or anarchic world
11with no higher authority to moderate state action. In such an environment, it is assumed 
that states will seek to act increase their security and power.
The second model to be used, underscored by rationality and the precepts o f the 
RAM, is the Government Politics Model (GPM). In this model decisions are viewed as 
“outputs o f large organizations functioning according to standards o f behavior.”14 In this 
model, outcomes will be influenced by organizational, not individual, dynamics and 
cultures.15 The various bureaucracies which make up the decision making process serve 
themselves first, then their higher authorities, which can cause the creation o f gaps 
between the choices of leaders and the implementation capabilities and priorities of 
subordinate organizations.16 Information is not easily or efficiently shared, resulting in 
potentially incomplete knowledge for decision makers. In this model even a shared goal 
can cause conflict because o f the differing views of leaders based on the points o f view of 
their parent organizations, personal interests, and backgrounds. In such an environment, 
even a paramount leader, such as the president, must seek consensus with his 
subordinates, if for no other reason than to prevent misunderstandings, and even a 
president’s power may be curtailed by powerful subordinate bureaucracies.17
Because o f these limitations, the personalities o f key leaders and their propensity 
to fight for their views or acquiesce, even to the paramount leader, are central. This 
model can be heavily influenced by the power of key informed and motivated leaders to 
obtain their desired outcomes. Crucial to the model is the idea that “the leader’s initial




17 Woll, Peter. American Bureacracy. New York: Norton, 1977. 206-207.
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preferences are rarely a sufficient guide for explanation or 
takes place amongst agencies o f varying relative power 
crippling the ability to make rational choices.
In Explaining Foreign Policy, Steven Yetiv broadens the tools developed by 
Allison by use of a new case study, that of the decision making process which surrounded 
the U.S. armed rejection o f Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. One o f his refinements o f the 
Allison models was a Theory o f Government Politics, by which key leaders acted as 
“pied pipers” and brought others along with them through persuasive power, particularly 
if the outlook o f and relationships among the group members were similar and strong.19
The facets o f Allison’s models, with Yetiv’s modifications, are shown graphically 
in Figure 1 below:




Government as unitary 
actor.
Theory o f  games as 
determinant o f  choice. Rational choice among all actors
G O VERNM ENT
POLITICS
(BU REAUCRATIC)








TH EO RY OF  
G O VERNM ENTAL  
POLITICS
National Security Decision 
Making Organizations and 
Leaders
Leaders with similar 




18 Allison and Zelikow. 259.
19 Yetiv, Stephen A. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision Making and the G u lf War. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 120. Referring to the Fairy Tale Character who uses music to 
entice children into following him.
20 Bradford. 39.
prediction.” 18 Bargaining 
and interests, sometimes
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Yetiv’s model looks particularly useful for explaining the interventions in Kosovo and 
Libya, in which powerful actors, even though not in paramount roles, formulated their 
positions and drug other key leaders along, ultimately also participating in the public 
framing o f the issues, although this is not discussed explicitly. Similarly, the role of 
outside pressures, such as those generated from the international community, other great 
powers, alliances such as NATO, and international organizations, particularly the UN, are 
also not addressed.
Expectations Based on Allison’s Models
Case studies utilizing Allison’s models should reveal several points o f reference. 
The first is that one would expect all decision making actors to be rational, and to assume 
that other actors are also rational. The decisions made would resemble “outputs o f large 
organizations functioning according to standards o f behavior.” Organizational, rather 
than individual dynamics and cultures, will drive a bureaucratic decision making style. 
The initial preferences o f leaders, where known, do not sufficiently inform the eventual 
outcome, which is reached by a process o f significant bargaining, which occurs among a 
variety o f agencies o f varying relative power and interests. Usually, these agencies are a 
set group, including the office o f the president, the Department o f State (sometimes with 
the US Mission to the UN as a separate actor) the Department o f Defense, and the 
Intelligence Community. This bargaining may come at the expense o f rationality.
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Weaknesses of Allison’s Model
The most important critique Allison models is that they were developed with a 
hyper-focus on a single event, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and its sub events. Similarly, 
Yetiv’s take on the Governmental Politics Model has a deep focus on the approach to the 
first Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991.21 As articulated by Bendor and Hammond, it is 
possible that the group o f people and the specific events used by Allison may simply not 
be able to be replicated, thus making the work primarily descriptive rather than 
prescriptive or theoretical.22 Jeffrey Bradford’s theoretical approach focused the use of 
repeated games to look at issues such as UK annual defense budget negotiations, 
providing an additional counterpoint to Allison’s analysis. Bradford noted that Allison’s 
original draft was handicapped by how recently it appeared after the events it described. 
With this in mind, one purpose o f this dissertation is to assess the ongoing validity of 
these models.23
Other issues are raised as potential weaknesses. Unfolding events may prove to 
be far more complex and far less linear that acknowledged by Allison. Further, operating 
rules and may be more numerous and complex than individual actors can process. In 
addition, the issue of hierarchy, or how smaller decisions/influencers fit into a larger 
picture, is not recognized in Allison’s work.24 Modem decision makers are not as 
uninformed as assumed (and may be quite specialized, although sometimes in the wrong 
ways) and modem bureaucracies are not as sluggish or staid as Allison proposed. Indeed,
21 Yetiv. 120.
22 Bendor, Jonathan and Hammond, Thomas H. "Rethinking Allison's Models." The American Political 
Science Review  86, no. 2 (1992, June): 301-322. 302.
23 Bradford. 20.
24 Bendor and Hammond. 306. The term they use is “Single Time Period” organization.
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organizations can potentially bring more cognitive power to bear on issues than 
individuals. Unlike states, which are viewed as unitary actors, decision making groups 
are broken down into constituent groups, leading to questions o f similarity o f goals.25 A 
further potential problem is the assumption that all players are rational, or if  they will 
ever have adequate information on which to base decisions.26 A lack o f clarity in the 
model on the potential for multiple goals on the part o f a single actor provides a challenge 
to Allison’s definition of rationality, thus bringing the RAM into question.27 Finally, the 
cases in Allison’s study appear to be closed loops, a situation which may expose a 
potential flaw is Allison’s seeming presumption that decisions taken at key points in time 
draw their decision cycles to an end. This does not pay adequate note to the ongoing 
impacts o f decisions, changes in circumstances, and the possible need for revisits o f the 
same topics, which also points to events and crises as non-linear in nature.
A major criticism of the GPM focuses on whether the highest levels o f the 
government actually work in the manner described by Allison. Bradford questions 
whether goals o f leaders at the cabinet level are actually so disparate, and both whether 
and why a president would have to bargain with his own appointees.29 A common thread 
on this is that a president would try to avoid bargaining if possible, and that he would 
normally be in a paramount position to implement his or her desired course o f action 
without doing so.






Between the Models: Linking the Foreign Policy Decision Making Process to Framing
The U.S. government uses an interagency process to decide on when and how the 
nation will intervene abroad. At some point in this process, and not necessarily 
concurrent to it, leaders frame and communicate their themes and messages concerning 
their opponents and world events. As noted in Christopher Paul’s 2011 Strategic 
Communication, a successful framing or communication strategy calls for synchronizing 
messages with deeds.30 Admiral James Stavridis, a noted military advocate o f and expert 
on strategic communication, acknowledged the role o f the national security apparatus and 
entreated leaders to “take an early and persistent role in deciding how ideas and decisions 
are shaped and delivered.31 For Stavridis this need required a shared understanding of 
what strategic communications is and is not, particularly in an international context.32 
This is re-enforced by Nye (2005), who warned that “A communications strategy cannot 
work if it cuts against the grain o f policy,” reiterating the need for coordination of 
messaging at the highest levels. As noted by Rodman and others, based on the 
personality o f a given president, and the constitutional seniority o f the various cabinet 
members, the interagency process can be subverted by a powerful cabinet member.34 
Constitutional seniority in this case refers to the legal hierarchy o f the cabinet, in other, 
words, that a powerful Secretary o f State, the senior cabinet officer, will have more 
influence than a CIA director, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. Well known
30 Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Santa Barbara, 
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
31 Stavridis, James G. "Strategic Communication and National Security," Joint Force Quarterly, 2007: 4-7. 
4, 7.
32 Ibid. 7.
33 Nye, Joseph. Soft Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. 110.
34 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making o f  Foreign Policy from  
Nixon to G eorge W. Bush. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 53, 55-57.
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examples o f this include the role that Henry Kissinger played in the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, or that Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld played in 
the Bush administration. Richard Holbrooke, Madeleine Albright and Hilary Clinton also 
played this role in several instances, including the lead ups to the interventions in Kosovo 
and Libya, but no similar leader, including Secretary o f State John Kerry, had the 
political clout to carry the frame through in regards to Syria or with Russia over the 
Ukraine. Inordinately strong leaders can either enhance or limit the effectiveness o f the 
NSC and the interagency community to develop effective plans, to communicate them, or 
to get their plans cleared through the president.35
Even without the interference of personalities, however, a significant source of 
friction and conflict in the decision making process is the radically different institutional 
mindsets of the various interagency players, most specifically the Departments o f State 
and Defense. A key point here is the ongoing gap in funding, crisis response 
methodologies, training, outlook, and expectations between these two most significant 
stakeholders in the decision making process, making such a process difficult to 
implement.36 Where only one o f the leading policy development organizations pushes a 
program, it is not likely to succeed, but when a key leader can convince other 
organizations, action becomes more likely. This would have ramifications for the attempt 
to intervene in Syria, since none o f the cabinet leaders were in favor o f military action.
35 Nye. 29.
36 Deutsch, John. "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process." In Keeping the Edge, edited 
by Ashton Carter, 276-284. Harvard: Kennedy School, 2000. 270.
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Framing and the Entman/Castells Model
Robert Entman provided a model for framing in Projections o f  Power, noting that 
the purpose o f a frame is “to generate support or opposition to a political actor or 
policy.”37 This is what he calls the “Cascading Network Association Theory”.38 Since 
the government remains the primary source for information, this creates a system of 
asymmetric interdependence, but this can only be taken advantage o f if there is unanimity 
in the message, particularly in a media environment which is prepared to conflate news 
with entertainment.39 Manuel Castells drew upon and added to the concept in 
Communication Power, most particularly in his writing concerning Networks of Mind 
and Power. For this concept, Castells draws significantly on the models o f framing 
developed by Robert Entman, who focuses attention on the efforts of the Government to 
frame key events, and the media’s countervailing efforts to “counter-frame” them.40 A 
graphic depiction of Entman’s theory, showing the downward impact o f framing and the 
upward, communicative impact o f stakeholders on decision makers, is shown in Figure 2 
on the following page:41
37 Entman. 47.
38 Ibid. 17-21.
39 Bennett, Lance, and Entman, Robert. M ediated Politics: Communication in the Future o f  Democracy. 




Figure 2: Network Activation Theory
Entman's Cascading Network 
















In the graphic above, the downward hollow arrow lines show the cascade of 
information downward, while the upward lines show feedback mechanisms in the 
process. According to Entman, the government is generally successful in framing when 
it can call on shared themes and ideals and get its themes in “early and often.”42 Yetiv 
provides an example o f this theory in action by describing the methodology used by Bush 
in constructing an image of Saddam Hussein (who, in the summer of 1990, had just 
invaded and occupied Kuwait) as a new Hitler, and the overwhelming need to confront
42 Entman. 10.
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him rather than face a “New Munich,” implying that appeasing, rather than opposing 
Hussein would have the same dire consequences that appeasement had in 1938, after 
which general war followed within a year.43
Castells’ work focuses on a variety o f communications issues, noting that power 
is based on the ability to form, shape and adjust networks and messages. This is referred 
to as “network power,” which he calls the power to modify, change, or create networks 44 
To Castells, power lies within networked systems. Their operations, the interplay 
between them, and switching between them is a source of power to those who are able to 
implement the change. This ties directly back into the concept o f framing, which can 
always be done by those with the power, information, and interest to do so.45 According 
to Castells, “The framing o f the public mind is largely performed through processes that 
take place in the media. Communications research has identified three major processes 
involved in the relationship between media and people in the sending and receiving of 
news through which citizens perceive their selves in relation to the world: agenda setting, 
priming and framing.”46 With that in mind, agenda setting seeks to delineate the terms of 
acceptable debate, while framing describes the manner in which the coverage provided 
emphasizes desired aspects o f events in order to reach desired interpretations and 
outcomes.47 Castells states that “Only those frames that are able to connect the message
43 Yetiv. 94-95.
44 Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 45.
45 Nanabhey, Mohammed. "From spectacle to spectacular: How physical space, social media and 





to pre-existing frames in the mind become activators of conduct... by finding resonance 
and increasing the magnitude of their repetition.”48
In the cases to be examined, the government is the organization with the power 
and interest to establish, maintain, and capitalize on the power o f communication 
networks in order to frame the debate on armed humanitarian interventions, and to 
persuade stakeholders o f the need to intervene. Carrying this argument one step further, 
it is highly placed, powerful individual actors who create the frames used to encourage 
intervention. According to Alex Mintz, decisions are “sold” to the public, or framed, in 
order that elites and decision makers can enhance their political standing and popularity, 
naturally preferring to have more support than opposition in the process.49 Further, 
conflicting frames can be provided not only by the media, but by the party out o f power, 
which has significant implications for the Libya case study and others.
Expectations Based on the Entman/Castells Model
A model drawing off the work of Entman and Castells would expect to see a 
concerted, planned effort by senior decision makers to set the terms o f public discourse 
on a given issue, and to capitalize on the government’s unique position as a single source 
for definitive information on key foreign policy and defense issues. Influencers outside 
o f the foreign policy decision making process would be counteracted and refuted in order 
to maintain information primacy. Narratives would attempt to draw simple parallels to 
historical examples, not always contextually relevant, but well known and inflammatory
48 Castells. 158.
49 Mintz, Alex. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010.
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at times. Control or influence on information networks would be established and 
increased so that messaging could be enhanced.
Weaknesses o f the Entman/Castells Model
The Entman/Castells model describes a process by which power holders and 
decision makers monopolize information and attempt to use that monopoly to frame key 
issues both to enable decision making and to justify decisions that have been made. 
However, neither model describes the how of that process. Castells’ is criticized for two 
reasons. The first is because o f the negative linkages he draws with framing, network 
power, and free market capitalism however, the political side o f his model is not central 
to its contribution in this case.50
The Combined Decide/Frame Model, Expectations, and Challenges
Inductive reasoning was used to develop the grounded theory on decision making 
and framing employed in this study. According to Strauss and Corbin, “A grounded 
theory is one that is inductively derived from the study o f the phenomenon it represents. 
That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data 
collection and analysis o f data pertaining to that phenomenon.”51 Based on the 
hypothesis that armed humanitarian interventions occur when a powerful leader or small
50 Taffel, Sy. “Manuel Castells’ Communication Power.” M edia Ecologies.
http://mediaecologies.wordpress.com/2010/05/31/manuel-castells-communication-power/. Accessed on 
July 10, 2014.
51 Strauss, Anselm and Corbin, Juliet Basics o f  Qualitative Research Techniques and Procedures fo r  
Developing Grounded Theory (2nd edition). London: Sage Publications: 1990. 23
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group of leaders dominates the decision making and framing apparatus to force and 
explain such an intervention, it is necessary to construct a theory that explains the 
concurrence or nexus of the decision making and framing processes. Relying on the 
literature review and a thorough examination of the Allison, Yetiv, Entman, and CastelFs 
models, the following theory was developed and will be tested by the case studies; it 
could be suggested that when the foreign policy decision making process is dominated by 
powerful individuals with a motivation toward intervention, and the framing process is 
dominated by the same or similarly minded individuals, armed humanitarian 
interventions take place driven by this alignment.
A deciding and framing model would expect to see the decision making process 
dominated by key stakeholders with powerful interests in a given issue formed by their 
own experiences and pressures on them formed through their own participation in events, 
both in forcing a decision on a given issue (in this case, armed humanitarian 
interventions) and in framing that process and the associated decisions to the various 
stakeholders (in this case, the public, through the media). Such an explanatory model 
will face the same challenges that have been posed to its constituent models, however, it 
is believed that by unifying the two key processes (deciding and framing) into a single 
model, that weakness can in part be overcome. That, then, is the purpose for this study.
Case Studies and Case Study Selection
The method of research agglomeration for this dissertation is selective sampling. 
Under selective sampling, a thorough literature review, which has been performed, is
88
used to illuminate the various items (in this case, events) which form the overall sample, 
and to infer the strongest examples to be examined. While less than ideal for quantitative 
studies, purposeful sampling is a key element in qualitative studies such as this 
dissertation. In part, purposeful sampling was selected because o f the very small size of 
the overall sample. As seen above, fewer than twenty total events, or cases, can be 
examined. Furthermore, the nature of the evidence to be analyzed, books, memoirs, and 
primary source documents lend itself to a purposeful sample. The cases also have similar 
background conditions, helping to control for third variable influences, or at least to 
acknowledge those differences, while avoiding the pitfalls and narrowness inherent in a 
single case study approach.53 Finally, as Stephan van Evera notes, case studies can go 
farther in answering the question of how variables impact on each other more readily than 
quantitative tests.54
Explanation o f Related Variables
Along with explaining why certain methods are used in the study, it is important 
to discuss variables, theories, and case studies which were not used in the study, and why 
they were judged to not be central to it. This will demonstrate the rigor o f the research as 
well as the durability o f the theoretical model described in the previous section, while 
incorporating or explaining competing factors in the decision making and framing 
processes.
52 Creswell, John W. Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. London: Sage 
Publications. 1994. 119.




The case studies were selected based on the following criteria: First, each
intervention met the criterion established in the literature review, meaning that they were 
military, combative interventions, against the will o f the host government, for purposes 
named as humanitarian. The interventions all took place after the end o f the Cold War in 
1991. This allowed a focus on U.S. power and capability little constrained by other 
powers, in other words, the so called “Unipolar moment.”55 In terms of the case studies 
adopted, it is clear that there are numerous interventions in the period from 1991 to 2014 
that are not included. Notable U.S. interventions involving armed force in the period 
include: The Bush-Clinton interventions in Somalia from 1991-1993 (used), the Haiti 
intervention of 1994 (not used), the Rwandan Genocide (referenced), the end of the 
Yugoslav Civil War (used in terms o f the lead up to the Kosovo crisis), the Kosovo 
intervention (used), the interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)(not used), 
Pakistan Earthquake (2005 and 2010) (not used), Indonesian Tsunami relief (2004)(not 
used), Lebanon and Georgia Non Combatant Evacuations (2006 and 2008)(not used), 
Operation Tomodachi (2011) (not used) and the Libyan intervention o f 2012 (used). A 
key to the major U.S. interventions is provided below. Figure 3 below shows the 
interventions, the years o f the operation, an area to note whether the operation met the 
definition o f armed humanitarian interventions revealed by the literature review, and if 
the intervention would be one of the case studies for analysis.56
55 Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, America and the 
World 1990/91. 23-33.
56 O f course key data points from interventions not used in the case studies will be cited where appropriate.
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Figure 3: List of Post-Cold War U.S. Humanitarian and Other Interventions
Somalia 1 G.H.W. Bush (R)epublican 1992-3 Africa Y
Somalia 2 Clinton (D)emocrat 1993-4 Africa Y
Haiti Clinton D 1995 Caribbean N
Bosnia Clinton D 1995-8 Europe N
Rwanda Clinton D 1994 Africa N
Kosovo Clinton D 1998-9 Europe Y
Afghanistan G.W. Bush R 2001-14 Asia N
Iraq G.W. Bush R 2003-11 Middle East N
Pakistan Earthquake G.W. Bush R 2005 Asia N
Indonesian Tsunami G.W. Bush R 2004 Asia N
Lebanon NEO G.W. Bush R 2006 Middle East N
Georgia NEO G.W. Bush R 2008 Middle East N
Pakistan Flooding NEO Obama D 2010 Middle East N
Haiti Earthquake Obama D 2010 Caribbean N
Operation Tomodachi Obama D 2011 Asia N
Libya Obama D 2012 Africa Y
Syria Obama D 2013 Middle East Y
Brief synopses o f operations included in this chart help to illustrate the main points o f the 
interventions and why they may or may not have been chosen for analysis.
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Somalia 1 (1992) -  Response to humanitarian crisis caused by failure and collapse 
of Somali Government. U.S. armed forces intervened as part o f a UN effort to provide 
food, medicine, and humanitarian relief under President George H. W. B ush.57
Somalia 2 (1993) -  Mission morphed under President Clinton into a manhunt for 
Somali Warlords, and failure in this effort led to shut down of the mission.58
Haiti (1994) -  This intervention was undertaken to remove the administration of 
Raoul Cedras, which had overthrown the U.S. backed Aristide government. U.S. forces 
did land to provide security and humanitarian relief, but the issue was resolved 
diplomatically, and without significant use o f Force.59 Had the planned invasion taken 
place, then this intervention would have been included in those being analyzed.
Bosnia (1992-98) -  The Bosnian intervention took place near the end of multi­
year Yugoslav Civil War. Operating under a UN Mandate, NATO forces arrived in 
Bosnia to assist with peacekeeping following the withdrawal o f Bosnian Serb forces from 
the country.60 Not included as a case study because the mandate was not humanitarian, 
and did not involve significant U.S. kinetics.
Rwanda (1994) -  The most important non-intervention in the last century. Ethnic 
Rwandan Tutsis slaughtered over half a million Ethnic Hutus over the summer o f 1994. 
In spite o f some pressure from the UN, the international community remained largely 
inactive through the crisis.61
57 Weiss, Thomas G. Humanitarian Intervention. 2 ed. War and Conlict in the Modem World. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2012. 30-31.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. 10.
60 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. West Port, CT: Praeger, 1999. 
33.
61 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 30-34.
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Kosovo (1999) -  Provides one o f the case studies. Military force used for the 
humanitarian purpose of protecting the Kosovar Albanians from Serb atrocities in winter 
1999.62
Afghanistan (2001-2014) -  Military intervention and occupation o f the country as 
part o f the counter-attack following the 9-11 attacks. Although some disaster relief and 
reconstruction activities have occurred since the invasion, in 2001, they were not the 
purpose for the intervention, and Afghanistan was rejected as a case study because of 
this.
Iraq (2003-2010) -  Military intervention and occupation o f the country for a 
variety of reasons, but with the stated objective o f ending the Hussein government’s 
support of terrorism and abrogation o f treaties on the development o f Weapons o f Mass 
Destruction. Although some disaster relief and reconstruction activities have occurred 
since the invasion, in 2003, they were not the purpose for the intervention, and Iraq was 
rejected as a case study because o f this.
Indonesian Tsunami (2004-2005) -  Response to this 2004 Earthquake and 
Tsunami was provided by the armed forces, in part because o f the remoteness o f the 
stricken areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S. armed forces. 
However, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this 
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
Pakistan Earthquake (2005) -  Response was provided by the armed forces, 
particularly given the proximity o f major combat operations in neighboring Afghanistan, 
however, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this 
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
62 Phillips, David L. Liberating Kosovo. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, 2012. 90.
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Lebanon Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) (2006) -  This operation 
saw U.S. forces used to help evacuate U.S. Persons from Lebanon as a result o f the 2006 
Hezbollah War. Since the purpose was specifically to evacuate Americans, and not to 
impact the situation on the ground, this intervention was not considered for a case study.
Georgia NEO (2008) -  This operation saw U.S. forces used to help evacuate U.S. 
citizens from Georgia as a result o f the Russian invasion of the country. Since the 
purpose was specifically to evacuate Americans, and not to impact the situation on the 
ground, this intervention was not considered for a case study.
Pakistan Flooding Relief (2010) -  Response to floods in the tribal areas of 
Afghanistan was provided by the armed forces, in part because of the remoteness o f the 
stricken areas and the unique transport and response capability of the U.S. armed forces. 
However, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this 
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
Haiti Earthquake (2010) -  Response to the Earthquake in Haiti was provided by 
the armed forces, in part because o f the level o f infrastructure damage o f the stricken 
areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S. armed forces. 
However, the operations were not inherently combative in nature, therefore, this 
intervention will not be considered as a case study.
Japan Earthquake (Operation Tomodachi) (2011) -  Response to the earthquake in 
Japan was provided by the armed forces, in part because o f the level o f infrastructure 
damage o f the stricken areas and the unique transport and response capability o f the U.S. 
armed forces. Furthermore, U.S. bases and personnel were impacted, and evacuation was 
offered to all Americans who wished it. Since the purpose was specifically to evacuate
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Americans, with some lifesaving and search and rescue assets assisting the Japanese, and 
not to impact the situation on the ground, this intervention was not considered for a case 
study.
Libya (Operation Odyssey Dawn) (2012) -  Provides one o f the case studies. 
Military force used for the humanitarian purpose of protecting the Libyan civilians, 
particularly in the eastern part o f the country, from attacks by regime forces.63 This fits 
the qualifiers for intervention set out in the literature review.
Syria (2013) -  Syria is the second “nonintervention” to be considered. Syrian use 
of chemical weapons provided the catalyst for significant debate and diplomatic 
maneuvering surrounding a possible intervention in 2013, however, the intervention 
never took place. This dissertation argues that one reason for this is that no powerful 
leader emerged in support of the intervention either in the decision making or framing 
cycles. By 2014, air strikes, not under humanitarian auspices, commenced against 
Islamic State targets in Syria, but this also falls outside of the types o f interventions 
examined in the study.
With these thoughts in mind, three primary case studies have been selected for 
analysis to help determine the role o f individuals in advocating and framing intervention 
decisions. The chosen case studies were selected on the basis o f responses to natural as 
well as man-made disasters, government threats to human life, and attempts at genocide. 
They cover differing political administrations and one case study, Somalia, straddles a 
change in political administration. Geographic diversity is also ensured, with 
interventions in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East selected for study. This will allow a 
determination as to whether a particular region, ethnic, or religious group was treated
63 Hehir. 12-13.
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significantly differently. The selected cases occurred during both Republican and 
Democrat administrations and provide a balanced sample for analysis, helping to rule out 
a partisan based intervention hypothesis. The Rwanda non-intervention will also be 
discussed since it provided the impetus for the development o f current definitions and 
concepts of armed humanitarian intervention, while the decision not to intervene in Syria 
in August 2013 will be discussed as part of the findings.
Analysis of the case studies focuses on the following questions and themes. How 
did the case meet the criterion for humanitarian interventions as described in the literature 
review? What is the timeline o f events, in other words, what caused the intervention, and 
what were the key decision and framing points in time? What was the decision making 
process? Was it implicitly tied into the framing process? Did the same people undertake 
each? Since the events examined take place in a time line, how did each armed 
intervention, or decision not to intervene, impact future choices?
Limitations o f the Study and Intervening Variables
In examining the national security decision making and framing cycles, and the 
impact o f the individual on them, there are several intervening variables which must be 
acknowledged for their potential impact on both cycles and leaders. Intervening 
variables to be discussed are: War weariness, public distraction, the attractiveness o f the 
international narrative o f R2P (where applicable in terms o f the timeline), the lack of 
attractiveness of the narrative of other frames, such as chemical weapons abuse, 
geography and its impact on intervention, the timeline o f interventions, and the efforts of
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allied or opposition countries to impact U.S. framing of armed humanitarian intervention 
efforts. The foundational beliefs of leaders can play a role, with leaders drawing on the 
Second World War era for their beliefs such as George H.W. Bush and Madeleine 
Albright, saw appeasement as something to be avoided, whereas those o f the Vietnam 
generation, such as Clinton, saw internal dissent and defeat as a bigger problem.64 
Finally, the fundamental divide in America’s view o f itself as either a realist or liberal 
actor on the world stage must be considered.65 The latter is, on one hand, a motivator for 
the leaders analyzed in the case studies, but can also be a significant factor in the public’s 
support for or rejection of an intervention. This, in turn, becomes a planning factor for 
decision makers.
One intervening variable is the cumulative effect of events outside o f the case 
studies. War weariness, for example, or the internal focus o f the public following the 
world financial crisis o f 2008 may be contributing factors in both the stance taken toward 
intervention in Libya in 2012, and the lack o f interest in a similar intervention in Syria in 
2013.66 Lack of international support, or the active interference o f a great power, such as 
Russia, China, or France, can also be a factor in decision making.
Further factors in the decision to intervene have included the discourse on 
chemical weapons usage, particularly on civilians, as well as a broader academic and 
practitioner discourse on humanitarian interventions in general, with a focus on R2P. 
Chemical weapons have been a source of international discussion and at least tacit
64 Albright interview on the McNeil/Lehrer Newshour, 10 June 1999. From Schnabel, Albrecht and 
Thakur, Ramesh. Kosovo and the Challenge o f  Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, 
Collective Action, and International Citizenship. N ew  York: United Nations University Press, 2000. 89
65 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone Books, 1994. 43-45.
66 Dugan, Andrew. "Support for Syria Action Lower Than Past Conflicts." 
http://www.gallup.eom/poll/l64282/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx. Accessed on 
September 25, 2013.
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agreement on their non-use since the First World War, while armed humanitarian 
interventions are relatively new and require discussion in terms o f the narrative. In 
response to a series of man-made humanitarian disasters after the end o f the Cold War, 
the principal arose that the international community has a responsibility to protect the 
lives o f citizens whose sovereign governments were unable or refused to do so. The three 
principal events which brought this about were the killing o f over a million Rwandans in 
1994, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to the Kosovo air campaign of 
1999, and the ongoing Darfur crisis.67 A codification o f the principal o f humanitarian 
interventions came about as the result o f the 2000 UN Millennium summit, and the 
subsequent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
which officially coined the phrase “Responsibility to Protect” in its final report o f the 
same name. R2P implies that the security o f individuals and groups o f people is 
paramount over that o f the state, when that state fails to account for that security, or 
actively acts against it.68 Utilization of R2P provided networking power which enable 
framing to take place in Libya, while chemical weapons failed to provide the same for 
Syria.
Moral authority, or America’s self-perception of its moral authority, as a final 
intervening variable in the decision to launch or not to launch a armed humanitarian 
intervention. In “Necessity or Choice? Securing Public Consent for War,” John 
Schuessler discusses this as a problem of marketing, noting that the realist paradigm is in
67 Bellamy, Alex J. "The Responsibility to Protect," in Security Studies: An Introduction. New York: 
Routledge, 2008 ,422-37 . 423.
68 Ibid. 424
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conflict with core American values.69 This poses a problem in that any intervention or
conflict must be framed to the American public as a war o f necessity, forced on the
nation by dire circumstances, or even by armed attack. When America acts, it should do
so not for low goals, but with the goal of improving mankind’s lot.70 This is summed up
by a quote from John Mearsheimer:
“Americans tend to like (liberalism) because it identifies the United States as a 
benevolent force in world politics and portrays its real and potential rivals as 
misguided or malevolent.”71
It is this struggle between the moral and the realist that creates challenges for decision
making and framing. Richard Haass, writing in Wars o f  Necessity and Wars o f  Choice,
there is a significant burden on the government to prove the benefits o f its actions,
particularly when American lives are at risk. This adds to the burden o f both deciding on
and explaining armed humanitarian interventions, which are, in the end, wars of choice,
rather than necessity. For Haass, the benefits of such an intervention must outweigh the
costs, while the net result must be positive, “If this test cannot be met, the choice will
appear to be ill advised and most likely is.”72 Thus the “bang for the buck” test joins the
other tests, motivators, and detractors for intervention which must be considered when
examining each one, and which serve as intervening variables for the cases. In cases
where there was no decision to intervene, it is often because the cost benefit analysis, or a
perception o f that analysis, comes up negative, meaning that the human, monetary, and
political price o f armed humanitarian intervention is simply not worth the perceived
69 Schuessler, John. "When Wars o f  Necessity Become Contested as Wars o f  Choice." In 2004 Annual 
Meeting o f  the American Political Science Association, 2004. 4.
70 Schuessler, 4.




gains. The inference here is that framing acts o f choice, such as armed humanitarian 
interventions, is a more difficult and time consuming act, less certain to succeed than is 
the case in wars of necessity.
A key point to be noted is that this study is focused exclusively on U.S. 
government decision making and framing processes. That is to say that any linkage to 
similar processes is coincidental. The nature o f the U.S. political system is especially 
suited to the influence of the types of powerful leaders and framers discussed in the 
study. That said, it is reasonable to extrapolate that, where conditions in the political 
processes, institutions, and media o f other countries are similar to those in the U.S., the 
lessons of this study could apply.
The limitations presented do not detract from the value o f studying the role o f the 
individual in foreign policy decision making and framing, whether for armed 
humanitarian interventions or other foreign policy endeavors. Rather, they augment and 
complete a picture o f the foreign policy and framing processes which has heretofore been 
little explored. By bringing the literatures on decision making and framing together in a 
policy environment, this study expands the overall body of work on both fields, as well as 
on the case studies themselves. It also offers useful information to other researchers, 
policy makers and practitioners. Applicable implications focus on the linkages between 




As will be seen in the case studies, the common factor underpinning each of the 
interventions discussed is the intervention and interaction o f key leaders who could both 
push the decision making process and serve as spokespersons in successful efforts to 
frame the interventions. Similarly, in cases in which intervention did not occur, there 
was no clear spokesperson or mover with the political and framing cache able to provide 
the vital impetus for action. Having discussed the main themes o f the literature on armed 
humanitarian interventions, the foreign policy decision making process, and the framing 
process, the purpose of this section of the dissertation is to describe, in detail, the 
theoretical arguments o f the dissertation, and to define the tests that will be undertaken 
with the case studies to demonstrate the feasibility o f the proposed theories.
The purpose of this research is to examine the decision making and framing 
processes for U.S. armed humanitarian interventions in the post-cold war era to determine 
the impact o f individual transformational leaders on both processes. This section o f the 
study reviewed the hypothesis that interventions occur when a powerful leader or small 
group o f leaders dominates the decision making and framing apparatus to force and 
explain such an intervention, as well as the literature review which helped to frame it. 
Key definitions, particularly o f armed humanitarian interventions derived from the 
literature review were discussed more fully, while the choice o f qualitative over 
quantitative analysis was both described and justified in light o f the small number of 
cases and the nature o f the evidence, which is primarily anecdotal and not easily 
quantified. This section also discussed the cases, as well as rejected cases, and the
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rationale for their selection, noting a series of intervening variables and their potential 
impact on the findings. It also reinforced the utility of the study and its potential value to 
decision makers and other researchers. Preliminary findings o f this study are that in 
armed humanitarian intervention situations, the existence o f one or a few powerful 
leaders are required in both the foreign policy decision making process and the media 
framing process in order for such an intervention to take place. Where no powerful 
leader emerges to sway the opinion o f other leaders and bureaucracies, in either the 




This section o f the study provides the data for examination according to the 
standards set forth in the methodology section. It is divided into three sections, covering 
the Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya interventions. The second section, on the interventions 
o f the Clinton administration, is divided into two sub-sections, facilitating a discussion of 
the non-intervention o f the U.S. in Rwanda and its impact on future armed humanitarian 
interventions. As noted in the methodology, the case studies will examine the historical 
and political contexts o f the events, the makeup and decision making processes o f the 
administrations in question, the decision to intervene, framing and its impacts, and the 
usefulness o f the selected models on the case. Finally, each study will note how the 
intervention ended and if and how that end impacted future armed humanitarian 
interventions.
Case Study 1: George H.W. Bush and the Decision to Intervene in Somalia, 1992
“The very real threat was that as much as one-fourth o f all Somalia could
starve to death before January, 1993.”
Dr. Phillip Johnston, Director o f Care, 1994.1
1 Johnston, Phillip. Somalia Diary: The President o f  Care Tells One C ountry’s Story o f  Hope. Atlanta, GA: 
Longstreet Press, 1994. ix.
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In 1992, Somalia lay in ruins. Decades of civil war, inspired by a mixture of the 
influence o f the Cold War, the rise o f militant Islam, and the international drug trade had 
transformed the former Italian colony into the quintessential failed state. The epidemic of 
starvation which followed the end o f the civil war on 1991 was so bad that by September, 
1992, the media were reporting that 100,000 out o f the population o f six million had died, 
nearly half o f starvation, with an amazing, and staggering 95% suffering from some form 
from illnesses related to malnutrition.2 In December, 1992, the U.S. intervened with a 
massive military force designed at first to ensure safe food deliveries to the Somali 
people, and to defend those food shipments in an extremely hostile environment.
The U.S. armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia began in December, 1992, 
during the waning weeks of the presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush. While 
tragedy would strike the mission nearly a year later, with the battle o f Mogadishu (of 
“Blackhawk Down” fame) and the graphic deaths o f eighteen U.S. soldiers, the focus o f 
this case study is rather on the decision making process which led to the initial 
intervention, an operation generally judged as a success in its mission to alleviate the 
suffering, and in particular, the starvation, o f many of the people o f Somalia.
The Somalia intervention, according to Andrea Talentino, marked the first 
military intervention by the international community into a civil conflict since the end of 
the Cold War.3 This case study will describe the situation in Somalia which led to the 
U.S. decision to intervene, as well as describing the processes both for deciding on 
intervention and on the framing of the intervention in humanitarian terms. It will also
2 Johnston. 2.
3 Talentino, Andrea K. M ilitary Intervention after the C old War: The Evolution o f  Theory and Practice. 
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005. 95.
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describe the role played by key empowered individuals in both decision making 
processes. That process was dominated by President George H.W. Bush, and it is he who 
was the powerful leader whose actions led directly to the intervention. Unique among the 
cases examined, the Somalia intervention took place during a presidential election 
campaign, and the incumbent, who lost, proceeded with the intervention with the 
recognition and acceptance of his replacement, and undertook the operation during his 
lame duck session with the knowledge that it could well continue into the Clinton 
administration’s first term.
Somalia in 1992, Background to Intervention
The first major rumblings that there was an international crisis brewing in 
Somalia came in March, 1991, with the announcement by Under Secretary o f State for 
African Affairs Howard Cohen that Somalia was in the midst o f “civil strife.” 4 The U.S. 
Embassy in Mogadishu had been closed down in February o f that year, with negative 
impacts for information gathering both by the U.S. Government and the media on the 
crisis.5 The greater conflict in the former Italian colony has its roots in the Cold War, and 
is tied to the communist takeover in nearby Ethiopia. When that country’s pro-western 
leadership was overthrown by communists in 1974, U.S. efforts in the region shifted to 
support o f Sidi Barre’s regime in Mogadishu, and included military basing in the port of
4 Rutherford, Kenneth R. Humanitarianism under Fire: The U.S. And UN Intervention in Somalia. 
Sterling, Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2008. 14.
5 Sommer, John G., and Collins, Carole C. “Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role o f  the Office o f  U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 1990-1994.” Refugee Policy Study Group, November, 1994. 2. For 
over a year afterwards, OFDA remained the only U.S. Government Agency to remain in country.
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Berbera through the end of the Cold War.6 Barre had himself taken over by means o f a 
coup in 1969, but he made some real progress in the development o f the Somali state, 
driving up literacy and attempting to suppress clan-ism in favor o f a wider Somali
n
identity. What he could not overcome, though, was the strong sense o f tribalism within 
the country, as well as the pastoral nomadic system of agriculture.8 With the ending of 
the Cold War, Barre proved unable to continue the suppression o f dissent in the country, 
leading to a series o f coups and upheavals.
By 1991, the country was largely lawless. Mogadishu itself was wracked with 
violence as two sub clans of the Hawiye clan, led by Mohammed Farrah Aidid and Ali 
Mahdi Mohammed struggled for control.9 Aidid, the former foreign minister, and 
probably the strongest of the warlords, harbored significant animosity against both the 
universalist aspirations o f the United Nations in general and with Secretary Boutros-Gali 
personally, since Boutros-Gali, an Egyptian, was in part responsible for Egypt’s strong 
support for the former dictator Barre.10 With nearly all vestiges o f central government 
gone, the countryside fell victim to the drought and desertification which had famously 
afflicted Sudan and Ethiopia in the 1980s. Further, the epicenter o f the clan violence was 
the main agricultural area of the country, meaning that even food that could be grown 
was either pillaged, not harvested, or not distributed.11 As a result o f these factors, a UN 
report o f 22 July 1992 claimed that Somalia would not be able to grow enough to feed
6 Cohen, Herman. Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 197.
7 Oakley, John L. and Hirsch, Robert B. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Washington DC United States Institute o f  Peace Press, 1995. 5.
8 Ibid. 23.
9 Rutherford. 16.
10 Oakley and Hirsch. 19. He had served as Egyptian Foreign Minister and other positions before he 
became Secretary General o f  the UN in 1992.
11 Rutherford. 16-17. According to the author, only 15% o f  the land in Somalia was arable in any case.
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1 9more than half of its population for the following year. Prices for food, when it was 
available, had increased by 1,200%, putting the purchase o f food beyond the reach of 
many.13 Death therefore stalked the land, both in the form of malnutrition and starvation 
related illness caused by constant warfare amongst the tribes aspiring to take over the 
country.
Early efforts by the UN to provide assistance to the people o f Somalia were 
focused on food aid, and did little to attempt a political solution, which meant that, given 
the lack o f force projection and protection capability on the part o f UN forces, both UN 
and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) relief efforts came under frequent 
attack. Clark and Herbst documented the following major attacks as listed in Figure 4:
Figure 4: Snapshot of Violence of Fall 1991
17 September Mogadishu Plane hit by missile
International Committee 
o f  the Red Cross (ICRC)
October Somalia
Wide
45 aid vehicles looted, workers 
robbed
International Committee 
o f  the Red Cross (ICRC)
14 October Mogadishu
Security Guards Attacked, 
attempted theft Medicins San Frontieres
5 December Mogadishu
Employee killed while 
distributing food 1 killed CARE
9 December Berbera




Shot at Somali Red Crescent 
Headquarters 1 killed ICRC
11 December Berbera
Six gunmen robbed two 
employees 2 robbed UNICEF
12 UN Secretary General’s report S /24343 ,22 July 1992. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un- 
documents/document/Somalia%20S%2024343.php. Accessed on August 20, 2014.
13 Natsios, Andrew. U.S. Foreign policy and the Four Horsemen o f  the Apocalypse: Humanitarian R elief 
in Complex Emergencies. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Washington 
Papers, 1997. 21.
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Source: United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Situation Report14
By 1992 it was becoming more and more clear that the United Nations and the 
various members o f the NGO community were unable to adequately respond to the 
Somalia crisis. By mid-1992, an estimated 3,000 Somalis were dying, primarily from 
starvation, each day.15 Whereas such a crisis would have caused an outpouring of civil 
relief during the cold war, as seen by the response to the Ethiopia drought in the early 
part of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War meant that a more potent, military backed 
intervention might be contemplated. Furthermore, the desperate nature o f the situation, 
and the failure of the international relief community to ameliorate the crisis, left a 
military response as the only solution which promised success.
The U.S. and the World in 1992, Context fo r  Intervention
The central political fact o f the early 1990’s was the end o f the Cold War and the 
increasingly unilateral role of the U.S. during an emerging unipolar moment. An 
optimistic mood prevailed, best personified by Francis Fukuyama’s The End o f  History 
and the Last Man, which appeared in 1992, and posited that the U.S. victory over 
communism meant that liberal democracy had permanently displaced it. In this era o f 
triumphalism, however, the country, and the world, were led by the same politicians who 
had finished the Cold War, and were in fact still cold warriors. This was borne out 
through the first two years of the Somalia crisis, 1990 and 1991, in which the U.S. had a
14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Situation Report, Somalia Unit-Djibouti, October 31,
1991. In Rutherford. 17-18.
15 Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The M issed Opportunities. Washington, D.C: U.S. Institute for Peace, 
1994. 15-16.
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consistent stance, namely, that the problems of Somalia were internal in nature, and that 
therefore, the U.S. would stay out o f them.16 In 1992, the U.S. was just beginning to 
contemplate, if not to understand, the implications of the end o f the bi-polar world that 
was the product of the Cold War, which had come to an end with the collapse o f the 
Soviet Union the year before.
Washington was, in effect, left holding the bag for a world in which the control 
and stability provided by bi polarity and the gravity of the Cold War ideological conflict 
was rapidly devolving. The centerpiece for this decay was not in Africa, however, but 
the devolution o f the Yugoslav Socialist Republic into its constituent parts, and the 
efforts o f the Serbian government in Belgrade to prevent this. It was the breakup of 
Yugoslavia which most concerned the U.S. and its allies, as well as its former enemies, in 
the first years o f the decade, and which received the most attention from the media as 
well as politicians.
As important as the growing war in Yugoslavia was, there were a host o f other 
international issues to occupy the Bush team through 1992. Russia, the former enemy of 
the Cold War, was also trying to adapt to the new reality, and efforts to assist the new 
Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, to stabilize his country through economic measures 
such as Most Favored Nation Status were priorities.17 The U.S. international aid 
community was also focused on providing humanitarian assistance across the new states
1 ftwhich rose up across the former Soviet Union. In the Middle East, Israel’s efforts to 
absorb an influx o f Jews from the former Soviet Union caused demographic instability in
16 Talentino. 106.
17 Bush, George H.W. A ll the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings. N ew  York: Scribner, 1999, 
2012. 396.
18 Sommer and Collins. 3.
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the region, while the development o f new settlements on Palestinian land caused political
lO
upset.
Even in Africa, there was competition for attention for the administration. In 
South Africa, the most important country on the continent, the political fallout of the fall 
o f the apartheid regime occupied significant attention. In Angola, the post-Cold War 
settlement was still working itself out in the form of a continued civil war. In 
Mozambique, civil war also loomed as a major distractor for the administration. Even in 
a year that was not going to be a “Year of Africa” there was little reason to think in 
January 1992 that by December Somalia would be a leading foreign policy issue with 
U.S. troops on the ground.
In terms o f domestic politics, the impending November, 1992 presidential election 
was the key event o f the year, with the slow crawl out o f economic recession a prime 
issue. As early as March, Bush expressed growing concern o f the right o f center third 
candidate Ross Perot and his capacity to swing the election in favor o f a Democrat
i
challenger by stripping away Republican votes. By May, Bush’s approval rating had 
dipped down to 40%, while his disapproval rating had reached 53%.22 While Bush 
dismissed fears o f Perot and disapproval at the time, his correspondence indicates that the 
election came to take on increasing amount of his and his team’s time, particularly in the 
critical period after the Democrat National Convention in July. Personnel changes came 
along with this, most notably as James Baker, the capable Secretary o f State, was moved 
to the more political position of White House Chief o f Staff and senior counsel to the
19 Bush, 2012. 397.
20 Powell, Colin L. My American Journey. New York: Balentine Books, 1996. 559.
21 Bush, 2012. 403.
22 Powell. 553.
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president.23 Somalia became a key part of the electoral debate, with candidate William 
Jefferson Clinton accusing Bush of a major foreign policy failure for choosing not to 
intervene in either Bosnia or Somalia.24
One result o f the attempt to overcome the recession was a planned reduction in 
the expenditures across the foreign policy apparatus. On one hand, the Department of 
State had cut back its funding and staffing o f embassies.25 The Chairman of the Joints 
Chiefs o f Staff Colin Powell reports that, in 1992, the Department o f Defense was in the 
process o f a Post-Cold War draw down o f 25% of its manpower.26 At the same time, it 
was deeply involved in military assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, who were in the process of 
fighting off efforts by the Saddam Hussein regime to conquer their homeland. Indeed, in 
spite o f its defeat and humiliation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq remained a high 
priority for the administration, and another potential distraction from events in Somalia. 
In an era in which budgets still mattered, the Pentagon, which had already seen a billion 
dollars siphoned off to Post Gulf War Operations in support to the Iraqi Kurds, was leary 
of further potentially open ended and costly commitments. Whenever Robert Wolthuis, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Global Affairs, brought the money point up in 
interagency planning meetings, he was countered by Cohen, who continually reminded 
the group that Somalis were dying while they deliberated.27
23 Bush, 2012. 409.
24 Krieg, Andreas. Motivations fo r  Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical and Em pirical Considerations. 
Berlin: Springer Science and Business Media, September 3, 2012. 76.
25 Lofland, Valerie J. Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope. Newport: The United 




The Bush Administration in Its Second Half, Leadership, Processes, and Strong
Voices
In Presidential Command, Peter Rodman gives us a snapshot o f an administration 
that was the closest thing to a finely oiled policy making machine as any in U.S. history. 
He describes the Bush leadership team as “the most collegial and smoothest run” of the 
administrations he reviewed in his study.28 The key leaders in the administration had 
worked with one another before, and in varying hierarchical situations. For example, 
Colin Powell was National Security Advisor while Bush was Vice President, and Bush 
had been Director of Central Intelligence when Richard Cheney was White House Chief 
o f Staff. According to Steve Yetiv, who covered the same team and their decision 
making process for the First Gulf War, George H.W. Bush was one o f the most 
knowledgeable and prepared foreign policy presidents in the history o f the Republic,29 
noting that he was often better informed and educated on key issues than his cabinet 
subordinates.30 On the other hand, while this was invaluable in the case o f the Gulf War, 
it must be noted that none o f the senior members o f the administration were Africa hands, 
and by natural processes this tended to push African issues down in level o f apparent 
importance. Bush himself cites his military service as something which helped to inform 
his decision making, and this is significant considering that he is the last U.S. President to 
have served in combat.31 Bush’s leadership team were nearly all supportive o f him first
28 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making o f  Foreign Policy from  
Nixon to G eorge W. Bush. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 180.
29 Yetiv, Steve. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision Making and the G ulf War. 1 ed. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 9.
30 Rodman. 180.
31 Bush, 2012. 441.
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and their bureaucratic identities second. The sense o f camaraderie and common purpose 
among the Bush team were so strong that confrontations between them were inevitably 
the result o f poor information sharing on decisions rather than on purposeful deception or 
disagreement.32
Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor, came to embody the position, 
having held it before during the Ford Presidency. He is described as being wholly the 
president’s man, but he was also an innovator, establishing the NSC Principals 
Committee, which regularly consisted of the full NSC without the president.33 Such a 
gathering of senior leaders allowed for stronger, more final results than the already 
existing Deputies Committee. Scowcroft also brought the intellectual strength and 
organizational prowess to successfully help Bush to coordinate the activities of his two 
principal subordinates, Defense Secretary Cheney and Secretary o f State James Baker, 
both o f whom were powerful personalities, but also known for their absolute loyalty to 
the president. Cheney, in particular, is described by Rodman as being “The classic 
example of a cabinet secretary acting as the president’s man at the head o f his 
department, imposing the president’s agenda, not as the spokesman to the president of his 
department’s institutional agenda.”34 Secretary Baker is seen in a similar light in terms of 
his loyalty to the president. Although by the time o f the events in question, Baker had 
left the Department o f State, his temporary successor, Lawrence Eagleburger, continued 
in a similar vein to his predecessor.
Jon Western, in “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and 





decision makers in the Bush Administration as “selective engagers” who were able to 
build a frame of the situation in Somalia as being based on such deep seeded historical 
enmities that the U.S. intervention would be ineffective and dangerous.35 Because of 
their paramount positions in the administration, this group had superior access to 
information and influence to get their point of view across, and this explains why they 
were able to delay their selection o f option to intervene. In this analysis, one reason for 
the resistance to intervention by the administration was that, with the end o f the Cold 
War, the Horn o f Africa, which had been a significant flashpoint in the struggle between 
east and west, had significantly diminished in importance generally and as a threat to 
U.S. national security specifically. The opposing group, which eventually won out and 
drove through the implementation o f intervention, are termed “Liberal Humanitarians,” 
and include some in government but primarily the consist o f non-governmental 
organizations focused on human rights and food issues. This argument concludes that it 
was collusion with the media that allowed the liberal humanitarians to win out and secure 
intervention on humanitarian lines.37
Key to any intervention would be the Department o f Defense (DOD). Following 
the end o f the Cold War, the department was operating under the so called Powell 
Doctrine, which was adopted from a similar Reagan era policy championed by then 
Secretary o f State Caspar Weinberger. Under this doctrine, the U.S. would only 
intervene militarily in situations in which it could quickly commit overwhelming force on 
a rapid timetable for mission completion and success. Leaping into civil wars, or
35 Western, Jon. “Sources o f  Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. 




seemingly unending commitments, was anathema to the spirit of the doctrine, and it was 
adhered to adamantly by DOD officials until the remarkable turnaround o f November 
1992.38 Even with the change in DOD opinion, the influence o f the Powell Doctrine is 
still clearly visible in the form in which the decision to intervene was made, and its 
mandate that the mission was only one o f providing food aid in Somalia rather than 
acknowledging the political nature o f the disaster, and also in the initial proposal that the 
intervention last no longer than Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993.39
The end o f the Cold War was also forcing a review o f structures, organizations, 
and outlook in the Department, under the leadership of Richard Cheney, as Secretary, and 
Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. There was a sense that the U.S. 
should not “go it alone” in countering threats, but should do so as the leader o f a coalition 
of friends and allies. The Defense Planning Guidance for 1992 emphasized that the U.S. 
must be willing to continue to provide the decisive leadership for such coalitions and 
missions.40 This would be borne out when President Bush decided to intervene in 
Somalia with a military force.
Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r  Intervention
In the early days o f the crisis in Somalia, leadership from within the Bush 
administration was primarily provided by a group o f junior level leaders, primarily in the 
Department o f State. Herman Cohen states that this was because o f an ongoing budget
38 Powell. 557.
39 Poole, Walter S. The Effort to Save Somalia. Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office o f  the 
Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff, 2005. 2.
40 Cheney, Richard. In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2011. 236.
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crisis and a feeling of conflict fatigue, with over a dozen U.S. commitments around the 
world since the end o f the Cold War.41 In spite of this, Congress, became the strongest 
and most consistent supporter o f relief aid, and, later, intervention in the struggling 
country.42 Although the final decision for U.S. intervention was made relatively quickly, 
the groundwork for the ultimate decision stretched out over the whole o f 1992. In 
January, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 733, which provided for armed 
intervention, imposed an arms embargo on the country, called for a cease-fire, and 
mandated the deployment of unarmed cease fire monitors. Ironically, as it would turn 
out, the resolution passed in this form in spite o f efforts by the U.S. delegation to the UN 
to weaken its provisions43 The U.S. would continue to classify the crisis in Somalia as a 
food issue through the decision making process and well into the intervention, which had 
the benefit o f securing support across the interagency community, but would have 
significant consequences when the intervention was well underway.44 Indeed, it was only 
the insistence on starvation rather than politics as the central issue in Somalia that 
eventually made military intervention possible, since the DOD would never have agreed 
to intervene, nor would the president have directed them to, had Somali politics have 
seemed to be paramount.45
Meanwhile, the Department o f State, and particularly the Africa Bureau under 
Cohen, began a push to raise awareness o f the Somalia issue in the government, with an
41 Cohen. 207.
42 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey. Learningfrom Somalia. Boulder, Colorado: W estview Press, 1997. 
191.
43 Natsios. 1. This was because the U.S. was concerned about payments for UN peacekeeping operations, 
o f  which there were already 12 at the time.
44 Interview with Ambassador Herman Cohen, May 12, 2004, in Rutherford. 22.
45Talentino. 113.
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opening step being to steadily increase the number o f meetings on the Somalia issue.46 
This desire for greater attention was echoed by other key players on the international aid 
and development scene at the Assistant Secretary level, most notably Andrew Natsios of 
the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (OFDA), and later the director o f the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In a congressional hearing in 
January, 1992, Natsios called the crisis in Somalia the “Worst in the world, with up to 
90% of children under age five were malnourished.”47
In terms o f international pressure to act, the primary motivator for overall action 
was UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali, who as an Egyptian saw the crisis in 
Somalia as a personal issue and one which he would expend much capital to have solved. 
Boutros-Gali was closely associated with several o f the key players mentioned above, 
such as Cohen, and Undersecretary o f State for International Security Affairs Frank 
Wisner 48 In addition to the personal nature o f the conflict for the UN Secretary General, 
he also suffered from a case o f UN triumphalism. Boutros-Gali believed that the post- 
Cold War world was the time o f the UN, which he called “the central instrument for the 
prevention and resolution o f conflicts and the preservation of peace.”49 Further, he 
expected the membership o f the UN, more specifically the members of the Security 
Council, and very specifically the US and the other Cold War winners to bear more 
burdens in support of the UN, famously calling out the west for its willingness to engage
46 Cohen. 205.
47 U.S. House o f  Representatives Select Committee on Hunger. “Humanitarian Tragedy in Somalia: 
Hearing Before the Select Committee on Hunger.” 102nd Cong., 2d Sess, report serial No. 102-120, 30 
January, 1992. 5. Testimony by Andrew Natsios.
48 Interview with Ambassador Herman Cohen, in Rutherford. 22.
49 Boutros-Gali, Boutros. Agenda fo r  Peace. New York, United Nations, June 1992. 
http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439. Accessed on October 
10, 2014.
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what he called a “rich man’s war” in European Bosnia while ignoring the plight of 
Africans, and in particular Somalis.50
It is worth noting that all voices in the Department o f State were not unanimous as 
to the sources and primary nature o f the problem in Somalia. While the Africa Bureau, 
with the backing of USAID, consistently pointed to the food crisis as the paramount issue 
in the country, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, led by John Bolton, 
continued to insist that the primary problem was the political infighting in the country 
and its impact on the security situation.51 At the time o f the intervention, significant 
media sources seemed to side with the position of Bolton, with the New York Times in 
particular emphasizing the need to disarm the Somali warlords as part o f the 
intervention. The most significant resistance to a focus on Africa came, however, not at 
the deputy level, but at the top, where Secretary Baker was little focused on the issue, but 
increasingly dominated by the presidential campaign which he left to join in August 
1992.
The U.S. Congress, and in particular the Congressional Black Caucus and key 
Senate leaders such as Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, were central in pushing, in an 
increasingly louder tone, for increased U.S. action in Somalia. According to the 
Congressional Record, there were 162 events in with Somalia mentioned, covering both 
the Senate and House of Representatives, during the 102nd Congress. To demonstrate the 
increase in importance of the issue, 44 o f those events took place over all o f 1991. 118
50 Boutros-Gali, Boutros. “Remarks in the UN Security Council, July 23, 1992.” Facts on File, Vol. 52, 
No. 2700. 623.
51 Cohen. 207.
52 Bonner, Raymond. “Buy up the Somali’s Guns.” New York Times, December 2, 1992. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/02/opinion/buy-up-the-somalis-guns.html. Accessed on August 20,
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occurred in 1992, and 86 of those are from June onwards.53 In June, 1992, for example, a 
note to Bush signed by 88 House members implored the president to increase Somalia to 
the highest priority for U.S. attention and action, calling the situation “an unprecedented 
humanitarian disaster.”54 They find no evidence that any media report induced the 
administration to launch the airlift, rather that the airlift announcement incited the uptick 
in coverage.55 Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger stated that it was congressional 
pressure, rather than the media, which generated support for the airlift. His term for what 
did work was "...intense pressure from key members o f congress." In his estimation 
Senator Kassebaum’s visit in July was the turning point, and was undertaken specifically 
to engender media pressure.56 On July 22, her trip report appeared in an ABC Evening 
News story which directly prompted President Bush to meet with Secretaries Cheney and 
Baker to discuss and commence the airlift.57
In response, the Senate went directly to the source o f U.S. relief operations, 
requesting that USAID immediately step up its support for relief efforts, including further 
mobilization o f the Office o f Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).58 OFDA 
Administrator James Kunder notably echoed Andrew Natsios’ statements on the dire 
situation in Somalia.59 A series o f seven hearings began in the spring in several House 
committees right up through the decision to intervene, with queries and requests for 
action sent from the Congress to all of the U.S. players, Secretary General Boutros-Gali,
53 Congressional Research Service. “Congressional Record o f  the 102nd Congress.” 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2. Accessed on 9 October, 2014.
54 Office o f  U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. “Situation Report No. 10, ‘Somalia-Civil Strife’” 23 June 
1992. 3.
35 Livingston, Stephen and Eachus, Todd. "Humanitarian Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the 
CNN Effect Reconsidered." Political Communication 12, 1995: 413-429. 425.
56 Interview with Secretary Eagleburger on May 12, 1995, Livingston and Eachus. 425.
57 Livingston and Eachus. 426.
58 Rutherford. 39.
59 Livingston and Eachus. 424.
119
relevant international organizations, and even several o f the Somali faction leaders to 
raise awareness, gamer support, and urge action.60
This is not to say that the voice of Congress was unanimous, as significant 
resistance existed, based on several factors. The major cause o f complaint was the 
perceived price o f the operation.61 Another was a reluctance to have the UN take charge 
of such a massive, but delicate issue as the resupply effort. Some democrats resisted on 
the principal that the whole problem in Somalia could be traced back to republican led 
actions in the Reagan administration in support o f the Barre regime, although this was 
refuted by the administration.
By July, 1992, pressure from all of the aforementioned sources increased to the 
point that the White House began actively pressuring the Department of State to develop 
an array o f policy responses for Somalia, under the leadership o f Herman Cohen and the 
Department’s Africa Bureau. President Bush, although beginning to feel some pressure 
to act, did so at this time only on the pretext of developing ways to better assist the UN 
mission.63 As a result of these pressures to intervene somewhere in the world, which 
openly manifested themselves at the 1992 Republican National Convention, President 
Bush announced on August 14th one week before the start of the convention, that the U.S. 
would commence the transport o f relief supplies to Somalia.64 The airlift was undertaken 
with the support o f Kenya, but America’s traditional allies in Europe remained focused
60 Clarke and Herbst. 6.
61 Oakley and Hirsch. 37. At this time the U.S. already owed the Security Council over a $100 million for 
the support o f  peacekeeping operations.
62 Ibid. 37. The source o f  this complaint was Democrat Howard Wolpe o f  Michigan.
63 Brent Scowcroft, as interviewed by Western. 125. Western quotes Scowcroft on the mechanism for this 
decision, also noting that it was the Hempstone cable from Kenya, and it’s posting in the Washington Post, 
which inspired the response.
64 Fitzwater, Marlon. “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Additional Humanitarian Aid for 
Somalia.” Washington, D.C. August 14, 1992.
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=4676&year=1992&month=8
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on events in Russia during 1992.65 Notably, this was the last major administration 
decision on Somalia before the November elections. This decision was undertaken so 
quickly that the Kenyan government was not notified beforehand, which was significant 
since the neighboring country would necessarily be a location from which relief efforts 
would be launched.66 The airlift was, in hindsight, the fundamental policy shift that set 
the administration on the road to full intervention, and yet it was not decisive, since the 
main player in any intervention, the DOD, was still not compelled to cooperate beyond 
the airlifts, in spite o f Department o f State proposals that troops also be used to guard the 
supply distribution centers.
While the airlift did succeed in significantly increasing the amount o f food on 
hand in the crisis areas, the fact that the aerial ports o f debarkation were not secured 
meant that the local militants were able to seize a growing amount of relief aid for 
themselves, with OFDA claiming that the amount o f aid actually reaching Somalis fell by 
nearly half during this period due to corruption and violence.67 Furthermore, with the 
onset of the 1992 election, interest in Somalia by the senior leaders o f the Bush 
administration was at a low ebb. However, interest was maintained, and increased, 
through some portentous moves the secondary level o f decision making, such as the 
appointment o f Frank Wisner, a known advocate for African Affairs, as undersecretary of 
State for International Security Affairs, with a specific brief to develop strategies for 
Somali relief. Wisner and the NSC Deputies Committee, with Walter Kansteiner
65 Lofland. 58.
66 Hempstone, Smith. Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir. Sewanee, TN: University o f  the South 
Press, 1997. 21.
67 OFDA Situation reports numbers 13, 14, and 18, covering September 16, October 1, and November 6,
1992. In Oakley and Hirsch. 25.
68 Ibid. 41.
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serving as Scowfcroft’s eyes and ears there, would have to struggle between the 
competing distractions o f the political campaign, Bosnia, and other, seemingly more 
threatening and promising events in Africa, such as the planning for free elections in 
South Africa as well as the increasingly violent civil wars in Mozambique and Angola.69 
With all o f this in mind, the Deputies Committee, through September and October, came 
to the conclusion that the airlift should be ended by December, and that a brigade sized 
force o f approximately 3,000 personnel would be needed to secure the supply areas from 
corruption and pillage. They strongly encouraged greater UN involvement both in the 
supply and security operations, and offered to transport the multi-battalion UN force 
which was promised for Somalia on 4 November.70
President Bush began to get personally and deeply involved in the Somalia issue 
in July, 1992, in response to pressure from Congress and media reports on the situation in 
the country, and with Somalia already emerging as a campaign issue. He provided direct 
comment as well as a series of personal follow up questions to a report based on OFDA 
Director James Kunder’s visit to Somalia on 2 August and a report from the U.S. 
Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hemptsone, which provided a description o f how the unrest 
in Somalia was bleeding across their shared border.71 His "A Day in Hell" cable was so 
powerful and moving that Brent Scowcroft ensured that it was seen by the president.72 
Bush was described as acting with a “burst o f energy” by Herman Cohen in his memoirs 
on his time working with Africa issues. This increased interest culminated in a move
69 Interview with Walter Kansteiner, National Security Council Africa Desk Officer, March 29, 1999. 
Western. 134.
70 Poole. 12-13.
71 Kunder, James. “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
African Affairs.” September 16, 1992.
72 Livingston and Eachus. 425.
73 Cohen. 208.
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by the administration to encourage the UN to markedly increase the number of 
peacekeepers allocated to Somalia by 3500, up from the 500 currently allowed.
From August onwards, the administration’s focus was dominated by the 1992 
presidential electoral campaign, which the Bush administration lost by the largest margin 
o f an incumbent president since 1912.74 The campaign saw the challenger, William 
Clinton, repeatedly accuse the administration o f complacency for its failure to act in 
either Bosnia or Somalia.75 While Bush continued to show interest in the Somalia crisis, 
it was not until after the election that his interest returned and indeed peaked, and within 
days after the polling ended Bush increased the frequency and intensity o f his questioning 
and directed his staff to come up with viable options to ease the suffering.76 This level of 
planning for action would primarily take place at the Pentagon, which, for reasons of 
bureaucratic structure, was pushed down to a secondary level (being handled at first by 
SOLIC, the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict directorate), which 
recommended that any action be done as part o f the UN mandate and not as a unilateral
77U.S. action. This recommendation, in modified form, influenced the decision to couch 
the U.S. intervention strictly in terms of the UN mandate. However, reporting from the 
CIA warned that a UN only approach was not feasible due to the high vulnerability of 
lightly armed UN forces to lethal attack from the forces o f the warlords.78 This meant 
that better armed U.S. forces would be required at some point.
74 Greenstein, Fred I. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from  FDR to Barack Obama, 3rd  ed. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 169.
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Public Opinion and the Somalia Intervention
Direct comparisons were made between the unfolding humanitarian disaster in 
Somalia and the other major concurrent international issue, the devolution o f Yugoslavia,
70and in particular the privations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It must be kept in mind that the 
Somalia intervention, unlike the other case studies, took place without significant 
coverage by public opinion surveys and polling, particularly during the initial decision to 
intervene, although that would change near the end o f the operation.80 Television 
coverage o f the conflict in Somalia was non-existent into the first quarter o f 1992, while
Q 1
newspaper coverage among the major papers was also extremely limited. Media interest 
in Somalia remained slight until mid-summer, when it increased in intensity and 
frequency of coverage. From June 1992 on, however, print coverage steadily rose, and 
by August, over 100 articles per month were appearing, along with twenty to twenty five 
television news pieces.
Louis Klarevas notes that the decision by Bush to start the airlift raised public 
attention somewhat during the fall, but also said that news coverage peaked only twice, 
once in December, 1992, when the intervention began, and once near its end after the 
Battle o f Mogadishu in October, 1993.83 This polling data puts further lie to the idea that
79 Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary o f  State for Political Military Affairs, said that “The memo said: 
Somalia -  Low Risk, High Payoff, Bosnia -  High Payoff, in an interview with Rothkopf, David. Running 
the World: The inside Story o f  the National Security Council and the Architects o f  American. New York: 
Perseus Group, 2005.
80 Klarevas, Louis J. “The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly Volume 64, 2000: 523-540. 524.
81 Livingston and Eachus. 419.
82 Ibid.
83 Klarevas. 524-525. Limited polling performed in September, 1992, revealed that only 11% o f  the polled 
audience followed Somalia closely, and a combined 35% showed any interest at all in the crisis. Kiarevas
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the media created the main pressure for the intervention, in spite o f the statements of 
some analysts, such as George Kennan, to the contrary.84 After the election in 
November, 1992, and Bush’s defeat, the drumbeat for intervention focused on the need to 
act before the inauguration o f William Clinton as President in January.85 Was there an 
effort by the administration to build a frame for the public in support of intervention? 
One would expect there to be, particularly since, as stated by Martin Linsky and Jonathan 
Moore, government leaders consider the media to be central in both policy
o /
implementation and agenda stetting with the public. The media therefore inform an 
audience which cannot possibly be fully informed on all issues, and policy makers must 
take account o f the opinions of the audience and the various tools for reaching those
87audiences.
Based on the records o f media coverage on Somalia and the key media pieces 
mentioned in this case study, it does appear that the U.S Government was able to 
successfully dominate the discourse on its intervention in Somalia, particularly when 
broadcast news is considered, at the outset of the crisis, although there is no evidence that 
it purposefully did so. The true deluge o f broadcast news stories about the events in 
Somalia followed, rather than led, significant government decisions. This was not the 
case with print media, however. In the case of Somalia, in many instances the media 
relied on government for key information based on initial ignorance o f the press corps,
529. Livingston noted that these numbers steadily increased through the fall, but did not exponentially rise 
until after the announcement o f  intervention after Thanksgiving, 1992. Livingston and Eachus. 420-422.
84 Livingston and Eachus. 413. Kennan (1993, September 30) is quoted as saying that there is no doubt 
that the media and images o f  suffering were the primary motivators.
85 Bell, Peter. “The Tragedy in Somalia can’t wait for Clinton.” The New York Times, November 5, 1992.
A note from the chairman o f  CARE, posted in the New York Times, noted that waiting until January might 
cost the lives o f  100,000 Somalis.
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and the public writ large, on the region and the issues. A lack o f diplomatic 
representation in the country helped to keep background interest low, since journalists 
relied on such sources for access and information.89 However, as public attention to the 
crisis grew, the lawlessness which was at the core o f the problem in Somalia made basic 
access to the country by third parties, such as the media and humanitarian aid agencies 
significantly easier than was the case in besieged Bosnia. This meant that it was possible 
for these agents to report more directly on issues in Somalia, and to, especially in the case 
of the aid agencies, eventually become agents o f change in their own right.90
Models and the Somalia Decision Process
Writing about the Persian Gulf War, Yetiv notes that the Rational Actor Model 
could not adequately explain some things, such as how President Bush would, on certain 
issues, act out seemingly impetuously in response to actions by Saddam Hussein.91 It 
appears that Bush’s decision to intervene in Somalia, and the Pentagon’s switch from 
refusal to acceptance o f the mission, should be seen in this light as well. Indeed, if  one 
takes the position, as Bush and DOD did through November 1992, that armed 
intervention in Somalia (or, for that matter, Bosnia) was an irrational act, then further 
evidence, both of Bush’s centrality to the decision making process, and the non­
rationality o f the decision to intervene, is the result.92 From a perspective o f national 
security, the decision is not rational, since the events in Somalia, as they were known at






the time, did not impact the vital security of the U.S.93 It is the impact o f personal 
politics that makes Bush’s actions rational. The airlift decision, when placed in the 
context of the political campaign, and falling as it did immediately before the Republican 
convention, is rational in that light. The final intervention decision, taken by a defeated 
president choosing to take on an operation that seemed achievable (Somalia) versus one 
that did not (Bosnia) is also a rational decision. DOD’s seeming flip flop in support for 
the operation was a result of the power of the president, and the congenial relations 
between the senior Bush leaders described above. Powell knew his boss well, and 
reacted to his desires as a good subordinate does. Once divining the commander in 
ch iefs intent, the Joint Staff then offered a series of approaches, from minimalist to 
maximum effort, and it was the maximal option that President Bush chose, while also 
agreeing to Powell’s suggestion that former Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley be 
recalled to lead the diplomatic side o f the operation.94
Furthermore, the Governmental Politics Model appears to be in operation 
throughout the Somalia decision making process. As could be expected, the DOD 
officials took a similar, common stance on intervention, as detailed in the description of 
the Powell Doctrine, which Somalia most definitely did not fit. This view changed as the 
key defense leader in the case, Colin Powell, began both to believe the mission was 
achievable, and that there was solid political benefit in doing so 95 The National Security 
Advisor adhered to the desires o f his boss, the president. OFDA and USAID favored 
intervention, as one would expect given the institutional mandates o f their organizations
93 Cohen. 201.
94 Poole. 20.
95 Lofland. 59. Powell had visited Somalia in October, and this may have also impacted his thinking, 
although he him self does not comment on this in his memoirs.
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to provide aid and humanitarian assistance to those in need, regardless o f danger. The 
Department o f State response was subdivided by relevant section, with those leaders and 
offices directly involved in Africa in favor of intervention, and some o f those with other 
or wider foci against, which does affirm the GPM in which what leaders say and do 
depends upon which agency they come from more than any other factor.
In terms o f the question of government framing of the crisis, during the summer 
debates and leading into the fall, there is limited evidence that either pro or con 
intervention forces attempted to use the media to frame the debate.96 There were some 
exceptions, including Natsios, who did turn to the media in an effort to secure funding 
and support for interventions. This, o f course, does not apply to outside o f government 
figures. Secretary General Boutros-Gali and representatives from numerous 
humanitarian aid organizations turned to the media, particularly the editorial pages o f the 
major papers, in an attempt to influence the debate.97 By fall. 1992, Boutros-Gali was 
pushing for a U.S. or international intervention under the auspices o f Article VII o f the
QO
UN Charter. Natsios openly believed that government framing was needed in order to 
secure intervention and he actively courted the media, being quoted over 50 times over 
the course o f 1992." Up until the switch by DOD, then the GPM seems to hold, but then 
it fails to provide a satisfactory result, such result which can only be applied by 
examining the role o f the powerful actor to sway decision making and opinion. In this 
case, it happened that the powerful actor also happened to be the most powerful actor, 
President Bush.
96 Livingston and Eachus. 422.
97 Ibid.
98 Cohen. 210.
99 Livingston and Eachus. 424.
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From the time o f the airlift decision in August, 1992, the Bush administration, 
with increasing pressure from within, in the form of continued and increased meetings 
and statements from Department o f State and USAID leaders, and from outside, in the 
form of Congressional and UN statements, began to push for more international support 
for a larger intervention. Both relief agencies and foreign governments asked for U.S. 
support to move supplies and peacekeepers in in accordance with UNSC 767, while the 
U.S. sought the assistance and involvement o f other major powers, particularly the UK 
and France. 45,000 metric tons o f relief supplies were delivered over the course of the 
airlift, but the reports from the media, NGOs, and fact finding missions continued to paint 
a bleak and monetarily costly picture of Somalia.100
Meanwhile, the U.S. media, which had been remarkably quiet on the Somalia 
issue, began to make itself heard, particularly with a New York Times piece on July 31 
which detailed the failure o f the UN to adequately deal with the food crisis.101 Other 
New York Times pieces that week specifically called out the administration and began to 
demand action. Media interest and pressure dovetailed with increasing demands from 
NGO’s for assistance with the mission.102
Decision making for intervention now fell to a traditional interagency process, 
chaired by the National Security Council, with a Deputies Committee chaired by Admiral 
Jonathan Howe in his role as Deputy National Security Advisor. In the meetings which 
followed, each deputy brought his own department’s plans and options to the table, in
100 Sommer. 22-23.
101 Rutherford. 45. The article, from the New York Times, was entitled “U.S. Says Airlifts Fail Somali 
N eedy.. .”. Up to that time, the author notes that the major television networks only mentioned Somalia 15 
times in the first half o f  2014, and most o f  those mentions were brief. That would change in the second 
half o f  the year.
102 Ibid. 67.
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accordance with Allison’s models. In this case, however, Howe was able to override 
departmental prerogatives and develop a unified strategy.103 This was, in part, because of 
a turnaround in the position o f the Department of Defense on the intervention, especially 
given that the conditions that General Powell and the Department o f Defense laid down 
as essential for a successful intervention, namely that the mission be well defined, were 
no closer to being met than they had been throughout 1992. A formal working group on 
Somalia was established under Ambassador Brandon Grove, which came to the rapid 
conclusion that a forceful, armed intervention would be required in order to provide the 
relief that Somalia needed.104
Building on what it claimed were its keys to victory in the Persian Gulf War, 
meaning a tightly defined mission, with a solid timeline for implementation, the 
Department o f Defense resisted efforts to push for an armed humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia on the grounds that the mission was ill defined and had no definite timeline. The 
main point of the argument was that the issue in Somalia was a lack o f a solid political 
basis for decision making or consensus building. By definition, this would create a 
situation where, if  U.S. troops did intervene, one side or the other o f the political 
continuum would resist, forcing the Coalition to choose sides in a mission that was 
supposed to be about feeding people.105 This combined with difficult terrain features 
(interesting for an armed force that had, a year prior, successfully completed full combat 
operations in far worse terrain in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq) and a perception that it
103 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey, Somalia and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention. Foreign 
Affairs, March/April 1996. http://www.foreignaffairs.eom/articles/51844/walter-clarke-and-jeffrey-herbst. 
73. Members o f  the Committee included: Howe as Deputy National Security Advisor, Wisner and Cohen 
for the DOD. The Department o f  Defense sent Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs 
o f  Staff. The Office o f  Foreign Disaster Assistance sent its director and senior staff.
104 Natsios, Andrew. “Humanitarian R elief in Somalia: The Economics o f  Chaos.” In Clarke and Herbst, 
1997. 78. Natsios was present when Bush related this information.
105 Interview with Kansteiner, 1999. Western. 116.
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would be very difficult to distinguish friend from foe in an environment where the 
combatants did not wear uniforms. The DOD remained the main hold out against 
intervention, not wanting to have to “fix the civil war,” as its senior leaders believed they 
were being told to do by the NSC.106 As late at the 20th o f November, the Deputies 
meeting on Somalia paid lip service to intervention while focusing on providing 
monetary and logistical support, but not military assistance, to the small cadre o f UN 
peacekeepers on the ground in the country.107
The deputies meeting on 21 November, 1992 became pivotal for the decision 
making process. Admiral Jeremiah, speaking for his lead, Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs 
o f Staff Colin Powell, switched the Pentagon’s former position, stating that his 
department was capable o f accomplishing the food aid and relief mission if so 
requested.108 The caveats were that there be no mission creep beyond the food operation 
and that the operation be short in duration, given the doctrinal mission of the forces to be 
used (The Marines).109 Furthermore, Powell sought to explicitly opt out o f a Bosnia 
intervention in return for acceding to the Somalia intervention.110 At this time, three use 
of force options were provided by the Pentagon, with each recommending a greater 
military footprint. With this advice given, President Bush decided to act two days later, 
and to select the option that utilized the strongest military force recommended.111
The DOD switch had come after the election, when, concurrent with a return of 
focus by President Bush, Scowcroft, Cheney, and Powell began discussions to reverse the
106 Oakley and Hirsch. 37.
107 Interview with Herman Cohen, March 30, 1999. Western. 136.
108 Oakley and Hirsch. 43.
109 Cohen. 211-212. Cohen remembers that the strongest choicer was selected because the intermediate 
option, a UN led operation, would have taken six months to implement.
1 0 Strobel, Warren P. Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute o f  Peace, 1997. 139.
111 Clarke and Herbst, 1996, 9.
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DOD policy, in coordination with General Hoar, at that time Commanding the relevant 
regional combatant command, US Central Command.112 CENTCOM, as part o f its 
doctrinal planning process, had already developed some plans for interventions in the 
Horn o f Africa region, and had gone so far as to designate the First Marine Expeditionary 
Force (I MEF) based in Camp Pendleton, California, as the primary unit for potential 
armed humanitarian interventions.113
Given that Bush is reported to have made his decision to intervene after a briefing 
of under an hour on 23 November, 1992, the question of why the change o f position must 
be asked. Several reasons reveal themselves. While not a factor in his August decision 
to start the airlift, media pressure, in the form of television news footage o f the victims of 
starvation in Somalia, is cited as a reason for Bush’s November decision both by acting 
Secretary of State Eagleburger and by Colin Powell.114 Political pressure from Congress 
and from liberal activists in the lower tiers of the administration is one reason, along with 
pressure from the UN, the NGO community, and increasingly by the media.115 Another 
is that the Bush administration, in seeking to establish its legacy in the aftermath of 
electoral defeat, wished to go out with a positive act on the world stage. Jon Western 
noted in an interview with National Security Advisor Scowcroft that Bush became more 
and more personally effected by the reporting coming from Somalia.116 Beneath the 
fa?ade of the Cold Warrior, Bush was actually predisposed to action by events in his vice
112 Oakley and Hirsch. 42. A note on Combatant Commands. At this time military oversight o f  U.S. 
affairs in Africa was divided, with Africa outside o f  the Horn o f  Africa falling under command o f  U.S. 
European Command, based in Germany, while the Horn o f  Africa, which included the countries relevant 
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presidency under Ronald Reagan. During the Sahel crisis of the early 1980s (made 
famous in part by the “We are the World” USA for Africa fundraising effort), Bush 
visited a CARE camp attempting to feed the dying, and he witnessed the suffering and 
death of victims in very similar circumstances to those reported to him from Somalia. In 
a more pragmatic vein, intervening in largely Muslim Somalia would allow him to reject 
pressure to do so in Muslim Bosnia coming from the Arab world, particularly Saudi 
Arabia. Similar pressure was exerted over the race o f the victims in Somalia, allowing 
the administration to deflect cries o f racism and differential treatment o f white Europeans 
in Yugoslavia over black Africans.1,7
Another concern for Bush was that the incoming president would be little inclined 
to act with decisiveness abroad, so that getting the intervention going before he took 
office would lock him into continuing it. On one hand, this seems to be disputed by 
Bush’s statement that the intervention would be wrapped up by inauguration day, and by 
the statement he made to Powell that “I don’t want to stick Clinton with an ongoing
1 1 Q
military operation.” On the other hand, Powell, Scowcroft, and Cheney all replied that 
there was little chance that the intervention could be wrapped up in such a short time, 
with Bush agreeing to the operation regardless.119 With the decision to act somewhere in 
mind, there were two choices for action, Bosnia and Somalia. To paraphrase a statement 
by later Secretary o f Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Bosnia was a “known known,” and what 
was known was ugly. Bosnia was guaranteed to be a quagmire in terms o f money, 
manpower, and national reputation. Somalia, although also known to have significant
117 Clarke, Richard, Director o f  the DOD Office o f  International Programs, interview with the authors. July 




problems, seemed to be by far the easier of the two missions to accomplish militarily, 
while also getting the benefit of defusing the increasing calls from the UN and the media 
for intervention somewhere. Some in the DOD may have thought that intervention in 
Somalia would be cheaper, quicker, and less of a burden than a similar intervention in 
Bosnia.120
President Elect Clinton, whose own actions had helped to bring about his electoral 
victory and increased pressure on the administration to act, continued that pressure after 
the election, pushing for intervention in Bosnia but accepting o f the Bush decision to do
I |
so in Somalia. This is all the more interesting since it marked a sea change in how 
lame-duck presidents could be empowered to act. In his own memoires, Clinton stated 
that he did not feel that he had been entrapped, that “Bush had been very helpful,” and
I ^
that “I felt that he wanted me to succeed as president.” Given that Bush’s failure to act 
in Somalia or Bosnia was a key facet o f Clinton’s campaign against him, he could hardly 
have said otherwise when Bush did act.
On December 3rd, 1992, The UN Security Council enacted resolution 794, which 
laid the framework for the establishment o f a multinational relief force under U.S. 
direction. The following day, President Bush congratulated Boutros Gali on the 
resolution, pledged his support, and reiterated the humanitarian nature and expected short 
duration o f the proposed U.S. intervention.124 Operation Restore Hope (The U.S. aspect 
o f UNITAS) was also announced on December 4th 1992, and on December 9th, U.S. Navy
120 Talentino, 115.
121 Western. 136. Western notes that the Joint Chiefs very much wanted to avoid intervention in Bosnia, 
and that Powell’s reversal came after a transition meeting with Clinton, and in part was the Pentagon opting 
for what it thought was the lesser o f  two evils.
122 Western. 135. Customarily, significant Presidential Activity ceased between the election and the 
innaguration o f  the incoming Chief Executive.
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Seals and Marines landed on the beaches south of Mogadishu, to a media circus, and 
UNITAF, the United Task Force implementing the operation began. As mandated by 
UNSCR 794, U.S. forces assumed command of the operation, and provided 25,000 out of 
37,000 personnel. In accordance with Bush’s planning guidance that the operation be a 
coalition, 28 partner nations contributed to the effort. Within days o f the launch of the 
operation, Pentagon leaders were already mandating the seizure o f weapons and 
disarming o f combatants.126
By March, 1993, UNITAF was converted into UNISOM II, ending the period of 
the case study. Viewed purely in terms of UNITAF’s mandate to alleviate starvation in 
Somalia, the operation was a success, with approximately 100,000 lives saved by all 
means deployed. But the fundamental issue of a political settlement to underwrite the aid 
was never adequately addressed. In another example in which the failure to plan for a 
long term operation manifested itself, eight to ten reserve civil affairs units were to have 
been deployed, but were cancelled because the operation was supposed to only last six
177weeks. Similarly, since food was the focus, there was no clear vision o f how 
reconciliation should proceed.128 However, the lack o f a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict led President Clinton to accept the transition to UNOSOM II, the force which 
ultimately met its demise following the events portrayed in “Blackhawk Down,” in which 
eighteen U.S. service personnel were killed a running battle with Aidid henchmen,
125 The Pentagon encouraged this as a follow up to Powell’s request to the White House to help build public 
support for the operation. Interview with Kansteiner, 1999. Western. 138.
126 Sciolino, Elaine, “Mission to Somalia: The Big Job Ahead.” The New York Times, December 4, 1992.
A 23.
127 Clarke and Herbst. 1996. 77.
128 Ibid. 78.
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creating a media circus as their bodies were seen to be drug through the streets of 
Mogadishu. U.S. forces were withdrawn soon afterwards.
Conclusion
“The first step in planning for humanitarian peace-enforcement operations must 
be the articulation of an integrated humanitarian-political-military strategy that 
responds to the immediate humanitarian crisis while outlining a longer-term 
process designed to resolve the underlying political issues that may have brought 
on the crisis in the first place. These actions must be consistent with international 
values and standards o f conduct.”
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 1997.129
This case study set out to examine the decision to intervene in Somalia, with 
several questions in mind. It laid out the timeline o f the crisis, to include its causes as 
well as the key decision points, who made and influenced them, and how those decisions 
played out in the final act, the intervention o f December 1992. Although there was 
significant action by lower level members o f the decision making cycle, in the case of the 
Somalia intervention, none o f them had the power to compel President Bush to act 
singularly. It is clear from the evidence presented, and from his known style of 
governing, that the decision to intervene came from the top, as only the president, at the 
top o f the decision cycle, could have compelled a clearly unwilling Department o f 
Defense to change its mind on intervention. Even Powell’s apparent horse trade of 
Somali intervention with avoiding the same in Bosnia with President Elect Clinton came 
after the election, at a time when Bush was already seriously considering an expansion of
129 Clarke and Herbst. 1997. 4.
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the U.S. role in Somalia as it became clear that the airlift was not working as expected. 
We cannot, o f course, know if his defeat impacted the decision making process, or if  a 
victorious Bush would still have decided for intervention, however, based on statements 
by Powell and Eagleburger that it was pressure from the media and NGO’s that prompted 
Bush, it is reasonable to believe that he would have acted in the same way even if he’d 
have won. If his reaction was purely to secure his legacy and to compel Clinton, then the 
operation might have been different in time and scale if Bush had won, but it would 
likely still have taken place. Further, if media and Congressional pressure were the key 
drivers, then a returning Bush may have not been able to resist the mission creep and 
change in focus that eventually doomed the operation.
In terms o f framing, the evidence presented shows that the media largely followed 
the lead set by the government. While some of the key players used the media to 
facilitate their own efforts to force decisions on key issues, such as the airlift decision, 
there is no evidence that framing by the government was undertaken in a systematic way, 
or that such decisions were an implicit part o f the decision making cycle for the decision 
to intervene in Somalia. In spite of the lack of a conscious decision to frame, decision 
makers did frame the media. This took place more because o f the primacy of the 
government as an information holder and broker, and because of the unique nature, and 
high danger, of the situation on the ground, which put the government in the position of 
having a monopoly on the information needed by the media to go to press in an accurate 
fashion.
U.S. policy toward interventions changed as a result o f the perception o f failure of 
the Somalia intervention, with a significant reduction recommended for future
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interventions.130 Had Bush been reelected, and been able to resist the pressure to change 
the initial mission, this might not have been the case. The first major intervention after 
the Cold War lead to significant questions on what armed humanitarian intervention 
meant, when they were appropriate, and what goals were appropriate for future efforts. 
Gone was the idea that a large military force, intervening in a sovereign nation, could do 
so in an apolitical fashion, without taking sides in the dispute at the heart o f the crisis.131 
OFDA proposed that the U.S. aid community and the DOD develop an early warning 
system for humanitarian crisis which might allow for pre-emption, an early U.S. move 
toward what would later become the concept o f Responsibility to Protect.132 Even UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Gali, in his "Agenda for Peace", published in 1995, showed 
the negative impact of the failed mission in Somalia, with a dampened ardor for 
intervention. Congress too had its enthusiasm for intervention dampened significantly, 
with the total price in dollars, lives, and political capital lost proving to be more than 
could be borne.
All of these factors would have repercussions for future interventions, most 
particularly for the failure of the international community to react adequately to a crisis 
which was brewing south-west of Somalia, and which in fact came to prominence just 
days after the Mogadishu battle. The genocide in Rwanda, which began soon after the 
end of the Somalia mission, would redefine the terms o f western armed humanitarian 
intervention and shape future discussions of state sovereignty, failed states, and human 
security.
130 Clarke and Herbst. 1996. 70.
131 Ibid. 82.
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To Intervene and Not Intervene - Clinton Studies: Rwanda and Kosovo 
Mini Case Study - To Not Intervene: Rwanda and Its Impact on Humanitarian
Intervention
“It (The U.S.) led a successful effort to remove most o f the UN peacekeepers who 
were already in Rwanda. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent 
authorization o f UN reinforcements. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans 
were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term "genocide," for 
fear o f being obliged to act. The United States in fact did virtually nothing "to try 
to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out o f Rwanda was an explicit U.S. 
policy objective.”
Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide (2001).”1
Somalia, and the failure there, as described in the previous case study, burned the 
Clinton administration badly. It was a foreign adventure that they had not chosen, but 
had warmly supported, and when the mission failed the White House quickly withdrew 
U.S. forces and sought to distance itself from the decision to intervene and from the 
principle o f armed humanitarian intervention. But the world had not changed, and 
Yugoslavia, the mission that no one in the Bush administration wanted to tackle, still 
loomed ever larger in the international calculations. But before the Yugoslav crisis 
reached its crescendo, there was a terrible international crisis which changed the way 
interventions, national sovereignty, and human security would be seen in the future. The 
genocide in Rwanda, which saw between half a million and a million Rwandans killed in
1 Power, Samantha. “Bystanders to Genocide.” The Atlantic Monthly, September, 2001. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001 /09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571 /. Accessed on April 
20, 2014.
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the 100 day period between April and June 1994, and to which there was little western or 
U.S. reaction, was the catalyst for change.
This section will discuss the non-intervention in Rwanda, with several objectives. 
One is to show the negative impact o f the way in which the Somalia intervention ended 
on decision making moving forward. Another is to introduce a new leadership team with 
a quite different dynamic, both in relation to each other and to their outlook on decision 
making, framing, acceptable use o f the armed forces, and humanitarian interventions in 
general. Yet another is to show how a different international environment, in other 
words, more international involvement, might impact decision making and framing 
efforts. Background information on the Rwandan genocide, the UN and U.S. response, 
and the impact o f the Rwandan genocide on future thinking will be provided, linking this 
shorter study to the larger study of the Kosovo intervention which follows.
Rwanda and the World in 1994, Background to Non-Intervention
Rwanda’s ethnic divide, between Tutsi and Hutu tribes, had been a source of 
division and occasional violence since the departure o f the Belgian colonial regime in 
1960. The Belgians had favored the Tutsi minority during the colonial era, which caused 
indignation among the majority Hutu population. A civil war between the Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu peoples on the one hand and the hard line conservative Hutus on the other 
had been underway since 1990, with a cease fire and power sharing agreement known as 
the Arusha Treaty imposed by the international community in 1993 and the establishment
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of a UN peacekeeping force, (UN Mission in Rwanda or UN AMIR) in October, 1993.2 
Unfortunately the force was lightly armed, had a disjointed command structure, was 
undermanned, and in fact became victims o f the violence, with the Belgians, the best 
armed, trained, and knowledgeable o f the various contingents, withdrawing early on after 
they began to take casualties in the violence. A ceasefire in the civil war, agreed to by 
the new President, Habyarimana, was viewed with skepticism and trepidation by Hutu 
extremists, resulting in the shoot down of the presidential aircraft on April 6, 1994, while 
on approach to the airfield at Kigali, Rwanda. Although blamed on the Tutsi rebels, the 
shoot down was undertaken by Hutu extremists in retaliation for the Habyarimana’s 
relatively moderate stance toward the rebels. Notably, the area from which the pair of 
rockets which destroyed the aircraft was fired was controlled by the Presidential Guard, 
which was in turn controlled by the extremists.3 Massacres o f Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
elements began on the very next day, in what was clearly an orchestrated slaughter, 
perpetrated at first by Hutu police and military leaders. The national identity card system 
imposed by the Belgian colonial administration decades before became a chooser of the 
dead, as checkpoints were set up all over the country, and those with the wrong identities 
were killed. By late April, 1994, the International Committee o f the Red Cross estimated
2 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, a Memoir. New York, Harper Collins, 2013. 148. According to 
a memo to the US UN staff, the U.S. made it clear when it voted for the resolution, which took place two 
days before the events in Mogadishu, that its support did not include the deployment o f  U.S. forces.
Original Document from 15 April 1994 in Ferroggiaro, William, Ed. “The U.S. and Rwanda, 1994, 
Evidence o f  Inaction.” George Washington University.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/ Accessed on 14 October 2014. A collection o f  
Declassified Original documents on the information known and the decision making process.
3 United Nations. “Report o f  the Independent Inquiry into the actions o f  the United Nations during the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” December 15, 1999. www.un.org/news/ossg/rwanda_report.htm. Accessed  
on September 15, 2014. This and other reports were not available at the time o f  the decision making in 
1994.
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that up to a half a million people might have been killed in what many in the 
humanitarian aid community were terming a case o f genocide.
The Rwanda crisis flared, and ended in catastrophe, within a three month period 
from April to June in 1994, beginning when the ceasefire between the Tutsis and Hutus 
ended, and ending when the Hutus completed their reign o f terror and re-established their 
undisputed rule.4 While there were warnings and indicators that a crisis was brewing 
before it began, this still represents a significantly shorter decision making time frame 
than that for the Somalia and Kosovo case studies, and similar in length to the Libya 
cycle. In terms of the other cases examined, Talentino notes that there was at least six 
months o f lead time for the Somalia intervention (and in that case the crisis was known 
about for another 18 months before that) and two years of decision making time before 
the Kosovo intervention of 1999.5
Furthermore, historical rivalries among the great powers involved clouded the 
issue and delayed actions that might have mitigated the violence. Albright notes that the 
French support of the Hutu government and leadership went so far as to say that they had 
been provoked into the violence by Tutsi and moderate Hutu reprisals after the 
presidential aircraft shoot down, and included arms shipments before and during the 
crisis.6 Herman Cohen was not as harsh, calling the French victims of poor judgment in 
continuing support o f the Tutsis, and focusing on perceived threats from nearby Uganda 
rather than internal violence.7
4 Talentino, Andrea K. M ilitary Intervention After the C old  War: The Evolution o f  Theory and Practice. 
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005. 279.
5 Ibid. 279.
6 Albright. 150. See also Cohen, Jared. 100 Days o f  Silence: America and the Rwandan Genocide. 
Lanham, Maryland, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2007. 2.
7 Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2000. 179.
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In terms o f the UN Security Council, veto carrying members France, Russia, and 
China came down on the side of state sovereignty and declared the crisis an internal 
matter. The U.S. also leaned in this direction, with a bias toward non-interference in a 
sovereign state. Belgian efforts to cover their own failure to prevent the attacks, and 
withdrawal o f their forces, by pushing for a complete international withdrawal also 
helped to confuse the issue. Rwanda’s recognized government made no request for, nor
n
appeared receptive to, international intervention. Given that the government was 
dominated, and then fully taken over, by the conservative Hutu elements who perpetrated 
the genocide, this is not surprising, but it meant that another voice which might have 
urged intervention was silent.
Finally, there was a large scale information gap, both from intelligence, 
diplomatic, and journalistic sources. With most embassies evacuated (The U.S. mission 
was evacuated early in the crisis), the remoteness o f the country, and the level of danger 
involved, it was extremely difficult to ascertain the details o f events in country, and 
therefore to formulate appropriate responses.9 Those who were expert on the ground, 
such as Bushnell and other foreign service staff in the Africa Bureau, had become callous 
about the numbers o f dead in various disturbances over the years. In the previous year’s 
fighting in Burundi, for example, 25,000 had perished. Significant massacres o f Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu had occurred on nine different occasions from 1990 to January 1994. 
While these experts knew that something was wrong, they were shocked and numbed by 
the enormity o f the unfolding catastrophe.10 President Clinton, who had more




information than most, said that “We did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with 
which Rwanda was being engulfed by this unimaginable horror.” 11
In an effort to save face and cover up their own ignominious withdrawal, the 
Belgians wished to see a complete withdrawal o f UN forces on April 20th.12 This was in 
contrast to African members o f the UN Security Council, who according to US Mission 
to the UN deputy David Scheffer, with a clarity provided by proximity to information on 
the crisis, wanted UNAMIR to be reinforced.13 Belgium’s stance, which included 
influencing the U.S. as a NATO ally, was a major factor in the U.S. decision to refrain 
from intervening militarily in the Rwandan crisis, in spite o f efforts by Albright to alter 
this stance.14 The Council, as a result, both ignored intelligence provided by the 
UNAMIR commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, warning of the violence, and 
minimized the circulation o f his early reports on the extent o f the massacres.15 In spite o f 
his appeals for more troops and a stronger mandate, the strength o f the force he had was 
cut down to nearly nothing, from 2700 to 250 personnel, and he was censured by the 
Security Council for making the suggestion.16 As it happened, Dallaire actually kept 
about 500 troops on the ground, and it is estimated that they were able to save 
approximately 25,000 potential victims, a sign of what could have been accomplished 
had there been adequate international will power applied.17
11 CBS Evening News. Text o f  Clinton’s Rwanda Speech. March 25, 1998. CBSnews.com. Accessed on 
14 October 2014.
12 Albright. 150.
13 Scheffer, David. “Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide.” Georgetown Journal o f  International 
Relations, Summer/Fall 2004. 127.
14 Albright. 150.
15 Original January 11, 1994 in Ferroggiaro.
16 Okechukwu, Groupson-Paul. “Politics and Failures o f  Ethics o f  Humanitarian Intervention in African 




As was the case with the deterioration of Somalia in 1991-1992, the world was an 
ugly place, with a series of other crises that Albright noted tended to drown out what 
warnings there were about rising violence in Rwanda.18 Foremost among them was the 
ongoing violence in Yugoslavia. In his memoirs, President Clinton noted that the NATO 
bombing of Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the ethnic Muslim city of Gorazde began on 
the same day as the Rwandan presidential aircraft shoot down, and absorbed his 
attention.19 The U.S. was still heavily involved in operations in the Middle East, still 
instigated by an intransigent Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Economic and political reform in 
Russia still dominated the attention o f the U.S. at this time. Another political and 
humanitarian affairs distraction came in the form of the U.S. response to political unrest 
in Haiti. The U.S. reaction began with embarrassment but ended with an ouster o f the 
dictator Raoul Cedras under the threat o f U.S. military force (The threat was real, as U.S. 
forces were actually on the way to Haiti when the political deal took place).
The DOD, in the throes of post Cold War downsizing, was still wedded to the 
Powell Doctrine, all the more so after the tactics of the “Blackhawk Down” incident 
seemed to verify the Powell precept of overwhelming force. In response to the debacle in 
Mogadishu, the U.S. was in the midst o f developing a formal White House doctrine on 
peacekeeping, under the leadership o f Richard Clarke, a special assistant to Clinton 
known to be highly proficient in the bureaucratic maneuvering necessary for such a 
position. The resulting Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 225, named sixteen factors
18 Albright. 19. Among them were numerous warnings from the UNAMIR commander, including the 
January 11 ,1994 memorandum already cited.
19 Clinton, William. M y Life. N ew  York: Knopf Doubleday, 2004. 584. Specifically, Clinton says that he 
was “Preoccupied with Bosnia.”
20 Halberstam, David. War in a Time o f  Peace. New York: Scribner, 2001. 273. The embarrassment was 
the turnaround o f  a U.S. military ship carrying relief supplies to the country. The ship, the Harlan County, 
was turned away by armed militants shouting taunts about Mogadishu to the U.S. Sailors and Marines 
aboard.
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that policymakers needed to consider when deciding whether to support peacekeeping 
activities: seven were linked to U.S. support o f UN votes to start operations, even if no 
U.S. soldiers were involved. Another six, stricter criteria would limit the role o f U.S. 
forces in such operations, while three more, stricter still, would limit combat roles. The 
criteria were described as "zero degree o f involvement, and zero degree o f risk, and zero 
degree o f pain and confusion."21 The implementation of this peacekeeping doctrine in 
May, 1994 would virtually guarantee that the U.S. would not get involved in Rwanda.
Senior U.S. leaders, stung by the failure in Mogadishu, simply did not wish to act; 
even though a U.S. led international force may have been the only force with the 
international respect to pull off an intervention. Scheffer told reporters in October, 
1993, that “We should not rush into each and every humanitarian affairs catastrophe, 
deflecting thoughts o f an early involvement in the crisis.23 Albright notes that the lessons 
of Somalia, and of other African crises such as violence in Burundi in 1993, were simply 
not applicable to the situation in Rwanda, and that sticking to those lessons led to 
inactivity in the face o f levels o f violence which were extreme and unexpected.
New Players: The Clinton Decision Making Team and New Directions in Foreign
Policy
If the administration of George H.W. Bush was one o f the most prepared for 
foreign policy decision making in the history o f the Republic, than that which followed, 
the William (Bill) Clinton administration was nearly exactly the opposite. First and




foremost, the new group of leaders was not a team, as such, at the outset o f the 
administration. Unlike the Bush cabinet, the new group had not all worked together in 
the past, and because of this were not accustomed to how each worked, or how changes 
in hierarchy might change the dynamic of their relationships. The new administration 
brought with it both a new outlook on decision making and foreign policy, but also a new 
team with a new outlook on what the U.S. role in the world should be. There was a 
significant discussion in the Clinton Administration over what direction U.S. policy 
should take in a post-Cold War era. In spite of this, they did build on some Bush team 
practices, with a sense that U.S. power should be used in accordance with U.S. Allies and 
interested parties, and where possible under the auspices o f the United Nations.
Clinton himself had received an education which exposed him to foreign policy 
matters, having studied them at Georgetown’s School o f the Foreign Service before 
spending time as a Rhodes Scholar and as a staffer on then chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright.24 Balancing this, he was highly risk 
averse, and desired actions that could be guaranteed to succeed rather than potentially fail 
and cause a loss o f popularity for him and his administration.25 In contrast to Bush’s 
passionate focus on foreign policy (to his political detriment) Clinton’s entry argument 
for his presidency was that he would take direct control o f the domestic agenda, and in 
particular the economy, while allowing expert foreign policy staff take care o f the
" J ( \international issues to be faced. This approach was criticized by Cold War historian 
John Lewis Gaddis, who said that Clinton was “ ...at fault for allowing an illusion of
24 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. W estPort, CT: Praeger, 1999. 
15.
25 Ibid. 203.
26 Halberstam. 193. The author claims that Clinton saw Foreign policy as “an inconvenience” which 
would get in the way o f  his true passion, domestic affairs.
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safety to produce a laissez-faire foreign and national security policy.”27 Criticism aside, 
this mindset can be clearly seen in the foreign policy team he assembled in 1993.
As a result, Clinton tapped the foreign policy leaders of past Democrat 
administrations. Twelve years separated his administration from the last Democrat, 
Jimmy Carter. Nevertheless, second tier Carter veterans formed the first cadre of 
Clinton’s foreign policy leadership team. Warren Christopher, who had served as 
Deputy Secretary o f State under Carter, is the chief example of this. Les Aspin, the 
incoming Secretary o f Defense, seemed to be the one example o f a purely political 
choice, although his knowledge of defense issues was widely known.29 His replacement 
after Mogadishu by William Perry meant that an untried, if  capable leader, would be in 
charge of the Defense Department during the Rwanda crisis. In a continued role of 
prominence, Colin Powell remained as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff until the end 
of his nominative term of office. None o f these leaders were strong activists for U.S. 
military intervention, which left those initiatives to other administration personalities. In 
that regard, this is not significantly different from the way the Bush team had looked two 
years earlier on Somalia, with deputies and department heads rather than principals 
taking first note o f critical events.
One significant change in the power o f the foreign policy leadership team was the 
return o f the U.S. Embassy to the U.N. to a seat on the cabinet. Having served in that 
position, George H.W. Bush had demoted it for the course o f his presidency, but it was 
returned to prominence by Clinton, and the person appointed to the job, Madeleine
27 Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Cambridge, Massachussetss: 
Harvard University Press, 2004. 77.
28 Hyland. 18. Hyland notes that Clinton specifically avoided senior cabinet officers in favor o f  their 
deputies to avoid having them overshadow his own presence.
29 Ibid. 19.
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Albright, would rise to prominence in the second term of the administration.30 Albright, 
along with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and Strobe Talbot, who served as 
special Ambassador to Russia, provided the intellectual guidance for the administration’s 
foreign policies.31 Unlike Scowcroft and the Bush National Security Council, the 
primary drivers for the new team were to craft strategies that attempted to solve Clinton’s 
political needs and desires, while avoiding a new Vietnam-like (or Munich, in the case of 
Albright) entanglement.32 The team, however, did keep the basic processes o f its 
predecessors, in that Lake met with the Clinton daily, and the Principals and Deputies’ 
Committees continued to function. However, according to Rodman, the president’s role, 
which he described as “unstructured” meant that both groups were weaker than they had 
been under Brent Scowcroft’s guidance.
As noted by Hyland, the new team inculcated the administrations polices with a 
set o f key tenets, namely that: Balance of power politics were outdated; in their place, 
the U.S. needed to pursue more noble, humanitarian goals; that the use o f force should be 
used to these ends, and that the best test o f the validity o f a policy lay in the support that 
could be gathered for it both domestically and internationally.34 The first two of these 
goals were a definite change in outlook from the Bush administration. This leadership 
team would bring about a changeover toward a Wilsonian worldview, pressing for a 
much broader set of collective security solutions to international problems under UN
30 Hyland. 19.
31 Ibid. 20.
32 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making o f  Foreign Policy from 
Nixon to George W. Bush. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 206.
33 Ibid. 208. On page 209, Rodman quotes Clinton as directly saying that he did not wish to be “confined 
by formal structures,” preferring to “forage around himself.”
3 /Hyland. 21.
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leadership.35 The new leadership team and their new outlook set the stage for significant 
changes in how the U.S. would operate, and this would be seen in the Haiti intervention 
o f 1994, and later in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. But first, the Rwandan tragedy 
would strike, and in response, the new team would do ... nothing.
Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r  Non-Intervention
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell was one o f the first to 
send up warning signals immediately following the plane crash which killed the Rwandan 
and Burundian Presidents, claiming that “widespread violence” could follow, an opinion 
which was supported by Rwanda observers outside the government, most especially the 
group Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organizations.36 This was 
supported by the intelligence community, which continued with its routine missions in 
spite of the difficulties in information gathering in the region. By April 26, only weeks 
into the genocide, elements of the intelligence community identified the planned nature 
o f the atrocities and the names o f the perpetrators. This was reinforced by a Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) report from 9 May on the directed nature o f the attacks, using 
the term genocide to describe the events.37 There is, however, no evidence in the 
literature examined that the various intelligence agencies as a community took a stance
35 Hyland. 23.
36 Interview with Bushnell from Power. Her Original report is included in Ferroggiaro.
37 April 9 Report is included in Ferroggiaro.
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on intervention. Cohen describes executive level intelligence reporting as being designed 
more to cover the agencies equities than to encourage action.38
Following the evacuation of the American Embassy, official U.S. notice o f events 
faded quickly. According to National Security Advisor Lake, Haiti and Bosnia were his 
primary foci for the period.39 In an interview to Ivo Daalder, he said that “it was almost 
literally inconceivable that American troops would go to Rwanda.”40 The Principals 
committee of the NSC never met to discuss Rwanda. Thus Lake, who was an Africa 
expert, was not engaged, whereas his deputy, Clarke, crafter o f the non-interventionist 
intervention policy, was most closely connected with events, followed a predictably non­
interventionist course.41 The Deputies Committee did meet to discuss the situation, as 
did a series o f interagency working groups and task forces, which were dominated by 
Clarke and his staff. Familiar faces, such as Frank Wisner, represented the DOD in the 
Deputies group, but Wisner had already been prepped by his staff in an April 11 memo 
which stated clearly that there would be no U.S. involvement on the ground until after the 
end of the conflict.42 Much like Sate Department Leaders, he had juniors, such as Donald 
Steinberg, the Africa desk officer, who were knowledgeable, but he did not avail himself 
o f the advice offered. Congress similarly maintained its distance. Democrats, while in 
the majority, were on the defensive against a resurgent Republican party with a dominant 
domestic agenda. No one wanted to go near a situation which might turn into another 
Mogadishu during a congressional election year. An examination o f the Congressional
38 Cohen, Jared. 100 Days o f  Silence: America and the Rwandan Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowan and 
Littlefield, 2007. 29.
39 Interview with Anthony Lake, 2001, in Power.
40 Anthony Lake interview with Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f  the O val Office: Profiles 
o f  the National Security Advisors and the Presidents They Served - from  JFK to G eorge W. Bush. New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. 241.
41 Power. 2001.
42 Original memo in Ferroggiaro.
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Record for the time frame in question, September 1991-May 31, 1992 (this date was 
selected because after this point the bulk of the atrocities had already been committed), 
shows much less interest than had been the case with Somalia. During this time frame, 
the 103rd Congress had 44 events, hearings, or resolutions mentioning or related to 
Rwanda, and o f those, only five o f the events (hearings in this case) specifically 
discussed the ongoing atrocities there.43 On 13 May, Senators Jim Jeffords o f Vermont 
and Paul Simon of Illinois sent a letter to Clinton urging an arms embargo, sanctions, and 
an increase in the strength of UNAMIR, however, did not request the involvement of 
U.S. forces.44
Madeleine Albright, who at the time was the U.S. representative to the United
Nations, summed Rwanda up with the sad, but accurate statement that “I had become
defensive and cautious about UN peacekeeping in general and didn’t see any practical
45way for the UN to restore order at that point.” According to Albright, the Pentagon was 
against an intervention, arguing first that it would be impossible to create a coalition with 
the requisite resources to intervene, and then that the logistical difficulties o f intervention 
in a land locked country were too high. Ultimately, she says, military leaders “said 
bluntly that they were not prepared to do it.”46 While these debates raged, both in 
Washington and New York, the killing and dying continued.
On 22 April, 1993, the White House Press Secretary released a statement noting 
the survival o f a prominent Rwandan Human rights monitor, Monique Mujawamarija, 
who had previously met with President Clinton, and about whom he had specifically
43 Congressional Research Service. Congressional Record o f  the 103rd Congress. 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2. Accessed on 9 October, 2014.




asked as the news o f the slaughter became known.47 The statement also called on a 
return to cease fire negotiations, and for the leaders o f the Rwandan Army to end the 
violence in the country, and called for the continuation o f the UNAMIR mission, 
although not the strengthening o f the mandate of UNAMIR or the forces assigned to i t 48 
This statement was the most significant U.S. effort to respond to the crisis, and its impact 
was minimal. Equally ineffective were contacts made by Bushnell to contacts in the 
Rwandan Defense Ministry on 27 April. She noted that the “world did not buy” the 
official line, that the killings had been started by Tutsis, and appealed personally to the 
Rwandan Defense Cabinet Director to “do the right thing” and stop the violence. This 
lower level effort also failed to achieve results.49
Public Opinion and the Rwanda Non-Intervention
Beginning immediately after the start of the massacres, the media began to cover 
events, mainly based on eyewitness accounts from contacts on the ground. Notable 
coverage included front page stories in the April 9th and 10th editions o f the Washington 
Post, one on the 10th in the New York Times citing a Red Cross source that "tens o f 
thousands" had died. Other front page stories appeared on April 14th' 19th, and 24th. The 
April 19th report, which cited information from Human Rights Watch, specifically called




for use of the term "genocide."50 Meanwhile, the Washington Post Editorial Board had 
spoken against U.S. intervention, in effect towing the government line on the issue.51
The Rwandan crisis happened at time when foreign policy was on the decline as a 
point of interest for the American public and media. According to James Lindsay, a 50% 
drop in major network coverage of international stories occurred between 1985 and 1995, 
but this trend was starting to reverse itself by the time o f Clinton’s reelection.52 The 
Rwandan crisis would engender a similar response. In June, even after the details o f the 
killings were well known, CBS public opinion polling, asking the question “In order to 
stop the killing in Rwanda, do you favor or oppose the United States sending in ground 
troops?” revealed only 28% in favor and 61% against such action.53 This fits with 
Entman’s proposition that a split in public opinion over an issue will serve to generate 
opposition to action among elites and decision makers.54
The Rwandan genocide followed shortly after the inglorious retreat from Africa 
which followed the Battle o f Mogadishu and the withdrawal o f U.S. forces from Somalia. 
This left a bad taste in the mouth of policymakers and an unwillingness to commit forces 
to a part o f Africa that was even more remote and unstable than coastal Somalia. Media 
coverage o f the crisis was evident, but since there was no decision to intervene, there was 
no ready government source o f information, and the media reporting was not desirous of 
action in the way that it had been in the case of Somalia.55 Since the crisis area was so
50 Power, 2001.
51 The Washington Post Editorial Board. “One, Two, Many Rwandas.” The Washington Post, April 17, 
1994. A 15.
52 Lindsay, James. “The New Apathy.” Foreign Affairs 79, No. 5, September/October 2000. 2-8
53 Wittkopf, Eugene. The Domestic Sources o f  U.S. Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004. 103.
54 Entman, Robert M. Projections o f  Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2004. 18.
55 Talentino. 40.
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remote, this meant that information was simply unavailable to the media, and therefore 
the public, which meant that there was no public groundswell o f support. For example, in 
the most dangerous week of the massacres (and most crucial decision making in the U.S. 
and the UN), only one question was asked about Rwanda during the Department o f State 
daily briefing.56
Models and the Rwanda Decision Process
According to Cohen and Power, there was never a pivotal moment, a debate, an 
argument about intervention. Lake, Christopher, and Perry never met with President 
Clinton about it.57 The failure o f the outside world to intervene in the Rwandan genocide 
was not only a failure of U.S. policy makers to act. In each o f the earlier interventions o f 
the decade, Somalia, and Haiti, the U.S. had acted under a firm UN mandate, even if the 
U.S. took on a disproportionate role or command o f the interventions. A key failure, and 
one which influenced others in the case of Rwanda was that o f the United Nations to 
reach a consensus on intervention in a timely fashion. Given that the U.S was not, under 
the George H.W. Bush or Clinton White Houses, inclined to act without UN authority in 
these cases, this was a critical failure.58 According to Hehir, this was a result o f a 
conscious decision by the P5 (The five permanent members of the UN Security Council; 
the U.S. UK, France, Russia, and China).59 That failure, while a significant factor, still
56 Albright. 154.
57 Cohen. 5.
58 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 30.
59 Ibid. 31.
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allows for a discussion o f the decision making processes which kept the U.S. to its 
position to act multilaterally if at all (In this case, to not act).
In his memoir, Bill Clinton reiterated that there was simply little interest in an 
overseas deployment o f U.S. forces to central Africa in 1994. Clinton later expressed 
deep regret for this, but he reiterated that due to domestic pressure against deployments, 
and the other world issues pressing at the time, he and his team were “inadequately 
focused” on the possibility of sending troops to stop the atrocities in Rwanda.60 Decision 
making for the non-intervention seemed to follow the bureaucratic Governmental Process 
Model o f Allison. Institutional interests and bias were the order o f the day when 
determining the fate o f Rwanda. The DOD stuck its prevailing doctrine, and since it was 
not ordered to change its stance by President Clinton, it did not do so.61 At the 
Department o f State, Secretary of State Christopher knew so little about the area that an
atlas was required to bring him up to speed, and he showed a general lack o f interest in
62the issue. Naturally, the specific bureau o f interest, the Africa Bureau, brought key 
knowledge to the table, but, as had been the case with Somalia, were unable to overcome 
the biases of their organizational leaders. Unlike Somalia, however, no one at the senior 
cabinet level, least of all President Clinton, was willing to take on the cause and push 
through and frame an intervention, and little domestic pressure existed to overcome the 
fact that administration leaders simply did not perceive Rwanda as a national security 
priority. With that in mind, the administration can be said to have acted rationally in 
deciding not to intervene.
60 Clinton. 584.
61 This was confirmed by the Joint Staff in an interagency conference on the situation on 11 May. Original 
notes in Original document from Ferroggiaro.
62 Power, 2001. The author quotes the Belgian Foreign Minister Willie Claes, who was infamously told by 
Christopher that "I have other responsibilities" when discussing the situation.
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There is, interestingly, evidence o f framing as part of the justification for non­
intervention in Rwanda. This can be found in part in the staunch refusal o f the Clinton 
administration to use the term genocide in identifying the crisis.63 Not only did the 
administration not want to act, since it would be obligated by the 1948 Genocide 
convention to do so, but it did not want to be seen as calling out an aggressive act without 
being willing to do anything about it. 64 The resultant potential loss of legitimacy 
weighed heavily on the minds o f Department of State lawyers and NSC staffers such as 
Susan Rice, who openly questioned the impact o f using the term might have on the 
upcoming mid-term elections.65 The U.S. did not, in fact, even hint at genocide in a 
general fashion until May 21, six weeks into the crisis, and well after most o f the killing 
had taken place.66 This was a result of a series o f consultations involving the Africa 
Bureau, the International Organizations Bureau, and the Legal Department at State, 
which approved the statement that “Acts of genocide had occurred,” even though those 
acts were still ongoing at that date.67 As late as June 10th, a Department o f State 
spokesperson still refused to openly use the term, and it was on that date that Secretary o f 
State Christopher finally used the term publicly. Thus, the only significant framing o f the 
crisis was to actively frame the effort not to respond to the crisis in Somalia. To be fair, 
however, this appeared at the time to be a bold move, considering that the UN itself did 
not refer to the situation in Rwanda as genocide until over a month later, in July.68
63 Talentino. 127.
64 Halberstam. 273.
65 Rice quoted in Power, 2001. Although she later denied memory o f  the statement, it was corroborated by 
other members o f  the working group on the conference call.
66 Power, Samantha. A Problem From Hell: America and the Age o f  Genocide. New York: Harper 
Collins. 2002. 366.




“America's new peacekeeping doctrine, o f which Clarke was the primary 
architect, was unveiled on May 3, and U.S. officials applied its criteria zealously. 
PDD-25 did not merely circumscribe U.S. participation in UN missions; it also 
limited U.S. support for other states that hoped to carry out UN missions. Before 
such missions could gamer U.S. approval, policymakers had to answer certain 
questions: Were U.S. interests at stake? Was there a threat to world peace? A 
clear mission goal? Acceptable costs? Congressional, public, and allied support? 
A working cease-fire? A clear command-and-control arrangement? And, finally, 
what was the exit strategy?”
Samantha Power, 2001.69
No senior leader wanted intervention in Rwanda strongly enough to force the 
issue. This was true from the UN to the U.S. and its allies. As the springtime of 
slaughter continued, there was simply no leadership provided by the White House, and no 
member o f the top foreign policy hierarchy was motivated enough to bring their political 
cache to bear on the Rwanda issue. As then Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who was 
working on policy issues at the Pentagon put it “The Pentagon is always going to be the 
last to want to intervene. It is up to the civilians to tell us they want to do something and
7ftwe'll figure out how to do it." While this opinion is not always true, what is the case is 
that with no senior leaders arguing for intervention, the next tier down, the deputies and 
department heads, were not going to stick their own necks out in favor o f a troop 
deployment into combat operations in the middle o f Africa. And so, the status quo 
reigned supreme.
69 Power, 2001.
70 Clark interview with Power, 2001.
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The findings in the Rwanda case can be simply stated. In terms of the process 
used in decision making, the models provided by Allison and Yetiv stand up well. 
Cabinet departments defaulted to their institutional positions, and no senior leader chose 
to break the deadlock. In fact, the institutional biases, and that o f President Clinton, 
against action were so strong that no serious effort was made to have the senior level 
discussion that might have led to action. Due to this, the idea o f the powerful individual 
is negatively verified, in that, lacking a strong, well placed motivator or spokesperson, no 
intervention took place. Similarly, other than the discussion and debate on using the 
word genocide, there was no attempt to frame an intervention, rather the opposite, as 
events in Rwanda were repeatedly downplayed by government spokespersons. 
Unfortunately for the people o f Rwanda, the arithmetic was quite simple. No consensus 
and no framing meant no intervention.
This mini case study described the genocide in Rwanda and the decision not to 
intervene. It noted the new set o f personalities and different decision making dynamic of 
the first Clinton administration, and the impact o f a perceived failure in the Somalia 
intervention on the possibility o f involvement in the Rwandan Civil War and genocides. 
This study stands as a stark example of a situation in which no powerful decision maker 
is motivated to force government decision making and framing efforts for armed 
humanitarian intervention. Without either, there was no motivation among key 
stakeholders, namely Congress and the American public, for intervention. Ultimately, 
the genocide in Rwanda would spark a discussion on human security and the meaning of 
state sovereignty when human rights and security were endangered. The resulting 
thought process in the international community was that states which did not adequately
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address human security needs might have their sovereignty abrogated by the international 
community, the core of the idea that would become the doctrine o f Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P). That discussion would help to fuel future armed humanitarian 
interventions, most particularly the remaining two case studies, the Kosovo intervention 
o f 1999 and the Libya intervention o f 2011.
Case Study: Kosovo -  Madeleine’s War: March, 1999
“The Balkans produce more history than they consume,” Winston Churchill1
“Ambassador Frank G. Wisner... laments that the U.S. Department o f State has a 
“very thin” understanding of history’s role in shaping politics and state policies in 
Southeast Europe.”2
“Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.” President William J. Clinton, March 
2 4 ,1999.3
The U.S. led NATO military intervention in Kosovo began on March 24, 1999. It 
continued through June, consisting primarily of an increasingly intense series o f airstrikes 
intended both to convince Serbia to cease its internal persecution o f Kosovar Albanians 
and to materially degrade its capability to do so.4 According to Houghton, approximately 
1,000 aircraft, mostly American, flew 38,000 combat missions as part o f the
1 Phillips, David L. Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplom acy and U.S. Intervention. Cambridge, MA: 
Belfer Center, 2012. 3.
2 Excerpt from interview with Frank Wisner, August 31, 2010. Phillips. 4.
3 Clinton, William J. “Excerpt from transcript o f  the President’s Address.” University o f  Virginia, March 
24, 1999. http://millercenter.org.scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3932. Accessed October 15, 2014.
4 Clinton. William J. My Life. New York: Knopf, 2004. 941.
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intervention.5 This included contributions from 18 of the 19 members o f NATO at the 
time.6 The decision to intervene in Kosovo has its roots both in the early incidents of the 
Yugoslav Civil War from 1991-1996 and the interventions and non-interventions which 
preceded it, including the Somalia intervention and the Rwanda non-intervention. It 
came at a time when the international community, stung by its failure to prevent the 
massacre in Rwanda, began to seriously discuss human security and its relevance, and 
potential dominance over traditional concepts o f state sovereignty. This would 
eventually lead to the development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
which will be discussed more fully in the context o f the third case study, the Libya 
intervention.7 In fact, the air campaign in Serbia and Kosovo marked the first time that 
an armed humanitarian intervention would take place in an internationally recognized, 
undisputedly sovereign state, a fact in which it differs from the Somalia case study.8
This case study will examine the historical precedents for the intervention, noting 
the historical factors which caused the crisis and the intervention. It will also examine 
the changes in the second Clinton administration which helped to facilitate the 
intervention. One notable leader and two strong supporting actors took the lead both in 
the process. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, special envoy Richard Holbrooke, 
and General Wesley Clark acted as powerful leaders in pushing the decision making 
cycle, and as powerful spokespersons in the framing process for the intervention. The 
study will also examine the role o f President Clinton and presidential politics (in
5 Houghton, David P. The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 195.
6 Greece was the only holdout. A lso noteworthy is that the operation saw the first participation in external 
operations by the German Air Force since the end o f  the Second World War.
7 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 30.
8 Talentino, Andrea K. M ilitary Intervention After the C old  War: The Evolution o f  Theory and Practice. 
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005. 242-243.
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particular, ongoing effort to impeach Clinton over the Monica Lewinsky scandal), the 
UN, Congress, NATO and the media both on the decision making process and as each 
was impacted by the decision making and framing processes.9 Significantly, alliance 
politics were present in Kosovo in a way that they were not before, and the role of a 
powerful international ally, the UK, will be considered. Lessons learned from the 
intervention, including how the Kosovo intervention impacted future humanitarian 
interventions, will also be discussed.
Kosovo and Yugoslavia, J 989-1999 Background to Intervention
Through the early and late 1990s, Yugoslavia and the deteriorating situation there 
were at the forefront of world politics. As noted, the brief, bloody interlude in Rwanda 
did little to distract from concurrent events in the Balkans. And it was the failure to 
intervene in the African nation which would ignite a renewed discussion of intervention, 
and a greater readiness on behalf o f the international community and the U.S. to militarily 
intervene in humanitarian affairs crises in the future. 10 The NATO intervention in 
Kosovo would be an example of this increased zeal. By 1998, Kosovo remained as one 
o f the last unresolved ethnic disputes resulting from the breakup o f Yugoslavia." With 
two million inhabitants, it was, although nominally a part o f Serbia, 90% Albanian in 
ethnic makeup.
9 Rothkopf, David. Running the World: The inside Story o f  the National Security Council and the 
Architects o f  American Power Public Affairs. New York: Perseus Group, 2005. 373.
10 Talentino. 127.
11 The other remaining flashpoint in Serbia is the Hungarian dominated province o f  Vojvodina, north o f  
Belgrade. The remaining disputes focus on outside claims to various pieces o f  former Yugoslav states, and 
semantic issues such as the name o f  Macedonia, which is disputed by Greece. Hill, Christopher R.
Outpost: Life on the Frontline o f  American Diplomacy -  a memoir. New York: Simon and Schuster,
2014. 448.
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Serious persecution of the Kosovar Albanians had commenced with the ascension 
to power o f Slobodan Milosevic in 1987, and continued with increasing severity 
throughout the period of the breakup of Yugoslavia, an event which overshadowed it in 
the eyes o f the western media.12 The primary pro-Kosovar leader, Ibrahim Rugova, had, 
since 1992, led a non-violent campaign on behalf of his people, but he was increasingly 
sidelined as Serb hostility bred a hostile Kosovar response. Kosovar Albanians were 
surprised by their seeming abandonment by the west, as their leaders had expected the 
negotiations which led up to the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996 to include favorable 
resolutions to all remaining territorial disputes, including their own.13 According to 
DiPrizio, this occurred as an implicit tradeoff to Serbia on Bosnia, since the Serbs would 
never have agreed to a linkage between the two issues.14 On the other hand, Albright 
notes that the Kosovar Albanians were well aware that they were nearly alone of 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups in not achieving independence from Serbia.15
In the spring of 1998, an extensive, systematic attack on Kosovar Albanians 
began, with two results. The first was a wave of thousands o f refugees, eventually rising 
to 750,000, which fled to whichever country would accept them.16 The second was an 
increase in the power, and effectiveness, o f the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Since 
its inception in November, 1997, The KLA eschewed the non-violent means of Rugova, 
and actively sought the means to retaliate against the Serbs in any way it could,
12 Independent International Commission on Kosovo Report. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 38- 
39.
13 Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: The Modem Library, 1999. 273.
14 DiPrizio, Robert C. Arm ed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from  Northern Iraq to Kosovo. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 218.
15 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, A Memoir. New York: Harper Collins, 2013. 383.
16 Blair, Tony. A Journey: My Political Life. London: Knopf, 2010. 252.
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eventually be classified as a terrorist organization by the U.S.17 Following economic 
unrest in Albania in 1997, the KLA received, through theft and direct aid, enough 
Albanian military weapons to seriously destabilize the situation.18 Its actions caused a 
violent thought loop by blurring the nature o f the Serbian response between legitimate 
police and counter terror action and its own barbarous acts.19 The U.S. envoy, Robert 
Gelbard did not help the situation by quickly branding the KLA as a terrorist group, 
which could be seen to legitimize the Serb response. By summer, 1998, attacks on 
ethnic Albanians had escalated to the point that U.S. interest began to peak, with a pivotal 
report by Julia Taft, Assistant Secretary o f State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. 
Discussing a recent investigative mission to Kosovo, she notably described a region on 
the precipice o f genocide.21
Given the general consensus not to involve ground troops in the intervention, the 
administration decided to press on the diplomatic front. The lead negotiator for the 
region, Gelbard, proved to be incapable o f dealing adequately with Milosevic.22 In 
October, 1998, therefore, Richard Holbrooke, although not currently holding an 
appointed government office, was therefore sent to Belgrade to negotiate on Kosovo, 
armed with the threat o f air strikes.23 Christopher Hill, the American Ambassador to 
Macedonia, was sent to accompany him due to his expertise in the region and the fact that
17 Zenko, Micah. “Coercive Diplomacy Before the War in Kosovo, Case 252.” Washington: Georgetown, 
Walsh School o f  the Foreign Service, 2001. 3.
18 Hill, Christopher R. Outpost: Life on the Frontline o f  American Diplomacy -  a Memoir. N ew  York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2014. 101.
19 Albright. 389.
20 Hill. 104.
21 Department o f  State News Briefing, Julia V. Taft, Assistant Secretary o f  State, Bureau o f  Population, 
Refugees, and Migration, and Eileen Malloy, Deputy Secretary o f  State for European and Canadian Affairs, 
September 9, 1998. Included in Zenko. 3. Her exact description was “An Erie Landscape, teetering on 
the brink.”
22 Hill. 100. Gelbard was see to be “Too honest and blunt” for the job, treating Serb leaders as though 
there were Latin American crime lords as a result o f  previous work in that region.
23 Clinton. 940. He notes that air strikes were threatened by NATO on 13 October.
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Holbrooke had been a private citizen and uninvolved in the peace process since Dayton.24 
Their efforts seemed to be successful in the short term, but the Racak massacre proved 
that Milosevic’s promises were not trustworthy. Much as the loss o f the 1992 election 
served as the catalyst for President Bush’s volte face on Somalia, Racak proved to be the 
turning point on intervention in Kosovo. By late January, 1999, the impeachment 
proceedings were over, and while the Clinton White House certainly lost some moral 
authority as a result, the end of the trial meant that Clinton could not look on Kosovo 
with an undistracted eye. With this in mind, Albright personally galvanized her fellow 
cabinet members into action, particularly over a 4 day period beginning on January 19th.25 
Even though they were known to be opposed just weeks before the start o f operations, 
Albright’s rhetoric drug her peers along.26 Keeping the aversion to ground invasion in 
mind, she convinced Defense Secretary Cohen, National Security Advisor Berger, and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Air Force General Hugh Shelton to agree on a set o f guiding 
directives for negotiation and intervention.27 These were agreed to by the main players, 
and consented to by a newly interested Clinton.
This agreement, to back diplomacy with the threat of force, to include NATO, and 
to force the two parties to meet under the auspices o f the International Contact Group, 
which included the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. The meeting, which 
occurred under British and French leadership at Rambouillet, began on February 6, 1999, 
and lasted for a month, but neither the Serbs nor the Kosovar Albanians could be made to 
accept mutually agreeable terms, in spite o f a renewed embargo on Serbia, and the threat
24 Hill. 104.
25 Albright. 397.
26 Gellman, Barton. “The Path to Crisis: How the United States and its A llies Went to War.” The 
Washington Post, 18 April 1999, A l.
27 Ibid.
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of a naval blockade of the Albanian ports through which the Kosovar Albanians imported 
the majority o f their military supplies.28 Morton Halperin, Department o f State Director 
o f Policy Planning, noted that as the negotiations drug on, U.S. intelligence services 
noted a significant buildup of Serb forces in and near Kosovo, after pressuring the 
removal o f the observer team provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), the Serbs launched an ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.29
In direct terms, the failure to reach an agreement on the status o f Kosovo at the 
Rambouillet conference led to the U.S. led military intervention in Serbia, although key 
leaders such as Albright, Clark, and Solana expected both the diplomatic failure and the 
subsequent intervention. Serbian intransigence at the negotiating table strengthened 
western resolve to act, and to follow the lead of a U.S. government that, due to Albright’s 
efforts, already say military intervention as the only way to compel compliance from 
Belgrade.30 The conference ended on 18 March, the final foreign policy meeting, at 
which the definitive decision for intervention was taken, occurred on the 19th, and the 
bombing began one week later.31
The European members o f NATO, having concluded the rest o f the Yugoslav 
Civil War, and having endured a series of public embarrassments, such as the failures to 
protect Muslim minorities in Srebrenica and Gorazde, had little stomach for further 
conflict with Serbia, and would have to be led into any intervention by the United States. 
Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister, worked hard to personally change this stance from
28 Clinton. 940. The Albanians eventually agreed to terms, but they were not accepted by the Belgrade 
government. Clinton thought that he could work with Rugova, but not the KLA.
9 Halperin, Morton. “ Winning the Peace, ” from Buckley, William Joseph. Kosovo: Contending Voices 
on Balkan Interventions. Grand Rapids, Ml: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. 227.
30 Talentino. 261.
31 Clinton. 940. Clinton emphasized that he approved o f  the Airstrikes.
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January, 1998 onwards, and during the intervention would work closely with Clinton, 
splitting the duty o f coalition cheerleader. Furthermore, with NATO forces already on 
the ground in Bosnia as a result of the Dayton Accords, where they would be vulnerable 
to Serb reprisals, it was unreasonable to expect there to be no NATO voice in decision 
making.33
Notably among the cases examined, and in U.S. post-Cold War interventions in 
general, there was no specific guidance, in the form of a resolution, from the United 
Nations Security Council on the events in Kosovo. The U.S., and NATO, would, in 
effect, be acting bilaterally on the issue. This was due to the question o f Russia and how 
it perceived the intervention in Serbia. Historically, Russia had seen itself as the 
protector o f the Slavic peoples. This feeling was so powerful that in 1914, Russia had 
mobilized its army against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in retaliation for Austrian 
attacks on Serbia, an act which helped bring about the First World War. U.S. envoy to 
Russia Strobe Talbot called the Kosovo decisions and intervention “the most severe, 
dangerous, and consequential crisis in U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War 
period.34 Russia’s stance, according to Talbot, was that western involvement in a 
traditionally Russian sphere of influence would critically damage pro-western reform 
efforts in the country.35 Twice, during the October threat o f attacks that led to the final 
Holbrooke agreement, and once, in late March, 2008, the Yeltsin government threatened 
the U.S. over Kosovo. It was Serbian intransigence, and continued flaunting by 
Milosevic o f attempts to negotiate, that allowed Moscow its way out, and there was a
32 Blair. 252.
33 Gellman. A l.




tacit agreement that Russia would not bring the intervention to the UN Security Council 
because o f this.36
The United Nations, unlike previous humanitarian interventions in the 1990’s, 
was not a leading player in Kosovo, in part because Serbia’s patron, Russia, sat on the 
UN Security Council ready to use its veto to protect Belgrade. Sanctions and projects for 
humanitarian assistance, but not intervention, were approved by Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 in March, 1998.37 The strongest UN statement on the issue 
came in September 1998, with Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199. The 
resolution did recognize the threat that Kosovo posed to “peace and security in the 
region,” but went no farther, and did not authorize action. A follow on measure, 
UNSCR 1203, passed on October 24th, 1998, led to the OSCE support o f the Kosovo 
Verification Mission, which was supposed to monitor the ceasefire that Holbrooke had 
brokered, but the mission was ill defined and coordinated, and in any case the ceasefire 
that it was supposed to monitor was tenuous at best.39 As part o f the deal, Milosevic also 
pledged political conciliation and the chance for displaced persons to return to their 
homes, but these agreements were never kept.
36 Talbot. 348.
37 United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1160.” New York: March 31, 1998. 
http://unscr.eom/en/resolutions/l 160. Accessed on October 16, 2014.
38 United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1199.” New York: September 23, 1998 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1199. Accessed on October 16,2014.
39 University o f  the West o f  England. “Kosovo Documents.” Bristol, UK. 
www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/kosovo-documents7.htm. Accessed on October 16, 2014.
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The U.S. and the World in 1999, Context fo r  Intervention
In every case of foreign policy decision making, the decisions made have to be 
taken in the context o f the broader state o f the U.S. and the world at the time of the crisis. 
For the Clinton administration, the implosion of the Russian economy and the economic 
collapse o f the Asian Tigers was a number one priority for attention and effort.40 Within 
months, the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, 
and South Korea spun out o f control, undoing years o f double digit growth, and dragging 
Russia along with them. Similarly, the rise o f China as a serious economic competitor 
was underway. Clinton would fly to China in 1998, followed by visit by the Chinese 
premier Zhu Rongji to discuss Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization. Details 
such as arranging for Clinton to avoid Tiananmen Square, the site o f the brutal 1989 civil 
rights crackdown, absorbed time and attention.41 Meanwhile, North Korea demonstrated 
its capability to launch a multi stage rocket, increasing its ability to threaten U.S. interests 
in East Asia.42 Further south, India shocked the world by conducting a nuclear test which 
was mirrored weeks later by Pakistan.43
Perennial problems in the Middle East and Africa continued. The death o f King 
Hussein of Jordan caused concern over the succession to the Hashemite throne, while the 
Middle East peace process was at a standstill.44 Saddam Hussein continued to cause 
trouble for the U.S., while in Africa, war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 







attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred, and taken with the decision 
making surrounding the retaliatory cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan, this 
served to push events in the Balkans further to the back burner o f public awareness.45 
Cuba was in the news, according to Albright, when a Papal visit to the communist island 
state raised the possibility o f political change there, and with that possibility came 
attention from the administration.46
Europe provided a positive glimmer, but the source o f the good news was not in 
the Balkans, or in Russia, but rather in violence plagued Northern Ireland. According to 
Clinton, the negotiation o f the Good Friday Agreement in May, 1998, largely ending 
three decades o f sectarian violence in the province, drew considerable attention just as the 
conflict between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians was entering a deadly phase.47 Events in 
Russia, which was still in the throes o f unrest in Chechnya tempered this positive news 
and created more work for the Clinton Administration. Russia came to see the Kosovar 
Albanians as Serbia’s version o f the Chechens, and, given its violent response to Chechen 
rebels in 1995, Moscow’s tendency was to let Belgrade deal with the Kosovar Albanians 
in a similarly brutal fashion.48
Domestically, a primary, and, indeed, overwhelming preoccupation o f the 
administration was the Monica Lewinski affair and the impeachment proceedings which 
stemmed from it. From August, 1998, when Lewinski testified to a grand jury on the 
president’s sexual activity, to January, 1999, when the impeachment ended, the affair





dominated the attention of the media and the White House.49 Ivo Daalder cites the 
combination o f the end of the Lewinsky affair, and its coincidence in time with the Racak 
massacre, as the two events which brought Clinton fully on board intellectually with the 
Kosovo intervention discussions, which had hitherto been handled nearly exclusively by 
Berger (to the dismay of Albright).50 Furthermore, a pre-election financial scandal, the 
Whitewater affair, was nearing its own completion and this also absorbed presidential 
attention. Ken Starr, the independent prosecutor assigned to the case, was publically 
tracking down leads throughout 1998, and is frequently mentioned in the Clinton 
memoirs.51 A glimmer of redemption and relief on this issue would not come until the 
acquittal o f Susan MacDougal, one of the defendants, on April 12, 1999, in the midst of
e'y
the Kosovo War. These pressures forced Clinton, who had grown considerably in his 
effectiveness as a foreign policy president, to return to the strategy o f his first years in 
offices, in other words, to let his delegates handle international crises. This would not, at 
first, bode well for Kosovo.
The Clinton Administration in Its Second Half, Leadership, Processes, and Strong Voices
1994 was a key year for the administration. The Republican congressional 
victory in November of that year brought the administration under repeated attacks from 
key opposition leaders on the direction, or lack o f direction, that administration policies
49 Albright. 352.
50 Daalder. Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f  the O val Office: Profiles o f  the National Security 





undertook.53 While his chances for a second term were in question after these mid-term 
elections, Clinton beat Senator Robert Dole handily in 1996, and became the first 
Democrat president to be reelected to a full term since Franklin Roosevelt.54 While the 
Dayton Peace Accords o f 1996, which brought an end to the main actions o f the breakup 
of Yugoslavia, gave the administration a solid foreign policy victory on which to hang its 
reputation, the rhetoric of weakness continued and would be a factor in future 
administration decision making.55
The years between 1994 and 1998 saw significant changes both in the outlook of 
the Clinton Administration and in its leadership. In terms o f personal growth, the events 
in Somalia, Rwanda, and elsewhere had taught President Clinton that he could not simply 
delegate foreign relations to his subordinates, but would have to take a steady, consistent 
role in the national security decision making process, and he became more comfortable 
doing so.56 Clinton had also emerged as one of the world’s senior statesmen, not only in 
the obvious power o f the U.S., but in terms of his own time in officer and personal
en
growth in that office. According to Henry Kissinger, Clinton and many on his staff 
were still too keen to conflate foreign and domestic policies, and to see the former as an
£D
extension of the latter. At his core, he remained far more pragmatic and less moralistic 
than his subordinates, particularly Madeleine Albright, who was now Secretary o f State.59
53 Hyland. 139.
54 Daalder. 251.
55 Hyland. 145. In the fall elections, the Republicans took control o f  the U.S. House and Senate for the 
first time since 1952.
56 Houghton. 201.
57 Albright. 350.
58 Kissinger, Henry. “Kosovo and the Vicissitudes o f  American Foreign policy. Doing Injury to History.” 
Newsweek, April 15, 1999. From Buckley. 296.
59 Houghton. 213.
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Albright, the first female Secretary o f State, brought a strong awareness o f the 
need o f her new role, having moved up from her previous position as Ambassador to the 
UN. Her formative years were dominated by experiences surrounding the Second World 
War, and the parallels she drew to the situation in the Balkans referred back to Hitler, 
Munich, and appeasement. By 1998, Albright had been part of the leadership team since 
the beginning o f the administration, and was a powerful advocate for a number o f causes, 
one of which became Kosovo. She distinctly lamented the failure to act in the Rwandan 
genocide, and was quick to use her position o f new found importance to ensure that 
neither another Rwanda nor another Munich or Auschwitz would happen on her watch.60
Completing the diplomatic side of the leadership trio which pushed for 
intervention was Richard Holbrooke. Holbrooke had a deep history in the Department of 
State going back to the Vietnam War, 'and an equally deep commitment to the concept of 
Atlanticism and the value o f maintaining peace in Europe.61 While he saw the need for 
UN approval for interventions, he was also willing to press for armed humanitarian 
interventions without the UN if need be.62 Holbrooke brought with him a close working 
relationship with two people who would prove to be critical in the Kosovo crisis. The 
first was Slobodan Milosevic. Holbrooke had forged a relationship with and 
understanding of Milosevic which made him the go to diplomat for dealing with him, as 
well as the acknowledged expert on how to deal with him. Second was Wesley Clark, 
who worked with him on the negotiation of the Dayton Accords and with whom he
“ Albright. 386. She pointedly reminded Berger when discussing M ilosevic in April, 1998, that she was 
Secretary, not Ambassador, and could not be dismissed now as she had been previously.
61 Chollet, Derek, and Power, Samantha. The Unquiet American: Richard H olbrooke in the World. New  
York: Public Affairs 2012. 165.
62 Holbrooke, Richard. “Speech at the National Press Club, November 2, 1999.” From Chollet and Power. 
253.
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would work on both the diplomatic front o f the Kosovo crisis as well as pressing for 
military intervention when those negotiations failed.63
With the departure o f Anthony Lake, his deputy, Sandy Berger took his place. 
Berger’s primary goal was to provide advice that fit his intense awareness o f Clinton’s 
political needs at a given moment.64 However, Berger was positively described as being 
highly analytical, incisive, and working well with the other members o f the cabinet, as 
well as having near identical feelings on events as his presidential supervisor.65 Albright 
describes their relationship, which would be central to the successful push for 
intervention, and not always perfect, but better than it could have been, and they were in 
frequent communication.66
Berger’s style was a significant, but logical changeover from that o f Lake. He 
established strong rules for behavior, emphasizing the need for team work, and 
particularly by avoiding “policy debate via press conference.”67 According to Ivo 
Daalder, he made better use of the Principal’s committee on the NSC to generate well 
thought out and debated recommendations for President Clinton to consider. Very little 
actually reached him without having been considered in this way.68 Furthermore, he gave 
voice to key leaders, such as Holbrooke, CJCS Shelton, and CIA chief George Tenet by 
having them join the senior group for meeting twice a week. This came to be known and 
the ABC lunches, with the acronyms standing for Albright, Berger, and Cohen.69
63 Clark, Wesley. Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs, 2012. 122.
64 Rodman. 207.
65 Halberstam, David. War in a Time o f  Peace. New York: Scribner, 2001. 409.





Like his predecessors, Les Aspin and William Perry, William Cohen, the new 
secretary o f defense, was not inclined to fight against the customary uniformed military 
reluctance to use force.70 Having voted against the interventions in Bosnia which led to 
the Dayton Accords, Cohen now sought to protect U.S. forces there by staying out of 
further military entanglements with Serbia.71 Furthermore, the uniformed leadership of 
the military, even six years into the administration, still bore a fundamental mistrust of 
Clinton and his senior cabinet officials, a mistrust that was largely reciprocated by the 
civilian leadership in the White House.72 In contrast to the earlier interventions, in which 
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs took the lead, however, the 
key mover in breaking the deadlock in the Department o f Defense turned out to be the 
commander on the ground, General Wesley Clark, the NATO and U.S. European 
Command leader who described himself as “a greater activist than most o f the people in 
the military.”73 Clark had been closely connected with Holbrooke, working with him in 
the negotiation o f the Dayton Accords in 1996.74 Like Albright, his view o f Milosevic 
and the threat he posed to the peace o f Europe was harsh.75 Wearing, as he did, two 
military hats, that of a U.S. regional commander and that o f a NATO coalition 
headquarters, Clark was uniquely situated to understand the impact o f action, or inaction, 
on the alliance, which would be engaging in what was only its second combat operation 
in the fifty years o f its existence.76 Unlike his military peers, he dealt with civilian 
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on the other hand many o f his military peers found him to be abrasive and a source of 
resentment.77 Like Albright, he was willing and able to establish direct linkages to the 
president and to the National Security Advisor rather than have his role be limited by his
-»o
direct superior, Cohen. He was regularly in contact with Berger directly, a fact which 
actually stiffened the bureaucratic stances o f his DOD leadership, such as Chairman 
Shelton, against him and against the intervention.79
The Clinton team, having now been together, by and large, for six years by the 
time Kosovo became a critical issue, had indeed gelled and matured in a way that was not 
true during the Rwandan Crisis. However, it would never be the type o f team that the 
George H.W. Bush had led during his Presidency. Indeed, such a team would have been 
impossible to create, given Clinton’s path to the White House from a small state 
governorship. Further, its focus on domestic policy and partisan combat were in stark 
contrast to the Bush administration (who, it must be countered, lost their bid for 
reelection in part because of the lack of domestic focus.) However, it was at least a team 
experienced with the hard knocks o f foreign and domestic policy, and of partisan politics. 
It was also a team that, according to Albright, was friendly and socially active with each
RAother. In Berger, Clinton had a perfect foil, and well understood the capabilities and 
foibles o f his senior cabinet team, most particularly Albright.
77 Halbertsam. 433.
78 Clark. 113. He was called to task by Shelton for some o f  the advice which he provided Holbrooke, 
which the Chairman and Secretary thought was out o f  order, and in their purview.
79 Rodman. 223-224. Doctrinally, Clark, as a Geographic Combatant Commander, reported directly to the 
Defense Secretary, not to the Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs. The CJCS does not, as such, give orders to or 
direct the military, but acts as a planning and advisory body to the Secretary o f  Defense and the President.
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Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r  Intervention
“When we were fighting against Hitler, it wasn’t just Hitler; it was fighting 
against fascism... and when we’re dealing with a now indicted war criminal such 
as Milosevic, it isn’t just him. It is struggling against a concept, which is that it is 
not appropriate, possible, or permissible for one man to uncork ethnic nationalism 
as a weapon.”
Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright, 10 June, 1999 interview on MacNeil 
Lehrer News Hour.81
Before the Dayton accords in 1995, Bosnia stood out as a symbol o f failure for the 
Clinton administration’s foreign policy initiatives, and NATO credibility became an issue 
just as important, if not more, than the situation on the ground in Kosovo.82 NATO 
intervention and the positioning of U.S. forces in Bosnia helped to secure the region and 
limit the ability o f Serbia to continue aggressive acts there. Kosovo, however, was a 
different case, as the embattled region was a province of Serbia itself, and not a separate 
region of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The province, which was 
overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Albanians, held a central position in the Serbian 
psyche because of the battle which was fought there against the Ottoman Empire on June 
28, 1389.83
As early as December 1992, then President Bush had warned the Belgrade regime 
that the U.S. would not tolerate a Serb crackdown on Kosovo, in what was known as his 
“Christmas warning”. The newly elected President Clinton confirmed this warning,
81 Albright interview on the McNeil/Lehrer Newshour, 10 June 1999. From Schnabel, Albrecht and 
Thakur, Ramesh. Kosovo and the Challenge o f  Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, 
Collective Action, and International Citizenship. New York: United Nations University Press, 2000. 89.
82 Kelley, Michael. Surrender and Blame, The New Yorker, December 19, 1994. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1994/12/19/surrender-and-blame. Accessed on 15 October 2014.
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following which Kosovo promptly dropped off the international or domestic U.S. radar 
screens, since it was an internal matter, and seemed to pale in significance compared to 
other issues, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and nearby Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.84 In 
1996, Kosovo, which had heretofore emphasized non-violent action to achieve 
independence from Serbia, began to see an uptick in armed resistance. The U.S. seemed 
to reinforce this in tacit ways, for example, by opening a U.S. Information Agency 
information center in Prishtina, the capital o f Kosovo, in July, 1996, which was 
considered to be a de-facto embassy in the province.85 By spring, 1998, with the 
aforementioned events having been resolved, the western governments began to focus on 
the Kosovo issue, although the fact that there had been no game changing event, such as 
the Siege of Sarajevo, or the destruction o f Srebrenica, to galvanize around, not would 
there be until the Racak massacre in January, 1999.86 Racak proved to be the game 
changing moment that allowed Albright to bring her full persuasive power to bear on the 
situation. William Walker, head o f the OSCE Verification Team, who called Racak a 
crime against humanity in a Prishtina press conference that was not approved by the 
White House, while an aide remembered that Wesley Clark said that, as a result o f Racak, 
he “had them where he wanted them,” meaning that force would now be on the table.87
Madeleine Albright emerged as the most senior, and powerful administration 
voice in favor o f military intervention in the Balkans in general and in the Kosovo crisis 
in particular, in this they were joined by the Vice President, Al Gore.88 Richard 
Holbrooke became assistant secretary of state for European affairs, and special envoy to
84 Talentino. 256.





the Balkans. It was his efforts which brought about a successful conclusion to the Dayton 
Peace Talks and put him in a key position to influence the Kosovo intervention. 
Holbrooke was trusted by U.S. leaders for his seeming ability to force Milosevic to 
comply with their demands, similarly, the Serbian leader seemed to respect Holbrooke as
OQ
a negotiator. He had arranged a meeting between Milosevic and the Kosovar leader 
Rugova which took place in May, 1998, but nothing meaningful came of the event.90 A 
meeting between the two in October, 1998, led to a ceasefire, but this had little meaning 
since the KLA were thereby emboldened to increase their attacks on Serb forces, which 
simply encouraged greater Serb intervention and an intensification of the spiral of 
violence.91 Furthermore, the negotiations had been explicitly underpinned by a NATO 
threat to begin air strikes within four days if no agreement was reached.92 Clinton made 
his decision to approve intervention when Serbia failed to sign on the Rambouillet 
proposals.93 When Holbrooke returned to Belgrade in March, 1999, after the failure at 
Rambouillet, his presence was more of a last ditch effort to inform Milosevic o f the threat 
o f force than a serious peace m ission94 This is the one example from the case studies 
that seems to fit with the “implemental mindset” discussed as part o f Dominic Tierney’s
89 Phillips. 60. Phillips reports the incident in which Holbrooke, having just been married, continued to 
lobby for bombing o f  Serbia, during his honeymoon, in the events which led to the 1995 Dayton Peace 
accords.
90 Interview with Ambassador Richard C. Miles, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Mission to Serbia. In Phillips.
71.
91 Talentino. 260.
92 Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on 27 October 1998. 
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York Times. 1A. April 18, 1999.
94 Talentino. 260.
179
“Rubicon Model” meaning that there was not going to be a backing down from attack by 
that point.95
Albright continued in her role as the hawk in terms o f NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, and she was skeptical that any diplomatic course that was not backed by force 
could be ultimately successful.96 Her position became so outspoken that Berger, now the 
National Security Advisor, frequently prevented communications from her reaching 
President Clinton, a situation which remained nearly constant until the Racak massacre.97 
In congressional testimony on the intervention given approximately one month after it 
began, Albright laid out the reasons for the U.S. actions. She noted historical importance 
o f the Balkans as a cultural and religious crossroads remembering that the First World 
War started there. She noted the proximity of the region to key U.S. Allies such as old 
NATO members Greece and Turkey, and new ones such as Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. She emphasized that the intervention allowed the U.S. and NATO to live up to 
their “highest ideals, and hoped that the intervention would become “a turning point in
n o
European history.” In stark contrast to the decision making process for the Somalia 
intervention, the Principal’s committee in the NSC repeatedly deadlocked on the issue, 
with the Departments of State and Defense at loggerheads over the potential responses.99 
Racak, and the Serbian slaughter o f 45 ethnic Albanians there broke the political 
deadlock and set U.S. leaders onto the path of intervention and allowed Albright, 
Holbrooke, and Clark to sway the other key decision makers.100 Over a four day period,
95 Johnson, Dominic, and Tiemey, Dominic. “The Rubicon Theory o f  War: How the Path to Conflict 
Reaches the Point o f  N o Return” International Security 36, No. 1 (2011): 7-40. 15.
96 Houghton. 208.
97 Rodman. 222.
98 Halperin, in Buckley. 224.
"R odm an. 223.
100 Houghton. 208.
180
from January 19 to January 23, 1999, the Principals Committee engaged in the debate 
that would ultimately set the U.S. on the path to intervention. As described by Albright, 
she convinced the other Principals that a further ultimatum, backed by the threat o f force, 
should be placed on the table, and it was this threat which brought about both the peace 
conference at Rambouillet and the armed humanitarian intervention which followed.101 
During the October crisis, Clark had developed an air campaign which was never 
implemented, and proposed a similar military response now.102 Nevertheless, neither 
President Clinton nor his Vice President, Albert Gore were interested in deploying troops 
into Kosovo, although the events in Rwanda and Bosnia seem to have convinced them 
that some military action could work.103 They seemed to collectively forget that the 
supposed effectiveness o f air strikes in compelling Serbia to negotiate at Dayton failed 
was explicitly linked to ground offensives into the region.104
In contrast to the Somalia intervention, in which pressure from Congress was 
directly cited as a source of pressure to intervene, there was little outright support for 
military coercion of Serbia. Albright noted that key leaders, such as Senators Biden and 
Lugar, from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Speaker o f the House Dennis 
Hastert, were in general support of the air strikes, and that the vote in the Senate 
supporting them was respectable, at 58 in favor, 41 against, while the vote in the House 
o f Representatives was 219-191, both indicators of bipartisan support for the air 
strikes.105 However, Congressional leaders were strongly opposed to the possibility of 
the use o f ground forces in Kosovo, a fact which significantly influenced the decision to
101 Albright. 397-398.
102 Clark. 118.




intervene and the planning for the implementation once intervention was agreed upon. 
The Kosovo crisis covers two Congresses, the 105th and 106th. The 105th Congress, 
which lasted from January, 1997 to December, 1998, mentioned Kosovo 461 times, with 
seven hearings specifically focused on intervention, and one, that o f 5 October 1998 
specifically enjoining the U.S. not to intervene. From January to April 28, 1999, there 
were 42 Congressional events about or mentioning Kosovo, with a pivotal hearing 
recommending against the use of ground forces on March 10th 1999.106 Neither Clinton 
nor his political allies wished to embark on a major invasion while the presidency was 
under attack, with impeachment proceedings underway following the Monica Lewinsky 
sex scandal.107 Furthermore, they did not want an extended campaign, particularly a 
ground campaign, to last into the fall, when it would potentially cause problems for Al 
Gore’s campaign for president.108
Congress came to support the attack decision, but was unwilling to commit 
ground forces. This is reflected by two key votes which took place on the first day o f the 
air strikes. According to Clinton, the Senate voted 58-41 in support o f the air strikes. 
The House also supported them, but was careful to place limits on them. Voting 219- 
191, the House stated that ground troops could only be used in Kosovo after a cease fire, 
and only with Congressional approval.109 So throughout, Congress remained reluctant on 
a total combat solution to the problem. In April, as pressure to introduce ground forces
106 Congressional Research Service. Congressional Record o f  the 105th and 106th Congresses. 
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grew, Congress again voted to deny their use.110 Congressional reluctance transferred 
itself over to Secretary o f Defense Cohen, who had come to his position directly from 
Capitol Hill, voted against action in Bosnia, and now felt caught between the activists and 
the non-interested.111
The Pentagon, as it had been in previous cases, was against the intervention and 
particularly against the deployment o f ground forces in Serbia and Kosovo, with one 
study estimating that 100-200,000 troops would be needed to properly enforce NATO’s 
will on the Belgrade regime, and the CIA noting that ethnic cleansing had already begun
I * 'j
there. Clearly these forces would be primarily supplied by the U.S., something which 
the Pentagon was unwilling to do. Buckley notes the dichotomy that, nearly to a fault, 
the players pushing for military interventions were all civilians whose outlooks were 
shaped by the Vietnam War, while the military, also remembering Vietnam, were by and
i i •>
large against intervention. Support was bipartisan, according to Hill, with key 
conservative figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, a neo-conservative and later an architect of 
the U.S. Global War on Terror, in support o f U.S. efforts to resolve the Kosovo issue 
forcefully.114 In a manner reminiscent o f the Vietnam Era, once the bombing began, 
Clinton insisted on personally signing off on targets, a process which would limit the 
flexibility and effectiveness o f the attacks.115
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The most significant international leader pushing for intervention in Somalia had 
been UN Secretary General Boutros-Gali, but there was no UN pressure for Kosovo, as 
has been discussed. Instead, international pressure for intervention in Kosovo would 
come from two key sources. One, very public voice, was the UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. In response to the events which led to the fall, 1998 Holbrooke mission, Blair, in a 
speech to the UN General Assembly, called the situation in Kosovo an “Impending 
humanitarian affairs disaster.”116 Blair notes that what he calls his “political awakening” 
over Kosovo came over the course of 1998, fueled by UK intelligence reporting over the 
rising death toll in the province.117 Blair had developed a close working relationship with 
Clinton, which he says was put to the test, particularly over the issue of ground 
intervention, o f which Blair was outspokenly in favor.118 But Blair also understood that 
there could be no NATO intervention without the U.S., which would bear 85% of the 
military burden of the intervention. The relationship stood the test, and the “political soul 
mates” continued their collaboration afterward.119
The other, who exerted pressure primarily through NATO military commander 
Clark, was that organization’s Secretary General, Javier Solana. Solana was supremely 
aware of the need for successful operations in building NATOs reputation after the Cold 
War. One o f his first directive to Clark was to absolutely ensure that the NATO piece of 
the effort which brought Serbia to the table at Dayton succeeded.120 He carried that 
determination forward into the Kosovo planning, imploring Clark to make sure that
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whatever operation be carried out be done under NATO auspices, particularly after 
NATO was shut out o f a role in the enforcement o f the October agreement in 1998.121 In 
common with the White House, the overwhelming preference for NATO was that there 
be an air component o f the operation with no NATO ground forces until after a peace 
deal had been forced. This was in contrast to the view o f military leaders in the 
Pentagon, who questioned the utility o f an air only operation, while simultaneously 
strongly resisting the idea of putting boots on the ground.
Support among the NATO allies was varied. UK support for air operations stayed 
in the 60-70% range through the conflict, as did the French, with the French showing a 
similar taste for ground operations. In the UK support for ground operations never 
rose above 50%. 124 In Germany, on the other hand, support never rose above 30%.125 
According to Blair, Solana and Clark welcomed Blair’s assistance in gathering support 
for the intervention, which he was happy to give.126 He also helped to deflect calls for an 
early cease fire, particularly from the Italians and Germans.127 In Germany, a political 
upheaval had just occurred, with incoming Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, a Social 
Democrat, leading the first non Christian Democrat (Conservative) government since 
1982. The leaders o f the new government, in particular Schroeder and the Green Party 
foreign minister, Joschke Fischer, openly supported the operation, and decried Milosevic, 
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into a conflict.128 With this in mind, Schroeder deployed German military forces into 
frontline combat operations for the first time since the end of the Second World War, 
saying that the operation was “not a war, but the imposition o f a peaceful solution” to the
1 ?Qcrisis. Germany was also keen to reassure its allies that a Social Democrat Germany 
could be a reliable military partner.130 However, the bombing campaign revealed a rift in 
the German left between those in the former West Germany who supported the military 
operation, and those in the former East Germany, in particular members o f the PDS, the 
former German communist party, who were decidedly against the intervention, noting 
that it had no UN mandate, threatening to break apart the new coalition government and 
return the Christian Democrats to power.131 As a result, Schroeder later used his position 
as the rotational president o f the EU council to help broker an end to the conflict.132
As Wesley Clark described it, there were four agreed to objectives for the air 
offensive with the overall goal o f halting and reversing the ethnic cleansing campaign 
and facilitating the return of the refugees who had already fled. First, it should be as near 
to casualty free as possible. Second, it should be focused on the Serb forces who were 
actively engaged in ethnic cleansing. Third, following from the second, was the principle 
of minimal collateral damage. Fourth, targets would be chosen with the aim of 
maintaining the alliance’s cohesion.133 With this latter, the credibility o f NATO would
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be protected and enhanced. Though the initial agreement was for a few nights of 
bombing at most, once the campaign began it proved to be easier to continue it than it had 
been to negotiate it in the first place.134
Public Opinion and the Kosovo Intervention
There was little press coverage o f the Kosovo issue before the Racak massacre in 
January, 1999, according to Holbrooke.135 In September, 1998, for example, the 
Washington Post reported on the growing number o f refugees in the region, noting that as 
many as 300,000 people had been displaced internally by Serb actions.136 The American 
public was largely focused on the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and remained largely 
uninterested in the events in Kosovo, although this did change somewhat after Racak. As 
had been the case with Rwanda, there was little public pressure on the media, Congress, 
or the president to act. The Rambouillet conference and the lead up to the intervention in 
Serbia saw an uptick in U.S. support for operations. A Gallup Poll taken twice, on 
February and March 19-21, 1998, showed a 3% increase in participants who supported 
military operations if no agreement was reached, from 43-46%.137 Similarly, respondents 
increasingly conflated Kosovo with U.S. security, and between 19 February and 25 
March, the number o f respondents who thought that acting in Kosovo protected U.S.
134 Clark, quoted in Buckley. 264. Also Talbot. 338. Clark told Talbot “If we start this thing, it will be a 
long haul.”
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interests increased by 6%, from 37 to 43%.138 A summary of the polling data on the issue 
o f U.S. intervention in Kosovo is shown below in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Key polling data on Intervention in Kosovo, February-May 1999








































Source: Polling Report on Serbia and Yugoslavia139
What is most noteworthy about this collection of polling data is that support for 
intervention grew only slowly through the course o f the Rambouillet peace talks, peaking 
only once intervention had actually begun on March 24, 1999. While Kosovo benefited
138 The Gallup Poll. “Americans Hesitant, As Usual, About U.S. Military Action in Balkans." 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/3994/americans-hesitant-usual-about-us-military-action-balkans.aspx. 
Accessed on 10 November 2014.
139 Polling Report. “Polling Report on Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1999.” 
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from a lengthy period o f framing, this did little to increase enthusiasm for the operation 
before it actually began.
The White House first commented on Kosovo in the context o f the intervention 
crisis in March, 1998, but it did not emerge in presidential communications as a 
standalone issue until June, when Clinton specifically mentioned Milosevic during a joint 
statement he gave with Russian President Yeltsin. From September 1998 onwards, a 
series of communications began to clarify the situation and to frame the intervention, 
specifically naming Milosevic and his actions as the problem in the region.140 By early 
March, as the negotiations in France were failing, presidential statements increased in 
stridency and directly hinted at the air campaign which would follow if negotiations 
failed. Throughout, and throughout the actual bombing campaign, the messaging 
remained consistently focused on Milosevic personally and the need to correct his 
regime’s “evil.” Indeed, 45% of Administration speech acts on Kosovo were focused on 
the terminology “evil” and aimed at Congress and other government level decision 
makers, while 44% focused on justifying “intervention” and were aimed at the media and 
the public.141
One part o f the framing effort for intervention was bitterly contested between 
supporters and detractors of the president’s decision making and framing o f the 
intervention. Clinton’s announcement o f the commencement o f bombing attacks, on 
February 24, 1999, provided the context o f the intervention to the American people,
140 On October 12, Clinton famously said “Balkan Graveyards are filled with President M ilosevic’s broken 
promises,” at a fundraiser for Senator Charles Schumer o f  N ew  York. From Butler, Michael J. Selling a 




framing Milosevic’s actions and explaining the increase in atrocities in Kosovo.142 
Clinton also made specific and repeated references to putting troops on the ground. With 
his clear statement, “I do not intend to put our troops on the ground in Kosovo to fight a 
war,” Clinton sent very mixed signals to the Serb leadership, which military leaders 
credit with lengthening the conflict, since it gave them the impression that the 
administration was not serious in its intent.143 Clinton’s instinct domestically, however, 
appears to have been correct. In Fox News polls in May and June, 1999, specifically 
asking about sending ground troops into Kosovo, the results were nearly identical, with 
27% in favor and 59-60% against.144 Given the timing o f the polls, this result seems to 
be a result of successful framing of the issue by the president. In any case, Clinton was 
adamant, and claimed throughout, and afterwards, that the introduction o f ground force 
into the conflict would ended up claiming more innocent lives than might have been 
saved.145
The dueling narratives o f the planning effort turned out to be between the world­
views o f the two age groups represented in Clinton’s cabinet. Like George H.W. Bush in 
the case o f Saddam Hussein in 1990, Albright was quick to seize on the Munich analogy, 
conflating Slobodan Milosevic with Hitler, and strongly urging that he not be appeased 
over Bosnia and Kosovo as Hitler had been over the Sudetenland in 193 8.146 Either way, 
action was preferred to inaction, regardless o f which imagery was used to appeal to 
which audience. Thus avoidance of Munich and the perceived appeasement o f a new
142 Clinton. 940.
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Hitler was the primary narrative coming from the Department o f State, while avoidance 
o f a Vietnam like quagmire was the mantra of other governmental departments and the 
large cadre of Vietnam veterans serving in the administration and Congress, such as John 
McCain, the powerful Republican member of the Foreign Relations and Armed Service 
Committees in the Senate.147 This group also includes Cohen and the senior uniformed 
leaders, with the exception o f Clark.
Models and the Kosovo Decision Process
The Kosovo intervention shows in clear focus the role o f the powerful individual, 
or group o f individuals, in the decision making process. Madeleine Albright was at the 
center o f the process, to the point that the Kosovo conflict was often called “Madeleine’s 
War” by her detractors. Holbrooke had a role as well, building on his central role as a 
Milosevic expert in the Dayton Peace Accords. Clark’s role was highly significant, as in 
spite of the fact that he did not lead his organization, he was important enough of a player 
to have an independent, and important voice. President Clinton’s main focus was on 
Congressional and public acceptance of the war.148 Outside leaders, particularly Tony 
Blair, were also significant to the process, as was the key organizational player, NATO. 
Clinton would not have been pushed to agree to intervention without the U.S. trio of 
Albright, Holbrooke and Clark, with Blair thrown in from the outside.
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With the exception of Clark’s role, the Governmental Politics Model holds true 
for the decision making and framing processes for the Kosovo intervention. Since this 
intervention was not in response to a basic humanitarian need such as for food, shelter, or 
reconstruction, the agencies focused on those activities, such as OFDA and USAID had 
no role in the discussions. This was very much a Defense and Department of State show, 
with the intelligence agencies in a supporting role. As could be expected, with the 
interesting caveat on civilian versus military views on the use o f force, the Department of 
Defense came down in general against involvement, while the Department o f State came 
down in favor.
In terms of framing, this is the first case studied in which a planned framing effort 
leading to an intervention took place, indicating the decide/explain/act model in 
operation. Secretary o f State Albright led a deliberate effort to frame the debate on 
Kosovo, even pre-empting official statements from the White House and her fellow 
cabinet leaders.149 Immediately after the Racak massacre, Albright, then in Moscow, 
issued joint statement with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov decrying the event.150 This 
was one o f a series o f statements designed to ratchet up the pressure on all parties to act. 
However, there is little evidence that there was a government wide effort to frame to 
intervention to the public until immediately before the beginning of combat operations at 
the end of March. Efforts to influence the public included use o f Albright’s former boss 
at the NSC, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who wrote for the Wall Street Journal supporting an 
intervention days before it began. His argument, specifically calling for a massive air
149 DiPrizio. 136. The Author terms it “Leading through Rhetoric” and notes that Albright was targeting 
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assault on the Belgrade regime, echoed plans and orders that were already being 
circulated for implementation.151 The themes were consistent, and delivered at all levels, 
from the president down to staffers: Protect human rights, defuse war in the powder keg 
o f Europe, and strengthen NATO.152
Tony Blair noted that there was “No direct U.S. interest, no public appetite for 
action, in Kosovo,” other than that Europe should take care o f the problem itse lf.153 This 
begs the question o f whether the intervention was a rational choice for the Clinton 
administration. The rationality o f the Clinton decision to intervene comes not from a 
direct threat to the security o f the United States, but from the need to preserve NATO and 
prevent strife in Europe.154 An undercurrent from the various political memoirs 
examined is the need to prevent another Rwanda or Somalia, both for the political threat 
that an additional failure could cause, but also from some sense of moral outrage against 
such events in general. In this, Clinton was thinking o f his legacy, in a way similar to the 
way that George H.W. Bush was thinking of his when he intervened in Somalia in 1992.
Conclusion
According to the Czech President, Vaclav Havel, the Kosovo intervention was the 
“first war that has not been waged in the name of ‘national interest,’ but rather in the 
name o f principles and values.”155 David Gibbs counteracts this idea, claiming that the
151 Quoted in Buckley. 318.
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Kosovo intervention was an act o f nearly pure national interest on behalf o f the United 
States, which was intent on reaffirming its leadership over Europe and redeeming its 
military credibility after failures over the course of the decade.156 Gibbs focused on the 
role of Holbrooke in what he calls false negotiations, noting in particular the final 
Holbrooke trip to Belgrade in March, which he calls simple coercion rather than 
diplomacy.157 However, this seems unfair considering the events of the summer and fall, 
1998, in which Holbrooke genuinely tried to negotiate, and the very real massing of 
Serbian forces for ethnic cleansing operations in Kosovo which have been related in this 
case study.
At first, the bombing campaign in Kosovo served to intensify Serbian atrocities in 
Kosovo, but as the air campaign intensified, Milosevic eventually surrendered to NATO 
and allowed NATO troops to enter Kosovo in June, 1999. As Blair related it, Clinton’s 
increasing openness to the idea of a ground war after May 27th was mirrored in the 
“crumbling” of Milosevic’s resolve, in that the more Milosevic appeared to weaken, the
I ^ Rmore open to ground troops Clinton became. This led to confrontation with the 
Russians, who wished to further their own political in the region, but this was resolved 
diplomatically, and the whole affair was given legitimacy by the UN through UNSCR 
1244.159 While improving the situation in Kosovo, it also indefinitely delayed a 
permanent resolution to the problem, since Russia would be able to block any further 
changes in Kosovo’s status through use of its veto in the Security Council, a situation 
which has changed little to the time of writing.
156 Gibbs, David N. First, Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction o f  Yugoslavia. 





Kosovo, and its demonstration that major powers were willing to ignore the 
sovereignty of other nations in furtherance o f humanitarian goals, ignited a major 
discussion on the future of such interventions. In response to a series o f man-made 
humanitarian disasters after the end o f the Cold War, the principal arose that the 
international community has a responsibility to protect the lives o f citizens whose 
sovereign governments were unable or refused to do so. Kosovo joined Rwanda, Bosnia, 
and the ongoing Darfur crisis in inspiring the discussions.160 A codification o f the 
principal of humanitarian interventions came about as the result o f the 2000 UN 
Millennium summit, and the subsequent International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) which officially coined the phrase “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P) in its final report of the same name. R2P was accepted by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005, with the implicit agreement that individual security stand equal to or 
above the long cherished Westphalian order, which was based on belief in the primacy of 
the state.161 The UN Charter already provided foundations for R2P, including it’s 
outlawing of war in Article 2 as well as its desire for the protection o f human rights in its
I f\71st, 55th, and 56th articles. On the other hand, the charter’s support for the sovereign 
rights o f its member states in Article 2 created a tension between realist and utopian 
tendencies that R2P could potentially bridge.
R2P calls for UN members to intervene either to prevent serious suffering, stop 
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, or to rebuild societies which have been
160 Bellamy, Alex J. "The Responsibility to Protect," in Security Studies: An Introduction. New York: 




1 A3devastated as a result of such actions or failures. In the case o f Libya, prevention of 
serious suffering and war crimes are the most compelling o f the reasons provided for R2P 
intervention. Under the terms o f R2P, states which fail to offer adequate security to their 
citizens would forfeit the right of sovereign non-interference as set down in Article 2, and 
be subject to intervention by the international community. As previously mentioned, the 
ICISS report even went so far as to place human security higher than that o f the nation 
state.164 This utopian desire, however, was not specifically endorsed by the UN Security 
Council, in part because of its implied “Responsibility to Prevent,” 165 abridgements of 
human security rather than simply reacting to their occurrence.166 This move, as well as 
others, reflect an overarching problem for R2P; the lack of ability to agree on core 
definitions at any level o f the discussion, from the definition o f a major crisis to that of 
what an intervention seriously damaged the original, neo Kantian intent o f the R2P 
proposal.167 As R2P moved from proposal stage to a vote, it was significantly watered 
down, creating very high thresholds for action and with upholding the power o f the 
Security Council to decide if a situation was serious enough to warrant intervention. 
Thus, the Security Council retains the right to authorize interventions, keeping them 
subject to the whims of the permanent/veto wielding members o f the council.168
163 Pape, Robert. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f  Humanitarian Intervention." International 
Security, Summer, 2012: 41-80. 51. Further tenets for justifiable intervention were that the mission must 
be achievable, and be as small (tailored) as possible in its execution.
164 The ICISS states that, after the host country, the Security Council has the primary responsibility to act. 
Sovereignty, International Convention on Intervention and State. The Responsibility to Protect. Final 
Report, Ottawa: Published by the International Development Research Centre, 2001.
165 Responsibility to Prevent, although presented as a subset to R2P, actually goes beyond it, stating that the 
International Community can act against perceived humanitarian affronts, in other words, crimes which 
have not yet occurred.
166 Bellamy. 426-427
167 Pape. 51
168 The ICISS report suggested that the permanent members agree in advance to forgo a veto in cases o f  
R2P interventions, but this was never agreed to, nor was the proposal that R2P cases could be sent directly 
to the General Assembly in such cases. The Responsibility to Protect, Final Report. 2001.
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This case study focused on the decision making processes o f the second term 
Clinton administration, specifically the case o f the armed intervention in Kosovo from 
March-June 1999. It examined the context for intervention from a historical perspective 
in Yugoslavia, as well as a political perspective in Washington DC. It noted the 
influence of a small group of powerful leaders, namely Albright, Holbrooke, and Clark, 
who were in positions of influence, and, motivated to use that influence to drive decision 
making toward intervention. Furthermore, it discussed bi-lateral and multilateral 
relationships, with the UK and NATO, that impacted the operation and the decision 
making cycle significantly, and differently, than the UN had done in the previous cases. 
It addressed the role of a hostile great power, Russia, which also impacted the situation 
significantly, and in contrast to the way great power politics operated in the previous 
cases. Finally, it discussed the new thinking on state sovereignty, humanitarian 
interventions, and human security which resulted from the cumulative effects o f the 
series o f humanitarian interventions, armed and unarmed, which took place in the 1990s.
Case Study 3: Obama and U.S. Intervention in Libya, 2011
Spring 2011 will likely forever be known as the Arab Spring -  a sequence of 
popular uprisings which overturned the established political order in several countries. 
Starting with an incident in Tunisia, the Arab Spring rapidly engulfed Egypt and spread 
to points east and west. While revolts were crushed in the gulf state o f Bahrain, they
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flared in Syria. By February, 2011, Libya, which had undergone a remarkable, if  cynical 
transformation from enemy to ally o f the west in the early 2000’s, was perched on the 
edge. As rebellion threatened in the eastern part o f the country, Muhammar Gaddafi, 
ruling from Tripoli in western Libya, preached the status quo and commenced a policy of 
brutal retaliation.
The U.S. and the international community generally took a wait and see approach 
to the initial events of the Arab Spring. However, when the Libyan situation showed 
signs of disturbance, political elites in the region and Europe and the U.S. cried for 
intervention rather than support Gaddafi and the status quo. The U.S. and key European 
allies assembled a coalition for intervention, and were able to exert pressure on UN to act 
in favor o f intervention. This was facilitated by the Arab League and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, which were dominated by conservative Arab States which were 
simultaneously cracking down on protests in Bahrain. Thus, a coalition o f members o f 
both regional organizations and NATO launched what the U.S. called “Operation 
Odyssey Dawn” to enforce a no fly zone and later to provide air support to Libyan rebels. 
In March and April 2011, this amounted to some 100 cruise missile attacks and 1,900 
aircraft sorties. From enforcing a no-fly zone, support grew into a full spectrum air 
offensive against pro Gaddafi Libyan forces, eventually enabling the rebel movement to 
expand its operations westward and overthrow the dictator, with an additional 24,000 
sorties flown under NATO leadership through October 2011. In the end, Gaddafi was 
hunted and died during capture, and a largely Islamist and anti-western coalition has 
taken over the country.
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Intervention in Libya was achieved through a variety o f methods and channels, 
most innovative and notable o f which was the invocation o f the new UN doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The purpose of this case study is to look at the Libya 
intervention as a decision making process, both in terms of the deployment o f forces, and 
in the framing effort in support of the operation and against Gadhafi. R2P features in the 
study as a framing device for encouraging the decision to intervene and in the 
justification o f the intervention to relevant audiences. The study will review the history 
o f the crisis in Libya as well as how that crisis fits into the overall world situation in 
2011, continuing to examine the key players in the decision making process and the 
method by which the decision to intervene was made and framed to the American public. 
Research reveals that intervention was made possible through the pressure o f a few key 
leaders in the Obama administration. Those leaders, most notably Ambassador to the UN 
Susan Rice and National Security Council staffer Samantha Power were both relatively 
junior in the positions they held in the administration, but their unique ties the president 
facilitated both access and influence. With the eventual turnaround in support by 
Secretary o f State Hillary Clinton, to their cause, they were able to encourage President 
Obama to decide in favor o f intervention. Having decided on intervention, the 
government then rapidly launched a broad framing effort, including leaders who had been 
against the decision to intervene, in an effort to build support for the operation.
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Libya and the Arab Spring 2010 -  2011 -  Background to Intervention
Over the course o f the early 2000s, Libya achieved a remarkable rapprochement 
with the west, largely undoing the enmity brought about by a series o f confrontations 
with the U.S. in the 1980s, culminating with the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Airlines 
flight 103 in 1988.1 Through destruction of extant stocks of weapons o f mass destruction 
in 2003, and the foreswearing of efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, as well as the 
negotiation o f a series of oil and other trade deals, Gaddafi achieved through diplomacy 
what aggression could not: A Libya that was seen as a lucrative trade partner and
'j
potential ally in northern Africa. Libya’s leader Gaddafi, always eccentric, was 
increasingly seen as a continental player in Africa through his efforts to influence the 
African Union coupled with Libya’s immense reserves o f oil (largest in Africa and the 
fifth largest in the world with 76.4 billion barrels in 2010) gave it a strong strategic and 
economic position.3
There was more to Libya than met the eye, however. Money tended to be 
concentrated in Gaddafi’s home city o f Sirte, and westwards in his capital, Tripoli.4 
Libya is a highly tribalized society, with government working as a function of deals the 
Gaddafi family made with the other tribes for various services. The growing interest and 
efforts o f U.S. and European multinational corporations (beyond the obvious oil linkages) 
served to add a veneer o f legitimacy to Gaddafi’s rule, a reign which was becoming ever
1 Chorin, Ethan. Exit Gaddafi: The Hidden History o f  the Libyan Revolution. London: Saqi Books, 2012. 
5-6.
2 Chorin. 182.
3 Administration, U.S. Energy Information. Country: Libya. June 2012. 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY. Accessed April 15, 2013.
4 Prashad, Vijay. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter. Baltimore: AK Press, 2012. 119.
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more authoritarian and removed from reality.5 The disparity in economic wellbeing and 
religious beliefs between eastern and western Libya was stark. A clear cultural divide 
existed between east and west, with the traditional capital city of Tripoli dominating the 
largely pro Gaddafi west, while Benghazi, largest city in the east, and long considered to 
be anti-regime, was touted by the regime as a symbol o f the improvements Gaddafi 
promised. But infrastructure improvements could not change the fact that the most 
effective regime opponents were clustered in Benghazi and its hinterland. Eastern Libya 
was already known for the higher than average number of its young men who had gone to 
Iraq to take part in the resistance to the U.S. efforts there.6 This was in part because of 
religious fervor and in part because o f poverty and political disenfranchisement at home.
The first major blow to this reinvigoration of U.S./Libyan ties occurred as a result 
o f the wiki leaks scandal, which broke in fall 2010. Many o f the leaked documents were 
highly personal observations o f Gaddafi and his family by embassy and other Department 
o f State officials, describing the inner workings and inner peculiarities o f the regime. 
This was seen as a shock and an insult by the U.S. to the Libyan leader and his family, to 
the point that U.S. diplomatic efforts and personnel were shut out and the Ambassador 
eventually withdrawn, just before what would prove to be a significant crisis for Libya 
and the whole region, the Arab Spring.7
The direct events leading to the Arab Spring began in December 2010, in Tunisia, 
with the protest suicide o f a street merchant claiming to have been abused by the 
government. Fanned by new media and by the mainstream A1 Jazeera network, the 





to experience unrest as a result o f what was then seen as an Arab uprising, and by the end 
of January the Gaddafi regime was already censoring foreign media websites and trying 
to control as much of the information flow from outside as it could.8 The U.S. 
intelligence community had been predicting political change in the Arab nations, but was 
caught by surprise by the scope and speed of the events o f the Arab Spring in 2011.9
Egypt, the centerpiece o f U.S. efforts to stabilize the Middle East since the Camp 
David Peace Accords brought peace with Israel in 1979, appeared to be tottering, 
potentially nullifying those thirty years o f intense diplomatic and political labor, and 
exposing U.S. partner Israel to threat.10 Furthermore, significant oil contracts between 
the U.S. and Libya, recently rekindled following Gaddafi’s “About Face,” were at 
stake.11 Fears of the unrest cutting off a key supplier of oil to Europe led to negative 
expectations for further oil trade with Libya, another possible cause for intervention.12 
Thus, the three pillars o f U.S. policy, oil, stability, and the protection o f Israel, loomed 
large in the minds of leaders in Washington. There was more than one set o f messages 
being transmitted, however, in what amounted to a series o f dueling narratives. But on 
February 4, 2011, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pronounced an “Islamic Awakening” 
across the entire Middle East, including Libya.13 The U.S. and international response
8 Chorin. 190-191. Unlike its neighbors, internet and advanced cell phone communications were rather 
limited in Libya, particularly in the east, so that the traditional media bore the main load in informing the 
public and fanning the flames o f  revolution.
9 Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights. New York: Penguin Press, 2014. 277.
10 Prashad. 38-39.
" Ibid. 45.
12 Copeland, Dale. "Economic Interdependence and War." International Security, 1996: 5-41. 39.
13 Prashad. 31.
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was characterized by what Maximilian Forte called the “ongoing militarization o f U.S.
foreign policy and the rise o f the new military humanism.”14
On February 14, 2011, the Arab Spring threatened the Arabian Peninsula for the 
first time, with the “Day of Rage” protests in Bahrain, and popular unrest growing in 
Yemen. With U.S. support, Saudi Arabian forces assisted the Bahraini government in a 
brutal crackdown which ended open dissent in the country. The Arab Spring was 
increasingly on the radars o f the Gulf states, and they would lead the way in pushing for 
ever stronger responses to events in Libya.15 On 15 February 2011, in an effort to diffuse 
protest, Gaddafi ordered wide scale arrests around the country. These arrests failed, 
however, and the net result was that significant protests broke out just two days later, on 
the 17th.16 In a cascade of violence, Gaddafi ordered further crackdowns in response, 
culminating in the arrest of resistance leaders and their representatives including Fathi 
Terbil, a lawyer who had represented earlier victims of regime violence. Fathi’s arrest 
turned out to be the catalyst which set Benghazi onto the path o f rebellion.17 By February 
20th, events in Benghazi were spiraling out o f control, and, following a poorly executed 
conciliatory speech by Gaddafi’s son Saif, major demonstrations spread for the first time 
to Tripoli, and thus to the dictators very doorstep.18 This was followed by one o f the first 
international actions of the drama, when, on 21 February 2011, the UN representatives 
for Libya joined the rebels, declaring their support for them and entreating the military
and other leaders o f the government apparatus to do the same.19
14 Forte, Maximillian. Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO's War on Libya and Africa. Montreal: Baraka 
Books, 2012. 9. Also seen in President Obama’s efforts to restrain Mubarak from attacks on Egyptians.
15 Gates, Robert M. Duty, Memoirs o f  a Secretary at War. N ew  York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 515.





Meanwhile, the Libyan government’s threat to its citizens was growing. Unlike 
Egypt, whose army largely refused to fight its own civilians, the Libyan military, largely 
made up of foreign mercenaries who were loyal to the Gaddafi government first and
"J(\foremost, had no qualms about employing violence. By this time, over 75% of Libya’s 
population center had already fallen away from government control.21 In a February 
22nd speech, Gaddafi himself promised to “cleanse Libya inch by inch”, and began 
deploying significant military forces to the eastern part o f the country.22 This increase 
and threat of violence triggered the humanitarian crisis which would later be used to 
justify intervention. Libya had long relied on outside labor for many of its industries, 
including oil, and for its army, and now all of these people, as well as foreign government 
officials and Libyans fleeing persecution, were trying to leave at once.23 On the same 
day, the UN retaliated by condemning the use o f force against civilians, while the Arab 
League supported this action by suspending Libya’s membership in it.24
The U.S. and the World in 2011 -  Context fo r  Intervention
Although the Arab Spring came to dominate the attention of the media and the 
Obama administration, there was a litany of other problems in late winter, 2011. Asia 
was the preferred focus area of the administration, and the decline o f Japan coupled with 
the rising economic power of China and its tacit challenge to U.S. and allied power in the
20 Clinton, Hillary R. H ard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 364.
21 Pape, Robert. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f  Humanitarian Intervention." International 
Security, Summer, 2012: 41-80. 62.
22 Chorin. 202. In Benghazi alone, this threatened over three quarters o f  a million lives.
23 Chorin. The austhor notes that 15,000 Chinese laborers were evacuated to Crete by boat, this is just one 
example o f  private individuals, to which must be added thousands o f  embassy and other government 
officials from around the world.
24 Gates. 510.
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Pacific area were major concerns. This coincided with calls among the Muslim 
population in China for a “Jasmine Revolution” of pro-democracy rallies modeled on the 
Arab Spring. Although there were assemblies in approximately a dozen Chinese cities, 
no popular uprising took place.
Japan was also a growing source o f concern during this period. In late February, 
its credit rating was downgraded because o f the increasing level o f government debt. 
Then, on 11 March, a series o f earthquakes hit northern Japan, culminating in a tsunami 
and which led the Fukushima nuclear reactor, located on the coast to flood and meltdown, 
instigating a massive U.S. military evacuation and assistance effort there. At $235 billion 
in damage, the Fukushima earthquake was the most expensive natural disaster in history, 
and further crippled Japanese efforts to re-assert itself economically and politically.26
As noted previously the wiki leaks scandal, which had broken in 2010, continued 
to cause embarrassment to the U.S., around the world, and to specifically impact U.S. 
perceptions in and of the situation in Libya. Over 250,000 documents, many o f the 
classified Department o f State cables, were periodically released over the period of 
January -  May 2011. Wikileaks information on wide scale state o f corruption in the 
Tunisian Government is credited by some with instigating the Arab Spring protests.27 
Protests in Tunisia eventually led to the overthrow of that country’s President, Zine Ben 
Ali, in January 2011.
25 Fitzgerald, David and Ryan, David. Obama, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas o f  Intervention.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 88.
26 Kim, Victoria. “Japan damage could reach $235 billion, World Bank estimates.” The Los Angeles Times, 
21 March 2011. Retrieved 10 October 2014.
27 Dickinson, Elizabeth. “The First WikiLeaks Revolution?” Foreign Policy , January 13, 2011. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/13/the-first-wikileaks-revolution/. Accessed on October 27, 2014.
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Elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa, spring 2011 saw a series o f failed coups 
in Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while an offensive against Al- 
Qaeda backed militants in Somalia resulted in hundreds of casualties. Two Iranian 
warships transited the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea on February 22nd, the first 
time that this had occurred since the 1979 revolution which overthrew the Shah o f Iran. 
On February 5th, Prime Minister David Cameron o f the UK said that multiculturalism had 
failed and that the country needed to restore a strong national identity at a security 
conference in Munich. This same meeting sparked the ire of Palestinian leaders, since 
their call for statehood was not accepted by those present. Further tensions were fanned 
when the new Egyptian government decided to re-open crossings into the Gaza strip at 
Rafah. In East Africa, Somali piracy continued to be a major concern, with a series of 
incidents showing the growing response of the anti-piracy coalition. The U.S. was in 
negotiations with Iraq for what forces it would be allowed to keep in that country after its 
planned withdrawal in December, 2011. Operations in Afghanistan were still ongoing, 
with increasing concerns about the corruption of the government o f Hamid Karzai. 
General David Petraeus, who had taken over command in the country from General 
Stanley McChrystal, was in the process o f revamping counterinsurgency strategies there, 
as violence continued.28
In economics, German and French leaders met to try to save the European 
currency, the EURO, from a series o f shocks, including the economic implosion of 
Greece and the ongoing impacts o f the World Financial Crisis which had begun in 2007. 
The state of the world and U.S. economies was the only issue which came near to
28 McChrystal was relieved following negative comments on administration key leaders in interviews 
provided to Rolling Stone Magazine in July, 2010.
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occupying public attention in the way that the Arab Spring in 2011. Gas prices reached 
their highest level in two years, in excess of 107 dollars per barrel, because o f the 
uncertainty caused by the events in the Middle East. In domestic politics, increasingly 
bitter partisanship marked votes to limit collective bargaining and union power in 
Wisconsin and Indiana, and both became national news stories, with Republican leaders 
prevailing in both cases. A budget crisis and threatened government shutdown were 
averted at the last minute by what would become the sequestration process of deferred, 
but forced, budget cuts, particularly in the defense field, while the disestablishment of 
U.S. Joint Forces Command and the re-apportionment of that commands training and 
support duties was causing re-adjustment through the Department o f Defense.
This case study differs from the others examined in one key way. Whereas each 
of the other crises, in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, took place along with or as 
background to more significant world events, in Spring 2011, the Arab Spring and the 
various protests and uprisings associated with it were they number one story and priority 
on the minds o f decision makers. In the next section of the case study, those leaders and 
their decision making processes will be examined more fully.
The Obama Administration, Leadership, Processes, and Strong Voices
“He (Obama) genuinely believes that he was elected to get America off its war 
footing that his legacy is to get the U.S. away from its over reliance on the 
military instrument.”
Julianne Smith, advisor to Vice President Joseph Biden.
29 Fitzgerald. 671.
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O f the three men leading the U.S. in the armed humanitarian interventions 
covered in the case studies, Barack Obama was, on the face o f it, significantly less 
qualified for a foreign policy role than either George H.W. Bush or William Clinton. 
This is based both on his academic background and his career before he assumed the 
Presidency in 2009, and in spite of his claims that living and travelling abroad at various 
points in his life made up for the lack.30 Upon winning a U.S. Senate seat in 2004, he set 
about remedying this lack with a reading plan on foreign policy issues and experts, and 
by contacting and learning from a series of experts, including Anthony Lake, Susan Rice, 
and Samantha Power, the latter two o f who would be among his most trusted foreign
i  j
policy advisors. Obama’s personal leadership style and decision making techniques 
were significantly different from the other leaders examined in the case studies. He is 
known to have limited his suit choices down to two types for his term in office so that he 
could focus more time on critical decisions than on minor ones. Gates noted that that
Obama was the “most deliberative president” that he had served, and “relished the
• 1"!
exercise o f his authority.” Moreover, he expected strong advice from his senior cabinet 
members, and when that was unavailable or perceived to be lacking, he was more than 
willing to ask second tier advisors for their advice, and to have the advocates for various 
responses to an issue argue out their stances in front o f him, as would be seen in the
30 Lizza, Ryan. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Barack Obama’s foreign policy.” 
The New Yorker, May 2, 2011. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist. 
Accessed on 10 November 2014.
31 Lizza, 2011.
32 Staff, NPR. “Inside Obama’s Decisions, from Libya to Lunch.” NPR interview with Michael Lewis, 
Presidential Biographer. http://www.npr.Org/2012/09/l 1/160898373/inside-obamas-decisions-from-libya- 
to-lunch. Accessed on 21 November 2014.
33 Gates. 296.
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Libya decision making process.34 Obama did not seek an “honest broker” in his National 
Security Advisor, but often preferred to fill that role himself as a means o f centralizing 
decision making power in himself, a process which often led to lengthy deliberations and 
long decision cycles.35 In terms o f what he sought as goals for his White House, more 
Middle East time was not high on the list at the beginning. He believed that the U.S. had 
been over focused on the region since 9-11, and that a rebalancing would be necessary to 
rebuild America’s reputation there.36 In spite o f this desire, it is said that the enemy 
always gets a vote, and the Middle East would not easily pass from center stage. Still, the 
desire to shift focus lead to some criticism, particularly after the White House failed to 
react to the political upheaval in Iran from 2009-2010 which had the potential to 
overthrow the hostile Ahmedinejad regime if care and attention had been given.37 Obama 
thus personally entered the Arab Spring crisis stung and vulnerable to criticism, and 
potentially more willing to act than before.
According to the memoirs of then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, President 
Obama sought to emulate President Abraham Lincoln, whose cabinet included serious 
political enemies, including his Secretary o f State, William Seward, who became a close 
ally. This was the driving force behind the “Team of rivals” approach to development of 
the Obama cabinet.38 Based on his own experience, and memory of the effectiveness of 
successful national security teams such as that o f George H. W. Bush, Secretary of 
Defense Bill Gates recommended that Obama have a team that was a “complete package”
34 Pfiffher, James P. “Decision making in the Obama White House.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 
2 ,2011 . 244-262. 247
35 Ibid. 244, 247.
36 Lizza, 2011. Interviews with Thomas Donilon and Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor.
37 Lizza, 2011. 17-18.
38 Clinton. 13.
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of members who got along with each other. To that end, he pledged to Obama that he 
would, in spite o f his different political leanings, never undertake a separate political 
agenda from the president.39 In spite o f that advice, the Obama team never came together 
in the way that was seen in the George H.W. Bush or second Clinton administrations.
In spite o f Gates’ recommendation, the team that President Obama actually 
assembled were not a “complete package” and in many cases did not know one another.40 
There were several reasons for this. One is that it had been eight years since the last 
Democrat administration, and there was somewhat of a passing o f the torch in terms of 
age and experience. The senior statesmen such as Warren Christopher and Madeleine 
Albright o f the Carter and Clinton years were gone, both because o f simple aging and the 
considerable acrimony that existed between the Obama and Clinton camps, based on the 
bitterness o f the struggle for the nomination o f the party. With some exceptions, such as 
John Podesta (who headed the Obama transition team, but then stayed out o f decision 
making until taking a position as Counselor to the President in 2013) and Leon Panetta 
(Who headed the CIA and then the Department o f Defense after the departure o f Gates in 
fall, 2011), senior Clinton leaders did not flock to Obama, nor were they welcome in the 
leadership, in spite of the personal rapprochement between Obama and Hillary Clinton 
culminated in her becoming Secretary of State.41 Nevertheless, the gap between the 
members of the two teams remained an issue.
The President’s immediate followers and advisors were also significantly 





incoming team “control freaks.”42 Gates described the political leadership team as 
“Smart and educated, but with no experience in governing.43 Furthermore, they reflected 
a far more partisan era than that in which Gates had matured as a leader. For him, 
bipartisan approaches to foreign policy issues were central, whereas they had become 
anathema to the later generations of political and foreign policy leaders.44 Foreign policy 
decision making was further complicated by the fact that there were many on the Obama 
staff who advised him directly on foreign policy issues, but independently of the 
associated senior cabinet members or the National Security Staff (NSS).45 Rahm 
Emmanuel, the White House Chief of Staff, Robert Gibbs, the spokesman, and special 
advisors Valerie Jarrett and David Axelrod, none of who held foreign policy portfolios, 
frequently offered their advice.46 While Jim Jones was the first National Security 
Advisor, he estimated that at least six people had better contact with President Obama on 
national security issues than he did. His departure may have improved matters by 2011, 
since his successor, Thomas Donilon, was one of those who had regularly done end runs 
around him to the president.47 Donilon had served as Chief o f Staff to then Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher,48 and he turned out to be a better fit than Jones had been, and 
had much better access to Obama, continuing the practice o f having the NSC Principal’s 
meet once a week to discuss issues for presentation to the president.49 According to
42 Gates. 276.
43 Ibid. 287. On Page 288, Gates describes his first situation room with the new set o f  advisors, in which 
nearly half o f  the attendees had their cell phones with them, and on, a major security violation and 
indicative o f  their lack o f  exposure to high level defense and foreign policy processes.
44 Ibid. 288.
45 The name was changed at the beginning o f  the administration to “National Security S taff’ so as to 
incorporate the Homeland Security Staff and Council.





Lizza, Donilon explixitly sought to restore the Brent Scowcroft Model o f how the NSC 
should run.50
Gates described Secretary of State Clinton as the only real independent center of 
power in the foreign policy decision making team, noting that she was “unfireable.”51 He 
and Clinton formed a power center together, at least until the Libya intervention, over 
which they came to disagree. However, all members of the cabinet who were not core 
Obama staffers had one attached, and Hilary was no exception. James Steinberg, who 
frequently disagreed with Clinton was appointed Deputy Secretary o f State without her 
endorsement Clinton, and furthermore, was allowed seats both on the Principal’s and 
Deputies Committees on the National Security Council.52 With the departure o f General 
Jim Jones from the position o f National Security Council in fall, 2010, the national 
security team lost its only leader with significant military experience, although the factors 
mentioned above, it is unlikely that this would have made a difference in the decision 
making for Libya.53
Gates himself might have suffered a similar fate, however, his role and approach 
were quite different. He was already known as someone who had been brought in by 
Bush to restore the Department o f Defense after the perceived damage o f the Rumsfeld 
years. His retention was recommended by many on both sides o f the political spectrum, 
including senior Democrat party statesmen like former National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski.54 Gates described his relationship with Obama as “ ...close, but always 







compromise,” as he was to demonstrate during the Libya decision making process. On 
their first meeting, Gates noted that Obama was far more passionate about the prospect o f 
the repeal o f the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t tell” policy on homosexuals in the military 
than he was about foreign policy concerns or the combat capacity o f the armed forces.55
Vice President Joseph Biden followed the so called “Cheney” activist model for 
his role, in spite of advice proffered that a more supportive and less activist role might be 
more appropriate.56 While Gates thought Biden incorrect on most o f his major foreign 
policy ideas, Clinton noted that he had a “wealth o f international experience.”57 Activism 
was further implied by the White House decision to appoint a series o f special envoys to 
key regions of the world such as the Middle East, Pakistan/Afghanistan, and Sudan.58 
This may have been an effort to leverage administration stalwarts into key positions in 
Hillary Clinton’s Department o f State, although Richard Holbrooke’s appointment to the 
Pakistan/Afghanistan position until his untimely death would seem to belie this. 
Holbrooke played an additional role that would be critical to the Libya decision making 
process. He had become a mentor to journalist cum human rights advisor Samantha 
Power, and as a mutual friend smoothed over what had been a problematic relationship 
between her and Hillary Clinton.59 The elevation o f the post o f Ambassador to the UN 
back into the cabinet also created friction, since Susan Rice, who had criticized Clinton
55 Gates. 298.
56 Ibid. 288. This refers to the highly involved and operational role Vice President Cheney took in the 
administration o f  George W. Bush from 2001 -2009.
57 Ibid. 288., Clinton. 22.
58 Gates. 295.
59 Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. “Still Crusading, but Now on the Inside.” The New York Times. March 29, 2011.
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openly during the campaign, would now both be Clinton’s subordinate in the Department 
o f State and her equal on the Principal’s Committee.60
Samantha Power’s career led her to be a hawk on humanitarian intervention in 
general and in the Libya operation in particular. Her work as a journalist covering the 
Yugoslav Civil War led to books both on that subject and on the failure to intervene in 
Rwanda, and the conclusion that “politicians shy away from humanitarian intervention 
because they see too much domestic political risk with little payoff for saving foreign 
lives.”61 After reading her book, then Senator Obama recruited her for his staff. She then 
served as a foreign policy advisor to the Obama campaign, famously attacking Hillary 
Clinton and her campaign, and marrying Obama confidante Cass Sunstein.62 Returning 
once the election was over, Power served as Special Assistant to the President and Office 
of Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights Senior Director on the NSC. For Power, 
prevention of genocide was a U.S. strategic, if  not national security interest, so it was no 
great leap for her to support the Libya intervention. In a later interview, She said that 
“failure to intervene in Libya would have been extremely chilly, deadly, and indeed a
ATstain on our collective conscience. Power also shared a strong conviction on the 
applicability o f R2P to the situation in Libya, noting that it was becoming a popular and
60 Allen, Jonathan. “Susan Rice’s Walk on the Mild Side.” Politico, January 3, 2014. 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/susan-rices-walk-on-the-mild-side-101705.html. Accessed on 
October 10, 2014.
61 Talev, Margaret. “Samantha Power: The Voice behind Obama’s Libya action.” McClatchy 
Newspapers, March 25, 2011. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/03/25/111084/human-rights-advocate- 
samantha.html. Accessed October 27, 2014.
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accepted international norm, especially in the European countries which were calling for
64intervention.
With a career in national security going back to the 1990s, and her position as an 
assistant to Richard Clarke on the National Security Council and protege o f Secretary of 
State Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice had significant foreign policy 
experience as well as exceptional access to President Obama. She was heavily influenced 
by her time in the Clinton White House, specifically in the decision making process 
which led the U.S. to stay out of the crisis in Rwanda, in part at her urging, as noted in 
the Rwanda case study. After time at the Brookings institution during the first term of 
President George W. Bush, Rice became a senior foreign policy advisor to the John Kerry 
presidential campaign in 2004, and was one o f the few senior policy leaders to sign on 
the Obama campaign in lieu o f that o f rival Hillary Clinton, a fact which gave her access 
to and clout with President Obama. Rice was a strong advocate o f the concept and 
application of R2P, and carried with her memories o f her stance on the Rwandan 
atrocities, as noted in the previous case study.65 Her management style was gruff and 
potentially off putting, as when she famously threw a particular insult at Richard 
Holbrooke during the Clinton administration, and she was known to be difficult to work 
with.66
Having led the agency himself, Secretary Gates was uniquely placed to offer 
comment on the incoming CIA director, Leon Panetta. Panetta was one of the few top 
tier Clinton era leaders who joined the administration, and although he had not served in 





most directors had been appointed from the outside.67 Panetta’s skill as a manager, and 
the general proficiency and history o f the CIA put him in stronger stead with Obama than 
his nominal superior, Dennis Blair, the Director of National Intelligence. Blair, like 
Jones, was a senior military commander who had significant difficulty adjusting to the 
world o f politics and since he only associated with Gates, Mullen, and Clinton of the 
other senior advisors, it was certain that Panetta would have more leverage with the
z o
Obama. Panetta, who did not have a seat at the decision making table, did support the 
president’s decision to intervene, calling the case for Libya “compelling” while noting 
that “Obama was tom about it, and did not desire another war in the Middle East.”69
As the crisis in Libya unfolded, Obama utilized his team o f rivals, but overall the 
inner core group that came into power with him had the most access, and influence, over 
his decision making. To the chagrin o f outsiders such as Clinton, Gates, and Jones, this 
was the central fact o f the Obama administration’s decision making processes. This 
would become evident in the decision making process which led to the intervention in 
Libya.
Who Is Behind the Wheel? Drivers fo r  Intervention
“The world is watching the situation in Libya with alarm. We join the 
international community in strongly condemning the violence in Libya. Our 
thoughts and prayers are with those whose lives have been lost, and with their 
loved ones. The government o f Libya has a responsibility to respect the universal 
rights o f the people, including the right to free expression and assembly. Now is 
the time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed. We are working urgently with
57 Gates. 292.
68 Ibid.
69 Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights. New York: Penguin Press, 2014. 349.
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friends and partners around the world to convey this message to the Libyan 
government.”
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, February 21, 2011.70
The decision to intervene in Libya has its roots in discussions of the situation in 
Egypt. On 28 January, the Principal’s committee met to discuss the situation, with 
Clinton, Gates, Donilon, and Biden urging extreme caution over the response.71 That 
day, Obama called for Hosni Mubarak, the President o f Egypt, to step down, sending 
Department of State Africa expert Frank Wisner as a special envoy to the opposition 
groups, but did not directly intervene there. The establishment and discussions o f R2P 
encouraged the idea that force should be used to protect civilians from harm, even if the 
when and how remained in flux. These ideas would be tested by the Libyan crisis. 
However, it would take time for the world to decide exactly what the crisis was, and how 
to react. Following the basic principles of R2P, an intervention could have been utilized 
as the engine for the support o f a protective action for eastern Libya not dissimilar from 
many other peacekeeping operations (albeit smaller in scale) in Africa and around the 
world. But the will and the plan to intervene would have to be constructed by powerful 
spokespersons. Based on the January 28th meeting, those spokespersons were not yet 
motivated. Through February, discussions continued as the situation in Libya continued 
to deteriorate. On February 17th, Libya was removed from the UN Human Rights 
Council at the urging o f the U.S., and through the efforts o f Clinton and Power.72 On
70 State, U.S. Department of. “Press Statement by Secretary o f  State Hillary Rodham Clinton.” February





February 23rd, President Obama again spoke to the crisis, pledging U.S. support to the 
democratic aspirations o f Libyans. This did not, however, lead to intervention.73
While the UN deliberated and U.S. leaders debated, others did not wait to provide 
humanitarian support, with France sending relief supplies to Benghazi as early as 
February 28th. France may have been compelled to act first because o f the intimate ties 
the Sarkozy government had with Gaddafi, which made early repudiation of those ties 
crucial.74 On the same day as the French acted, the U.S. stepped up the rhetoric, in the 
form of a call for Gaddafi to leave office by Secretary Clinton.75 Other international 
organizations served as vehicles for discussion. Hillary Clinton used the Group of 8 (G-8) 
meeting on March 14th 2011 to discuss responses to the Libyan situation with key 
economic allies. At this time, French President Nicholas Sarkozy, whom Clinton 
believed was moved primarily by the suffering in Libya,76 pushed the strongest for a 
military response before government forces could reach the town of Benghazi.
The French stance was based on several factors. Sarkozy was losing political 
popularity rapidly, and keen to continue his repeated practice of using foreign policy to 
buck up domestic poll numbers.77 In the face o f right wing opposition, he was keen to be 
seen taking a strong leadership role, particularly in a situation in which the U.S. did not
78appear willing to do so. This stance was also aimed at convincing European partners,
73
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particularly Germany, that France still led Europe in terms o f foreign and military 
policy.79 Finally, the issue of Muslim immigration was of critical importance in France, 
being another tocsin waved by the opposition especially that o f the right wing and the 
situation in Libya threatened to spiral into a flood o f refugees across the Mediterranean.80
Clinton was unconvinced that intervention was needed.81 Sanctions and an asset 
freeze by the UN Security Council were followed by the Arab League’s suspension of
O')
voting rights for the Gaddafi regime. As March began, Secretary o f State Clinton noted 
that no decision had yet been made by the U.S.83 Brutality and threat o f brutality was not 
sufficient to warrant R2P invocation, with notable numbers of leaders on both sides o f the 
American political spectrum coming out against R2P and against intervention.84 
Secretary of Defense Gates’ position was that intervention in Libya was not justified, 
since the American people were tired o f what was then nine years o f warfare, and that the 
still ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that the U.S. military was too
• sc
overstretched for yet another operation. The first suggestion for a U.S. action was a call 
for a U.S. enforced no-fly zone over Libya. Such calls began in February, but were 
deflected by Gates, who warned of the effort required, and the general futility o f no fly 
zones in other cases, most notably over Iraq. Further, he pointed out that, unlike Iraq, 
significant preparation o f the battle space would be required over Libya. These actions,
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including the suppression and destruction of the Libyan air defense apparatus, would be 
needed before air patrols could even begin, and such actions would be tantamount to war. 
In addition, experience in Iraq showed that a key ground attack and support asset, the 
attack helicopter, was very difficult to interdict with a no-fly zone, so that the utility of 
such a zone would be minimal even if it could be established.86 A tit for tat exchange 
occurred on this issue in early March between the team of Gates/Mullen and Arizona 
Senator John McCain, most notably in a series of statements and press conferences on 1 
March. General James Mattis, the general in command at U.S. Central Command, 
supported the Gates/Mullen point o f view in testimony to the House Armed Services 
Committee the following day.87
Clinton noted that as late as March 9th, the Principal’s committee had still not 
embraced direct U.S. intervention in Libya. The following day, she testified to a 
Congressional hearing that no action should be undertaken without international 
authorization, and that there should be no hurry to intervene.88 The very next day, the 
authorization that Clinton needed began to take shape, with an Arab League request to 
the UN for humanitarian action.89 On that day, General Wesley Clark, a Clinton ally, 
wrote in the Washington Post that Libya did not meet the criteria o f threat to the U.S. 
required for action.90 Although its own request did not mention military action, on 
March 12th the Arab League threw its support behind a UK request for a no fly zone over
86 Gates, Robert M. "Statement on Libya by Robert Gates (House Armed Services Committee, March 
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Libya to protect the population,91 while Russia agreed to abstain from a Security Council 
vote on intervention.92 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which saw its region 
threatened by the Arab Spring, became a key player in the responding to it.93 On March 
12th, the GCC joined the Arab League in calling for intervention to “stop the 
bloodshed.”94 There was uncertainty about the reliability and motives o f some o f the 
Libyan rebels, considering the large numbers o f them serving abroad with a range of 
terrorist organizations.
Further pressure to act came as thousands of guest workers, primarily from 
neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, attempted to leave the increasingly violent situation in 
Libya in February and March. Walking home was not an option due to the location o f the 
workers and the harsh climate, and this, combined with continuing threats o f violence, led 
to calls for an airlift to get them out o f the country. Demands for an airlift merged into 
the growing calls for a no-fly zone and direct intervention, and brought some 
administration officials to switch sides in the debate. Biden and Donilon now pressed 
Gates to release aircraft for this purpose. Again, the Secretary o f Defense pushed back, 
noting that with there were not enough aircraft or security forces available to do it at the 
scale requested. According to Gates, Biden tried to order him to act, to which Gates 
responded that the vice president was not part of the chain o f command, but that he 
would do whatever he was ordered to by the president.95
Decision recommendations to President Obama broke into two camps. Against 





95 Gates, 2014. 514.
221
President Biden, National Security Advisor Donilon, Chief o f Staff William Daley, Joint 
Chiefs Chairman Mullen, and Counter Terrorism lead John Brennan. Biden had spoken 
in general favor of human rights interventions, but not specifically on Libya, in a speech 
in Israel on 24 February.96 Donilon’s opposition was based on the fact that an 
intervention in Libya would violate all three tenets of the “Obama Doctrine” which the 
president had promulgated during his campaign. The first was that the U.S. would lead in 
humanitarian actions. The second tenet was that there would be no foreign military 
actions that did not meet a specific challenge to U.S. national security. The third was that 
there would be no invasion o f an Islamic country to overthrow an established 
government, even a dictatorship.97
In favor of intervention were Susan Rice and NSC staffers Powers and Ben 
Rhodes. Rhodes’ support is particularly noteworthy because o f his role in strategic 
communication, messaging, and speech writing for the NSC, which would make him a 
key framer for any operation. Rice and Powers took the position that R2P provided 
adequate justification for U.S. action.98 Gates noted that Hillary took a centrist position 
at first, but gradually moved to the side o f the interventionists, specifically citing R2P 
language as one o f the reasons for her eventual support of operations in Libya.99 Gates 
describes the tone of the deliberations as “blunt and stubborn, but not insubordinate.” As 
is the case in the Kosovo intervention, those pushing hardest for military intervention 
were those, particularly like Power, who were passionate about their issue, but had little
96 Foreign Policy.
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knowledge of military operations.100 The most significant non-administration player 
continued to be John McCain, who continued his attacks on the White House for its lack 
of action.
According to Clinton’s memoirs, the use o f the Libyan armed forces by Gaddafi 
to attack his own civilians is one o f the factors that drove her to decide in favor o f U.S. 
intervention. Her overall assessment was that Gaddafi had “Lost the legitimacy to 
govern.” 101 In a speech to the UN Human Rights Council, she said that “The people of 
Libya have made themselves clear. It is time for Gaddafi to go, now.”102 In contrast to 
the Kosovo example, in which the Secretary o f State was the prime mover for 
intervention, in Libya that push came from middling levels, meaning Power and Rice. 
But once Clinton was convinced, she swung her vote and her leadership skills toward 
intervention.
Hillary Clinton held the swing vote for intervention and took the lead in 
convincing President Obama to act.103 Obama was convinced over a three day period to 
switch his personal effort toward intervention, thus hastening the passing of UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 within weeks, in contrast with similar efforts which 
took months to construct, such as the Gulf War coalition of 1990-1991.104 The final 
decision to intervene in Libya took place on March 17th, 2011, and involved the 
Principals, key deputies mentioned, and the president.105 The most noteworthy change in 
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Clinton, sensing the international support for the operation, had switched over from a 
neutral stance to a decidedly pro-intervention, R2P driven stance. She described her 
changeover as having taken on March 14th. On that day, the Arab League requested 
action, and Clinton met with, and was pressured by Sarkozy, UK Foreign Minister 
William Hague, and leading Libya expert Mahmoud Jibril to support intervention.106 
Clinton participated remotely in the March 17 meeting because she was still in the region
107at the time. Gates recalls that President Obama made his decision after an hour and a 
half long meeting, and agreed to intervention with the caveat that no U.S. ground forces 
would take part in the operation, other than those needed for search and rescue operations
| n o
in case of downed U.S. or allied aircraft. Obama termed this decision a “51-49” vote, 
reflecting the strong opinions on both sides.109 Edward Klein claims that some of 
Obama’s resolve might have been fueled by allegations that his overall response to the 
Arab Spring had lacked firmness, and was therefore an effort to regain lost credibility.110 
Clinton noted that Obama’s guidance was to participate “in a limited way” with the 
intervention, noting that it was “Unlikely to find a perfect George Washington waiting in 
the wings,” and that the rebels would eventually become worthy partners for the U.S.111 
Having made the decision, with no dissent, follow on actions would need to be taken 
before intervention could begin. In keeping with the absolute need for international 
recognition for the intervention, Ambassador Rice set to pushing the relevant resolution 
through the UN, something that she called “A near miracle” o f negotiation and tough
106 Clinton. 383.
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talk.112 In a press statement, Rice emphasized that the U.S. sought “actions that will 
effectively protect civilians and increase the pressure on the Gaddafi regime to halt the 
killing and to allow the Libyan people to express themselves in their aspirations for the 
future freely and peacefully." 113
In Congress, the task was easier, significant bipartisan support for the intervention 
in both houses, as long as no ground forces were involved. The Senate unanimously 
called for a no fly zone in Libya on the 18th.114 Congress had taken an early interest in 
Libya, although notably not in intervention, with 148 mentions o f or events about Libya 
in the Senate and House of Representatives between January 1st and April 30th 2011, 89 
o f which were in the month o f April, after the decision to intervene had been taken.115 
Reflecting popular opinion, (which will be discussed in the public opinion section o f this 
case study) Congress supported the human rights o f the Libyan people, while remaining 
skeptical o f military support, ground intervention, and the potential to end the conflict in 
a timely manner.
The media blitz to build and ensure support for the operation began on the Sunday 
morning political talk shows on March 20th, with John McCain leading the way in 
supporting the intervention.116 In this he was supported by Senator John Kerry, 
Democrat from Massachusetts, who acknowledged that the intervention was not in U.S.
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vital national interest but urged it anyway.117 Former Secretaries o f State Baker and 
Kissinger, and former National Security Advisor Brzezinski were notable in their support
1 1 ftof the decision to intervene. Brzezinski supported the effort particularly strongly in an
interview on March 24th.119 Joint Chiefs o f Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen and
Secretary Gates also provided support both through media interviews and Congressional
testimony explaining the relevance o f the Libya mission to U.S. national security and
emphasizing the coalition nature o f the operations and their expected limited duration.120
Between March 17th and 19th, Rice and Clinton, working with France and the UK,
and keeping Russian and China from using their Security Council vetos, negotiated and
enacted UN Security Council Resolution 1973. The resolution is central to a discussion
of the Libyan intervention and the role o f R2P in it. As UN Secretary General Ki-Moon
stated upon its enactment:
“The Security Council today has taken an historic decision. Resolution 1973 
affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination 
to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them 
by their own government.”12
The resolution, which had ten votes in favor and five abstentions, called for 
intervention to protect the people of Libya, in accordance with the principle o f R2P, but
117 Goodenough, Patrick. “Kerry in 2011: Military Intervention in Libya Not ‘Vital’ to U.S. Security 
Interests.” CNS News. September 3, 2013. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/kerry- 
2 0 1 1-military-intervention-libya-not-vital-us-security. Accessed on 27 October 2014.
118 Klein. 288.
'19 Reisner, Hiram. “Brzezinski - Libya action isn’t war, but necessary intervention.” Newsmax, March 24, 
2011. http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/Brzezinski-Libya-intervention- 
MomingJoe/201 l/03/24/id/390587/. Accessed on September 30, 2014.
120 M ediaite.com. “Admiral Mike Mullen -  One o f  the outcomes o f  the operation could leave Gadafft in 
power.” http://www.mediaite.com/tv/adm-mike-mullen-one-of-the-outcomes-of-the-operation-could- 
leave-gaddafi-in-power/. Accessed on October 27, 2014 and Secretary Gates Testimony on March 31. 
http://www.voltairenet.org/articlel69227.html, accessed on October 20, 2014.
121 Hehir, Aidan. The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 12.
226
did not mandate assistance to the rebels or general attacks on government forces.122 The 
African Union (AU) promulgated a “Roadmap for Peace” on March 25th, but this was 
rejected, pushing the AU into an ambivalent stance toward the intervention thereafter.123 
UNSCR 1973 allowed for “No Fly Zones” to be established by whatever member states 
wished to intervene. But who would intervene? Clearly, the UN itself was not postured 
to do so.
Meanwhile the growing rebel movement (The Libyan National Transitional 
Council, or NTC) had no doubts what it wanted from the rest o f the world. In meetings in 
mid-March 2011, rebel representatives requested specific airstrikes on military targets 
from French President Sarkozy and Hillary Clinton. Further, they requested openly that 
the west find a way to assassinate Gaddafi themselves.124 The leaders o f the growing 
coalition were to a certain extent open to such ideas. Naming Gaddafi as the opponent in 
the humanitarian effort help to complete a construction o f the Libyan dictator as a 
murdering tyrant, a message that the U.S. in particular used to sell its operation at home 
as well as the coalition abroad. While France did not want NATO to lead the military 
operation (NATO is not a regional arrangement empowered by the UN to act in its 
stead)126, other NATO members insisted that it do so, even if, as in the case o f Germany,
127they refrained from providing direct support. Germany’s abstention seemed to be tied
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more to its own domestic politics, since, on the surface, Berlin’s insistence on a no fly 
zone and regional support prior to an intervention were met by the Arab league move.128 
In some ways, it was a case o f the wrong organization being called upon, since 
Germany’s preference was that the EU, rather than NATO, be the leading organization
17Qfor the intervention.
In spite o f this, the Obama administration insisted that NATO be involved in 
order to provide command and control capabilities to what was expected to be a wide 
ranging coalition.130 This strategy came to be called “Leading from behind,” and ended 
up coordinating the efforts of fourteen NATO member states as well as four partner 
countries, including the United Arab Emirates, in the coalition.131 As the U.S. led from 
behind, the French and others took on the mantle o f frontline leadership in the effort to 
enforce the UN mandated No Fly Zone enacted to protect civilians was under Arab 
League auspices, pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Even if it was mainly 
semantics, it was this taking on o f authority by the Arab league which helped enable 
Russia and China to abstain on the 1973 vote, given their predilection toward support of
1 3 7regional organizations.
Military operations were scheduled to begin on March 21st (U.S. Operation 
Odyssey Dawn), but the French commenced strikes nearly two days early, which threw 
planning efforts into disarray.133 Every member of NATO, at that time 28 nations, voted 
for the military intervention in Libya. O f these, half provided material support, with the
128 Jones. 45.
129 Gates, 2014. 515.





lion’s share of the command and control being provided by the United States.134 Further, 
military methodology took over the calculus of planning for the intervention. Air strikes 
require preliminary attacks to eliminate radars and surface to air missiles, for example, 
and the preparatory strikes to achieve this end were an escalation which appears not to 
have been part of the intent o f UNSCR 1973.
Public Opinion and the Libya Intervention
“We’re protecting innocent civilians in Libya...” to prevent “a humanitarian
crisis...”
President Barack Obama, March 28th, 2011,135
From January to April, 2011, two issues dominated the U.S. media. One was the 
U.S. economy, and the other was the Arab Spring, and increasingly the crisis in Libya. A 
Pew Research report noted that 34% of all mainstream media news coverage from 11 
January to 6 March was on the Arab Spring, with an overwhelming focus after 15 
February on events in Libya. By comparison, the economy, the second biggest issue, 
received 20% of coverage, and the threat of a federal government shutdown, the third 
most important, received 3%.136 By the week o f the U.S. intervention, Pew was reporting
134 Gates, 2014. 521.
135 Obama, Barack Hussein. "Remarks By the President in Address to the Nation on Libya." Speeches and 
Remarks, White House.gov. Washington D.C.: www.whitehouse.gov, March 28, 2011.
136 Joumalism.org. “N ew s Coverage Index, February 29-March 6, 2011.”
http://www.joumalism.org/2011/03/06/pej-news-coverage-index-february-28-march-6-2011/. Accessed on 
27 October 2014.
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that 47% of news was focused on Libya, with the second issue, the Tsunami and nuclear 
meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, receiving 15%.137
By invoking human rights in his March 28 speech and the need to act decisively 
and powerfully in their defense, (although, notably, not R2P, an omission also notable in 
a joint declaration prepared by the leaders o f the U.S., France, and the UK shortly 
thereafter) President Obama provided the moral imperative by which other intentions, 
even if driven by very realist power based motives, could be realized in terms of 
international protection and support for the Libyan people and the resistance 
movement.138 Further statements by Ambassador Rice in the UN encourage this belief.139 
Even though R2P was not specifically mentioned, its basic tenets were in effect.
Arnold Wolfers posited that it was only by identifying national entities as the 
primary actors that a true study of international relations (IR) could occur.140 IR realists 
would posit that the GCC and Arab League maneuvers regarding Libya were done in an 
attempt to gain their own control o f the escalating Arab Spring, a movement which was 
sweeping toward their own borders. This view would continue that ultra-conservative 
Arab interests were paired up with U.S. and European oil and security interests to bring 
about the intervention.141 Secretary Gates confronted NATO Secretary General Anders 
Rasmussen about this, both in stating that a UN Security Council Resolution would be 
required for U.S. action in a NATO framework, and in directly asking why NATO
137 Joumalism.org. “Libya Search.” http://www.joumalism.org/search/Libya/. Accessed on October 27, 
2014.
138 Pape. 62.
139 Hehir. 13. Rice said: "we are interested in a broad range o f  actions that will effectively protect civilians 
and increase the pressure on the Gaddafi regime to halt the killing and to allow the Libyan people to 
express themselves in their aspirations for the future freely and peacefully."
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/libya-air-strikes-urged-us-un. Accessed 1 October 2014.
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countries were keen to intervene in Libya, and not elsewhere, unless oil were the 
cause.142
R2P was invoked in Libya by Washington insiders who believed that “The will to 
humanitarian intervention, destroyed by Bush Administration actions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, must be rebuilt.” Secretary o f State Clinton and Ambassador to the UN Rice bore 
the burden of selling R2P to the rest of the world as a justification for intervention.143 
The two were joined by National Security Council Directors Samantha Power and Gayle 
Smith. In spite of the nature o f their directorates (multinational engagement and global 
development), they joined Rice and Clinton as the leading government hawks on 
intervention, convincing others to fall into line both by using R2P and by noting the 
benefits that intervention would provide to U.S. standing in the Arab World.144 
Interestingly, they were joined by Senator John McCain, although McCain’s commentary 
was primarily focused on support o f the NTC.145 O f note is this contrast between those in 
less combative or force oriented positions favoring intervention, while military leaders 
opposed the effort.
Public opinion of the crisis in Libya and the need for, and nature of, a U.S. 
response changed over the period from March - May 2011. The following graphics are 
based on key polls involving approximately 1000 respondents from across the political 
spectrum. The full list o f polls examined can be found in the Appendix.
142 Gates, 2014. 515.
143 Prashad. 176.
144 Chorin. 215 and 231. They became known as the “Warrior Women” as a result.
145 CNN. “Sens. McCain, Lieberman critical o f  Obama over Libya.” February 27, 2011. 
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Figure 6: Key Polling Data on Intervention in Libya, March-May 2011, Part 1
Poll Q uestion: Should th e  U.S. Lead R esponse? Should 
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Figure 6 shows responses on the question of whether or not the U.S. should lead 
or be involved in a response. It reflects a spike in support for military operations, which 
began on 19 March, but shows a drop off in support in the days before President Obama’s 
speech on the intervention on March 28th.
146 Polling Report. Accesed on 27 October 2014.
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Figure 7: Key Polling Data on Intervention in Libya, March-May 2011, Part 2
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Figure 7 shows responses on the question of whether or not a no fly zone or any 
military action should be undertaken in regards to Libya. It shows a spike in support for 
operations which dropped off, but then surged again after President Obama’s March 28th 
speech explaining the operation to the American people. After the speech, support began 
to drop off through April as the operation continued.
147 http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm. Accesed on 27 October 2014.
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Figure 8: Key Polling Data on Intervention in Libya, March-May 2011, Part 3
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Figure 8 shows a presidential approval question, reflecting spikes in approval both 
when military action began on the 19th, and when President Obama addressed the nation 
on the 28th. Additional polls, taken on March 13th and 20th, and so covering the initiation 
of combat operations, showed a wide scale negativity toward the deployment o f ground 
forces, at a 80% against on the 13th, dropping to 72% on the 20th, and staying there 
through April.
The polling data shown reveals several things about the public mood surrounding 
the intervention. There is an uptick in support for the intervention once UNSCR 1973 
went into effect, and when the air strikes began, supported by the aforementioned speech 
acts in Congress and by cabinet members and key advisors such as Mullen and Power.
148 http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm. Accesed on 27 October 2014.
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Furthermore, there was wide scale support for the no fly zone, but not for direct ground 
action in Libya. Finally, there was general, but not a majority, approval o f President 
Obama’s decisions and handling o f the problem. Interestingly, this was true both before 
the decision to initiate military action (when the support would presumably be for non­
action) and after. While the initiation of combat saw an uptick in support, Obama’s 
major address on the issue, on March 28th, did not lead to significant change.149 Overall, 
the Libya intervention was the least popular, at 47%, o f any o f the interventions 
examined. By comparison, Kosovo had 51% and Somalia 65% popularity.150 As had the 
discussions and decisions on intervention, support for the operation was bifurcated, with 
the same population supporting the protection o f civilians, but opposing military 
action.151
Models and the Libya Decision Process
The decision to intervene in Libya shows evidence o f two models. The Allison 
Governmental Process Model is exhibited in the stance of the Defense Department 
against intervention. This clearly reflected Secretary Gates acting as a representative o f 
his cabinet agency. The same is true, at the beginning o f the discussion o f Secretary 
Clinton. Gates, as the owner of the intervening military assets, had significant coercive 
power in the debate over intervention. However, he never threatened insubordination or
149 The Polling Report. “U.S. Intervention in Libya.” http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm. Accesed  
on 27 October 2014.
150 The Gallup Poll. “Americans Approve Military Action Against Libya.”
http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/Americans-Approve-Military-Action-Against-Libya.aspx. Accessed  
on 27 October 2014.
151 Talking Points Memo. Poll -  Plurality oppose Libyan intervention but support protecting civilians.” 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/poll-plurality-oppose-libyan-intervention-but-support-protecting- 
civilians. Accessed on 23 October 2014.
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not to act. In this, he stayed within an organizational model as predicted by Allison. 
Gates noted that Obama himself had come a long way in his thoughts on intervention 
from the candidate who specifically said that “The president has no power in the U.S. 
Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve 
stopping an action or an imminent threat to the nation.”152
In terms o f rationality, a threat to U.S. national security had to be constructed 
where it did not exist before, and this was the task of the key leaders who pushed for 
intervention. Libya also shows the power of the powerful or well-placed individual in 
bringing about decisions favorable to their wishes. Ambassador Rice and Samantha 
Power did not represent bureaucracies, but each brought their own personal histories to 
the decision making process, and this combined with their unique access to and influence 
on the president to enable them to push for action. Furthermore, while there is no 
evidence that Power or Rice personally convinced Secretary Clinton to change her stance 
on intervention, it is clear that the growing international pressure for, and acceptance of, 
intervention convinced Clinton that intervention was the best course o f action. Thus her 
powerful swing vote came into play, and personal, rather than institutional prerogatives 
triumphed, and intervention took place.
The strategic communication process provides a useful angle through which to 
view the various messages coming from the diverse actors. For the U.S., the message 
was that Gaddafi was a bloody tyrant who was about to launch a massacre on a part o f his 
population. At the UN, Libya’s failure to protect its people was a failure o f its 
sovereignty that could only be rectified by the international community. The French and 
the British used similar reasoning to the U.S., but with the added threat o f mass
152 Gates, 2014. 528.
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immigration which might have occurred if the massacre had been allowed to take place. 
The Arabs and the Africans were public about the threat to stability posed by Gaddafi in 
general and how that could be exacerbated by ongoing violence. The Libyan rebels fed 
the U.S. argument, obscuring their ties to radical Islam and focusing on the tyranny of the 
dictator.
Strategic communication calls for synchronizing messages with deeds.153 
Although the various messages o f the intervening or conceding states crossed a wide 
gamut, as shown above, (and even an internal gamut, as shown by the gulf between the 
statements o f the White House and the Department o f Defense as well as a bipartisan 
group in the NSC, the Senate and the House who spoke out against the intervention)154 
the deeds attached to them, the actions o f protecting the people o f Libya were consistent 
with the majority o f statements made on the issue.155 UNSCR 1973’s appeals for a 
ceasefire and discussions to peacefully end the crisis before things got any worse. The 
resolution’s specific mention o f R2P was a critical measure o f its importance and the 
future o f humanitarian interventions.156 In terms o f framing, the primary evidence for 
framing the intervention to the media and the public came after the decision had been 
made to launch the operation, with the coordinated media “blitz” mentioned above, which 
included current and former cabinet members. Statements made before the decision to 
intervene seem to be primarily and overwhelming directed at the Gadhafi government, in
153 Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Santa Barbara, 
CA: Praeger, 2011. 8-9.
154 Chorin. 215.
155 Ibid. 210. Gates testified to Congress strongly against U.S. involvement in Libya, citing the 
“nonessential nature” o f  U.S. interests there.
156 Claes, Jonas. “Libya and the “Responsibility to Protect.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute o f  Peace, 
March 1, 2011. http://www.usip.org/publications/libya-and-the-responsibility-protect. Accessed March 11, 
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an effort to coerce the dictator into reversing course, rather framing the intervention to 
U.S. audiences.
On the Libyan side, communications were used quite poorly. Given the recent 
past, in spite of superficial efforts at reform, it was difficult to undo the image of Gaddafi 
as a terrorist and a tyrant. Tripoli’s efforts to paint the rebellion as a threat to stability to 
rival Iraq failed to draw their targets, the west, into the right conclusion, that the regime 
needed support to crush the rebellion. Instead, that message was used as a justification 
for the argument that the people of Libya needed to be protected, from outside, against an 
ineffective regime. In her March 2 speech, Secretary Clinton noted her concern o f 
“ ...Libya descending into chaos and becoming another Somalia.”157
For the Arab League and the GCC, the deal was simple. In return for supporting 
the Libya intervention, the GCC got carte blanche to operate against a threat far more 
dear to it, Bahrain. GCC countries were enabled to crackdown on the Shiite Bahraini’s 
with impunity, and prevent the spread of the Arab Spring, which had caused unrest in 
Bahrain, Oman, Iran, and Yemen by that point.158 The African Union also worked in 
favor o f the intervention, although President Obama had to intervene personally in a 
meeting with South African President Zuma to help sway the vote.159
The intervention in Libya was a successful example o f R2P, in the sense that the 
human security o f the people of Libya was successfully used as a justification for a 
military intervention. However, since Libya lay outside NATO and the EU, the primary 
intervening agencies, it cannot in that sense be called an act o f collective security. 





definitions and knowledge.160 Based on its use in rhetoric and in the UN resolutions, R2P 
has been constructed into an institutional norm, and one that has been used to undermine 
the importance o f state sovereignty, a core tenet o f structural realism as a philosophy, as 
well as the principles o f the Westphalian state system. The Libyan intervention was 
undertaken with raw power, in a manner consistent with UN authorities and powers 
embedded in its charter, far predating the relatively recent discussion o f R2P.161 
Nevertheless, the invocation of R2P as a lever or justification for actions which might 
otherwise not have been taken is a significant step toward a constructivist or 
institutionalist theory for international politics. The Libya vote and intervention was a 
crucial test for and affirmation o f the strength o f international norms, o f which R2P is a 
part.162 This is notwithstanding the Obama administrations additional increased desire 
for regime change in Libya.163
This is a clear question o f utopianism versus raw power politics. In a realist 
model, the U.S. and Europe acted to protect their dwindling stake in Africa, both 
politically and economically, and the real enemy was not Gaddafi, but China and the 
BRICs. Negative feelings on Libyan oil, fostered by interdependence in oil, particularly 
with Europe, furthered the desire by the UK, and France, among others to secure the vital 
material.164 This model has the French, British, and Italians removing Gaddafi because 
o f his influence in the Pan African movement, while securing the oil for themselves.165 
In this case, the fact that Obama invoked human rights was not relevant because he also
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cited the threat to “Interests and values” in his primary Libya speech.166 By doing so, he 
was able to successfully frame a melding of idealism and realism, the two sides o f U.S. 
foreign policy thought for over a century.167
Conclusion
“NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention. The 
alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened hundreds of 
thousands o f civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime. It succeeded in 
Protecting those civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time and space 
necessary for local forces to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi. And it did so by 
involving partners in the region and sharing the burden among the alliance’s 
members.”
Admiral James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. European Command, 2012.168
For some months after the end of the intervention in Libya, it was deemed a 
success, as noted in the quotation above. Little treasure in terms of financial cost or loss 
o f military personnel for what appeared to be significant gain. The people appeared to 
have been protected from the dictator. Viewed in light o f the events which followed it, 
however, a far dimmer appreciation of events is apparent. President Obama would 
eventually call Libya one o f the biggest mistakes of his term in office.169 What should be 
said is that, after months of back and forth struggle through the summer o f 2011, 
stalemate seemed to set in. However, as the rebels streamlined their leadership as a result
166 Hehir. 16.
167 Atlas, Pierre. “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests.” Digest o f  
Middle East Studies, Spring: 2012, 354.
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The New York Times, August 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.eom/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama- 
thomas-l-ffiedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html. Accessed on 28 November 2014. Obama said that he did 
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of the deaths o f some of their key leaders, and airstrikes ramped up, the tide turned 
decisively against Gaddafi.170 On October 20th, as the result o f disruption caused by a 
NATO airstrike, the dictator was killed, execution style, as a result o f a combined attack 
between NATO air forces and Libyan rebels on the convoy in which he had been 
travelling near his hometown of Sirte. Although some of his family remains at large, the 
Islamist rebel movement NTC claimed victory.
The purpose o f this research was to assess how the coalition for armed 
humanitarian intervention in Libya was built. Without perfect vision o f future outcomes, 
we cannot be certain whether or not R2P in Libya prevented a massacre, and without that 
crystal ball, Libya joins the list of armed humanitarian interventions o f the post-Cold War 
era, potentially adding to what Robert Pape calls “modest” progress in the field.171 
However, based on Gaddafi’s statements and actions leading up to the intervention, it is 
reasonable to expect that a massacre in eastern Libya was in the offing. Compared with 
previous disasters, such as Rwanda, in which over half of the murdered had succumbed 
before the international community even agreed that genocide was taking place, and 
against who, the preventative nature o f the Libya intervention deserves praise.172
While oil, commercial interests, internal politics among the interveners, or a 
simple loathing of the dictator Gaddafi may have been the cause for intervention, it 
appears that R2P and the humanitarian crisis Gaddafi started were the primary factors 
which lead the U.S. to advocate military intervention and to see it through even when it 
looked as though stalemate might be the result. For this reason, R2P can be seen as an 





and the responsibility o f nation states to their citizens, as well as the use o f institutions 
such as the UN both to enshrine that vision as an operating procedure, indicate that the 
realist fundament o f raw power politics can at least be mitigated by both.
This case study reviewed the U.S. decision to intervene in Libya. It examined the 
historical buildup to the Arab Spring and the Libyan crackdown, and how the pressure for 
intervention built in the international community, which in turn enabled key leaders in the 
U.S. foreign policy decision making process to push for intervention. Further, it 
examined the process by which the decision to intervene was framed to the media and the 
American people, and that those efforts only marginally improved support for the 
intervention. The Libya intervention had significant consequences for U.S. foreign 
policy. Like the Somalia intervention, its aftermath soured the U.S. to further 
interventions, which would have repercussions for other hot spots in the Arab Spring and 
worldwide, most notably with the U.S. decision not to intervene in Syria from 2011 -  Fall 
2014, and the decision not to intervene in the growing humanitarian and military crisis in 




The purpose of this section of the study is to synthesize the lessons of the case 
studies into useable conclusions on the decision making and framing processes, and the 
role o f the powerful individual in shaping decisions and framing efforts in the armed 
humanitarian interventions and non-interventions discussed. The findings for this study 
will be organized to shed light on a series o f questions. In each case, broad historical 
similarities and differences will be examined to see if there are general situational themes 
surrounding humanitarian interventions. Next, the leadership teams o f the four 
administrations involved in the case studies will be reviewed for similarity or difference 
in order to explain how that organization and those changes might have impacted 
decision making and framing. Then, the actual process o f the decision making will be 
examined with an eye toward the validation of the models o f decision making and 
framing as set forth in the methodology section. Finally, framing will be examined as a 
separate factor, with the process and differences in framing for each case discussed and 
compared. Since these interventions took place in chronological sequence, the impact of 
each decision on follow on interventions will also be discussed.
Following a discussion of the factors mentioned above, the applicability o f the 
findings to a post-Libya case study, the Syria crisis o f 2013, will be examined. The 
purpose o f this mini case-examination is to see if the findings can provide a sound 
explanation for why the U.S. chose not to intervene in Syria in August, 2013, after having
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intervened in Libya and tacitly agreed to repression in Bahrain in 2011. A summary of 
this mini-study is that a combination o f different geographic and geo-political factors, the 
strong ability o f the targeted state, Syria, to counter-frame an intervention using powerful 
propaganda and social media tools, and the lack o f a powerful individual in the Obama 
administration who was motivated to push for intervention meant that the U.S. failed to 
do so after the August, 2013 gas attacks in Syria.
Armed Humanitarian Interventions
In each of the cases examined, the definition established by the literature review 
was met. To repeat, an armed humanitarian intervention is “A coercive action by one or 
more states, in the legitimate context of an international organization, involving the use 
of armed force in another state without the consent o f its authorities, and with the purpose 
of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”’ In Somalia, 
military forces engaged in combat-like operations for the purpose of providing 
humanitarian assistance to a starving population. This involved coercive action to deliver 
that assistance, and was envisioned as such during the decision making process. Rwanda 
would have entailed the rapid deployment o f peace-keepers to literally stand between the 
Tutsis and the Hutus to physically prevent slaughter before it was too late. Kosovo saw 
the use o f air strikes to coerce the government in Belgrade from perpetuating genocide, or 
at least a brutal repression, on a minority population, as was also the case in Libya.
' Pape, Robert A. "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard o f  Humanitarian Intervention." International 
Security 37, no. I (2012): 41-80. 44.
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In all of these cases, there was either no central government to welcome or resist 
U.S. involvement (Somalia), or the host government resisted or refused to work with the 
international community to alleviate the crisis (Kosovo, Libya) or denied offers of 
assistance and intervention (Rwanda). In all o f them, there was the legitimating context 
o f the support o f an international organization. In the cases o f Somalia and Libya, the 
UN was the lead international actor, with NATO, the Arab League, and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council as strong supporting actors. In the case o f Kosovo, the UN was a 
player, but a secondary one to the primary regional actor, NATO. In the case o f Rwanda, 
the specific lack of a UN or other mandate helped lead to the decision not to intervene.
In each case, a humanitarian crisis was at the root o f the problem and the 
intervention. For Somalia, the core purpose was to ease starvation, with attempting a 
political settlement as supporting reason which ended up taking on primary importance 
after the Bush administration left office. Rwanda would have been direct prevention of 
genocide, literally standing physically between murderers and victims. Kosovo and 
Libya were both efforts to stop the mechanisms of genocide by use o f air power, both to 
cause such pain to the existing government that it would no longer see the value in its 
oppressive acts, and in physically destroying the capabilities o f the aggressive 
governments to perpetrate those acts.
Comparing Contexts for Intervention, and Each Intervention’s Impact on Others
Each o f the interventions in the case studies took place in a unique time and place, 
and was discussed and implemented by a unique and changing group of decision makers
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and external change agents. However, there are some similarities between them. This 
section will discuss the political and historical contexts for intervention, or non­
intervention, and note those similarities and dissimilarities where they appear.
One o f the four case studies, that on Somalia, took place in a one term presidency. 
Three o f them, including Somalia, Rwanda, and Libya, took place in the first term of a 
presidency, leaving Kosovo as the only one of the four that took place in a second term. 
The importance o f this is seen in the process o f decision making, the power o f the 
President and the National Security Advisor as the leaders and coordinators o f the 
decision making process, and the role allowed powerful leaders outside o f the presidency, 
both in terms o f shaping policy and in framing the intervention efforts which followed. 
This is a question o f coherency in decision making. The Bush administration, for reasons 
discussed, was the most cohesive and effective decision making body o f the three 
administrations examined. They had, in effect, been governing together at least since 
1980, and in some cases back as far as the Nixon administration. They had ended the 
Cold War together, and also planned and implemented operations in Panama and Iraq. 
These were people who knew each other well, many were close personal friends, and 
were all comfortable with working with one another while backing President Bush 
implicitly. Bush was at the center, he was the key and most powerful decision maker, 
and it was he alone who needed to be persuaded to act in Somalia. Once he did, the 
administration fell into lock step behind his decision, and moved into an implementation 
mindset. It is this unusual, and potentially unrepeatable level o f cohesion which actually 
gives Somalia more in common with Clinton’s Kosovo intervention than with Rwanda or 
Libya.
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Another factor in common between Somalia and Kosovo is that in both cases, the 
presidents were keen to accomplish something big. For Bush, it was a closeout to his 
administration and an effort to lock the newly elected Clinton into a path o f positive, but 
seemingly painless, foreign policy action. For Clinton, it was an effort to cleanse his 
legacy of the failure in Rwanda internationally, and for the Monica Lewinsky scandal 
specifically, with a nearly risk free military option that would also preserve unity o f and 
U.S. dominance of European defense matters through strengthening NATO.2 Although 
Clinton was on his second, and in some cases third set of cabinet officers, by 1998, they 
had, for the most part, worked together in one or another capacity for six years, and had 
achieved some o f the familiarity and coherency that the Bush team enjoyed.
In contrast, the Clinton team which made the choice not to intervene in Rwanda 
actually has more in common with the Obama administration which decided to intervene 
in Libya in 2011. New in office, that team had been thrust immediately into crises in 
Yugoslavia and Somalia. The senior leaders o f the administration were either Clinton 
loyalists, or had been brought in from the last Democrat administration, that o f Carter, 
twelve years before. Many did not know each other, or well know how to best work 
together or with their boss, who was distinctly averse to foreign policy, preferring to deal 
with domestic economic crises.3 Similarly, the Obama team also had two foreign wars to 
deal with, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The events o f the Arab Spring took place further into 
the administration’s tenure than that o f Clinton (Rwanda began in earnest about one year 
after the inauguration, while the Arab Spring was two years after Obama’s inauguration), 
however, and Obama’s cabinet was significantly different in structure. Unlike Clinton,
2 Gellman, Barton. “ Allies Facing the Limits o f  Air Power.” The Washington Post, March 28, 1999. 1 A.
3 Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. London: Praeger Books, 1999.
8 .
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Obama did not take a significant number o f senior leaders from the previous Democrat 
administration, and those that he did take all had a deputy or senior subordinate who was 
an Obama stalwart, and who often had better access to the president than his or her 
appointed lead.4 This created a deep divide in the team, with further issues such as the 
retention of cabinet members such as Gates from the Bush administration. Returning to 
the comparison, both the Clinton and Obama teams were divided, neither president 
wanted foreign policy to be a leading issue, and neither wanted the specific events, 
Rwanda and Libya, to take on a central role. Differences between the two events include 
that Rwanda began just as another intervention, that in Somalia, was failing, whereas the 
events in Libya took place in a post Rwanda world with key leaders such as Power, who 
were specifically working with its memory in mind. Furthermore, the Libya crisis was 
just one of many that made the Arab Spring impossible for the White House to ignore. 
The bottom line was that no notable cabinet or sub cabinet officials wanted to intervene 
in Rwanda, whereas key empowered individuals, namely Power, Rice, and, later, Clinton, 
pushed for and achieved the intervention in Libya.
As has been noted, U.S. policy toward interventions changed as a result o f the 
perception of failure o f the Somalia intervention, with a significant reduction 
recommended for future interventions.5 Since the major negative act o f the Somalia 
intervention, the attempt to intervene in Somali politics which ended with the battle of 
Mogadishu and the “Blackhawk Down” debacle took place after the installation of 
Clinton as President, it would be under his administration that the lessons o f the 
intervention would be learned and implemented. Unfortunately, those final events
4 Gates, Robert M. Duty, Memoirs o f  a Secretary at War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 291.
5 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey. "Somalia and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention." Foreign 
Affairs, March/April 1996, (1996): 70-85. 70.
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happened so close in time to the early rumblings of trouble in Rwanda that they 
overshadowed an objective discussion on that crisis, and directly impacted the decision 
not to intervene there. The lessons o f Somalia, then, appeared to be clear. In summary, 
the U.S. government, from Congress to the White House to the cabinet agencies lost its 
ardor for large scale use of ground forces for humanitarian interventions, an opinion 
which has not changed since 1994.6 The price in money, lives, and embarrassment was 
more than any in government were willing to repeatedly bear. For the Defense 
Department, the Powell Doctrine was vindicated, and the idea o f sending in a large force 
with what became in increasingly poorly defined mission and goals should not be 
repeated. The idea o f being neutral in a humanitarian crisis also left the debate as the last 
U.S. troops came home from Somalia. Future armed interventions would clearly support, 
or protect, a victimized side against the government, and those actions would be part of 
the initial mandate of the intervention.7 As noted previously, OFDA proposed that the 
U.S. aid community and the Department o f State develop an early warning system for 
humanitarian crisis which might allow for pre-emption, but this failed to materialize in a 
way that brought about further interventions, and played no role in Rwanda, Kosovo, or 
Libya.
Rwanda would clearly suffer both for the failure in Somalia and for the newness 
o f the Clinton team and his lack o f interest at that time in Foreign policy. The genocide 
in Rwanda, which began soon after the end of the Somalia mission, would redefine the 
terms o f western armed humanitarian intervention and shape future discussions o f state
6 Clarke and Herbst. 70.
7 Ibid. 82.
249
sovereignty, failed states, and human security.8 The Rwanda case study, on the decision 
not to intervene, noted the different decision making dynamic o f the first Clinton 
administration and the impact o f a perceived failure in the Somalia intervention on the 
possibility o f involvement in the Rwandan Civil War and genocides. The failure to 
respond to genocide in Rwanda generated a discussion on human security and the 
meaning of state sovereignty when human rights and security were endangered which 
would both encourage the Kosovo intervention. The demonstration there that major 
powers were willing to ignore the sovereignty o f other nations in furtherance of 
humanitarian goals fueled the development of the R2P concept which eventually lead to 
the Libyan intervention o f 2011.
Many players in the administration changed between the first and second Clinton 
terms, but two were most important. The first was the replacement o f Warren 
Christopher with Madeleine Albright, who would turn out to be the prime activist for 
intervention. The second was the replacement o f Anthony Lake with Sandy Berger as 
National Security Advisor. Like Obama would do later on with Donilon, Clinton had 
placed Berger, his own man, as deputy to Lake. While their relationship was not as 
acrimonious as that described by many o f the Obama cabinet secretaries towards their 
Obama loyalist subordinates, there is no question that Berger was more in tune with 
Clinton’s preferences and desires than Lake had been, and better able to translate to 
requests o f the other interested parties in the foreign policy realm into actionable items
8 United Nations. “Report o f  the Independent Inquiry into the actions o f  the United Nations during the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” December 15, 1999. www.un.org/news/ossg/rwanda_report.htm. Accessed  
on September 15, 2014. This and other reports were not available at the time o f  the decision making in 
1994. 1.
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for the president.9 Because of these factors, Berger stands with Brent Scowcroft as the 
two most effective o f the four national security advisors examined in the case studies. 
Each had a keen knowledge of the interests and desires o f their boss, they were also close 
friends with that boss, had shared life experiences, and also understood the need for a 
smoothly functioning cabinet. It is important to mention though, that the comparison has 
its limits. Scowcroft did not make decisions for Bush, or speak in his name, both of 
which Berger frequently did.10 Berger, furthermore, actively envisioned his role as a very 
public one, in which he would be a primary salesman for foreign policy decisions, 
position in stark contrast to that o f Scowcroft. It is possible to argue that Albright’s job 
was not to convince Clinton, but Berger, of the need to intervene in Kosovo.11
The similarities between Scowcroft and Berger are not meant to pair Anthony 
Lake with James Jones or Thomas Donilon, the two Obama era National Security 
Advisors examined. Lake was close to the president, but as a career diplomat tended to 
operationalize his role in events rather than serve as arbiter for the president. His focus 
on Russia in 1994, for example, helped to blind him and the cabinet to events in 
Rwanda.12 Jones’ number one problem was that he was not an Obama insider. As a 
hierarchically trained military leader at the highest level o f the armed forces, he was 
unable to adapt to the Obama leadership circle, which was non-hierarchical and saw 
numerous information streams go to the president, many o f them outside o f Jones’
9 Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making o f  Foreign Policy from  
Nixon to George W. Bush. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2009. 207.
10 Daalder, Ivo, and Destler, I.M. In the Shadow o f  the Oval Office: Profiles o f  the National Security 
Advisors and the Presidents They Served - from JFK to George W. Bush. N ew  York: Simon and Schuster, 
2009. 248
11 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, a Memoir. New York: Harper Collins, 2013. 386.
12 Power, Samantha "Bystanders to Genocide." Atlantic Monthly September, 2001. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ Accessed on April 
20, 2014.
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I Tknowledge or control. Donilon also suffered from this issue, but he was new in his role 
at the time of the Libya decision, and in any case more entrenched players, Power, Rice, 
and Clinton all carried more clout when the moment came to decide.
Comparing the Key Players Across Administrations -  Seeking the “Powerful” Actor
In terms o f seeking the dominant actor for the foreign policy decision making and 
framing processes, the first case study examined, Somalia, turns out to be an outlier for 
the discussion, for several reasons. The UN and the Secretary General had a greater 
impact on U.S. decision making for Somalia than for any o f the other cases except for the 
negative role in Rwanda. It is the one study in which U.S. players outside o f the normal 
cabinet structure had influence. Herman Cohen and Frank Wisner at the Department of 
State fit this bill, as did ODFA lead James Kunder and USAID leader Andew Natsios. 
Congress also took on a much greater role in pushing for intervention in Somalia than in 
any other case, notwithstanding the individual role that John McCain took in pushing for 
intervention in the Arab Spring events, most particularly in Libya in 2011. In spite of 
significant actions by these lower tier actors, more than in any of the other interventions, 
there is no question in the histories o f memoirs that the Somalia decision was solely in 
the hands of President Bush, and that he made his decision to intervene with advice from 
senior cabinet officers, but not from a cabinet vote or other collective decision making 
means, as was the case in other interventions, such as the Obama cabinet’s Libya debate
13 Gates. 291.
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and vote for intervention.14 Bush, then is the “powerful actor” sought by the model, who 
had the conviction and influence to dominate the decision making process for 
intervention. Again, Bush is unique among the presidents examined for two reasons. 
The first was his deep background in decision making at the highest levels of 
government. This was a man who was comfortable in his role, and unafraid to exercise 
command. The second reason, touched on repeatedly, was the unique nature o f the 
George H.W. Bush cabinet. These were men who were not only friends, but had served 
together in government for decades, with players sitting in different seats, sometimes 
superior, sometimes subordinate to one another. This is clearly seen in the manner in 
which the DOD turned on a dime in its approach to Somalia. Bush and Cheney had 
worked with each other on and off since the Nixon Administration, as had Colin Powell. 
Each understood the hierarchy and their role in it, and once the boss decided, the 
discussions ended.
Bush’s motivations for decision are not dissimilar in kind from those o f other 
leaders examined, particularly in the case o f Clinton and Kosovo. To restate, Bush was 
motivated by: African experience prior to his presidency; by the need to take decisive 
action as the Republican National Convention and the reelection loomed (but in an area 
that seemed easier to “win” than the growing quagmire in Yugoslavia); by media 
reporting and the reports o f subordinates, most notably the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, 
and congressional leaders on the horrors occurring in Somalia;15 and then after the
14 Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey. Learning from  Somalia. Boulder, Colorado: W estview Press, 1997. 
9.
15 Brent Scowcroft, as interviewed by Western, Jon. "Sources o f  Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, 
Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia." International Security 26, no. 4 
(2002): 112-142. 125.
253
election by the simultaneous needs to secure his political legacy and to lock the incoming 
president into what was thought were salutary actions on the world stage.
The Rwanda mini case study is the other outlier in terms of the quest for decisive 
leadership in decision making. There simply was no decisive stance on Rwanda at any 
level o f government. In the wake o f the Battle o f Mogadishu, there was no interest in 
another entanglement, this time in a remote, hard to reach part o f the world, and one to 
which the American people and government leaders were already inured to accept large 
casualties and brutality on a regular basis. Unlike the case in Somalia, President Clinton 
was not interested, which meant that powerful leadership would have to rise up from 
lower levels of the cabinet. Since the issue in Rwanda was not one of reconstruction or 
food aid, but primarily political, the actors one would expect to push for intervention, 
USAID, OFDA, and the foreign assistance NGO’s were largely silent. Political officers 
in the relevant sections of the Department o f State, such as the Africa Bureau, were 
motivated, but as mentioned above were inured to accept significant death and mayhem 
before they realized the true gravity o f the massacres.16 By that point they largely 
switched over from benign disinterest to being stunned by the enormity o f the atrocities. 
At the next level o f government higher, the cabinet level, the only motivated actor 
seemed to be U.S. Ambassador to the UN Albright, and even she noted that while she 
was concerned, there was so much else going on in the world that the gravity o f the 
situation was simply not evident.17
Similarly, NSC staffers, such as Susan Rice, were clearly more concerned about 




on the upcoming mid-term elections.18 She was right to be so concerned, since the 
Republican landslide of that year did change the political landscape, and was in part due 
to foreign policy failures by the administration. The DOD remained against potential 
operations in Rwanda from the beginning, and there was no significant effort to sway 
DOD from that stance. One rung even higher up the food chain saw even more 
disinterest on behalf of the two leaders most likely to be able to sway the president and 
the DOD, since National Security Advisor Lake was focused on Russian politics, and 
Secretary o f State Christopher could not even find Rwanda on a map.19 It would be 
simplistic to say that intervention will only take place when there is a powerful individual 
interested, as in the case o f Rwanda it is one o f a plethora of reasons why action did not 
take place. But that lack is a significant cause for inaction and a key finding of this study.
The Kosovo intervention and that in Libya both feature the intervention of 
powerful individuals who had the power to shape the decision making process to secure 
their desired end state, presidential approval for action. As noted above, the 
administrations o f Clinton and Obama were in different places developmentally at the 
time of intervention, and the personalities of the two leaders were quite different. The 
Obama administration had a tendency to micromanage foreign policy, whereas Clinton 
was far more likely to let Berger make choices, at least when things were going well.20 
Furthermore, Clinton was strongly distracted by domestic politics, in particular the 
Lewinsky scandal. While the Obama administration had no desire to be sucked further 
into the Middle East, the Arab Spring joined the World Economic Crisis to dominate the 
news and the administrations attention in 2011. As mentioned above, the Clinton cabinet




had nearly all been with the president since the beginning, and their time together eased 
some of the decision making process, certainly the Kosovo intervention was decided on 
much more readily than that in Libya. The main new player was outside o f the central 
governing sphere, in the form of General Wesley Clark, whose own political acumen and 
ease o f working with the real insiders in the Clinton administration gave him clout 
beyond the normal role o f a combatant commander.21
Whereas in the Somalia case study, the Department o f Defense actively resisted 
intervention until it was ordered otherwise, and Rwanda, where it successfully resisted 
intervention, Kosovo represented a notable victory for the Department o f State against 
DOD. Madeleine Albright, with Richard Holbrooke and Wesley Clark in support, waged 
a multi month long struggle to motivate the rest o f the cabinet, in particular Berger and 
Secretary of Defense Cohen, to support intervention. Clinton himself came around when 
the domestic challenges to his attention were resolved in winter, 1999, and when 
atrocities and violation of agreements by Serbia became too blatant to ignore. His 
motivations were in part driven by guilt over failure to act in Rwanda, and a need to 
complete the still ongoing Yugoslav crisis in response to criticism over the failure o f the 
Dayton accords. Clinton was legitimately concerned about the suffering o f Kosovar 
Albanians, and was able to be convinced by Albright, through Berger, that intervention 
was necessary. He was so desirous of intervention that, in lieu of significant UN support, 
he turned to NATO as the international legitimator of action.
For the Libya intervention, the roles o f three players in convincing President 
Obama to act are well known. Power, Rice, and Clinton directly convinced Obama to act 
in a discussion and vote. Although the discussions took place over a two to three week
21 Halbertsam, David. War in a Time o f  Peace. New York: Scribner, 2001. 433.
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period in March, 2011, the actual decision happened quickly, and in the most egalitarian 
decision making environment seen in the three case studies. What is interesting about the 
Libya decisions is that, unlike the other interventions, they were decisively influenced by 
the actions of second and third tier agents, meaning Rice and Power, respectively. It was 
they who stood nearly coequal to a first tier advisor, Clinton, who in turn helped the other 
two overcome cabinet opposition and pushed the president toward intervention. While 
Kunder, Natsios, Cohen, and Wisner all had their roles to play in the Somalia decision 
making process, there is no evidence that any of them were allowed into the inner 
decision making circle in the way that Rice and Power were for Obama. This was 
because o f the close and special nature o f the relationship that each of them had with the 
president, relationships that predated the administration and allowed them to circumvent 
the usual channels for cabinet decision making.
Intervening Factors: Geography, Great Power Hostility or Support, International 
Affirmation, Domestic Politics, and National Interest
Five intervening factors in decision making emerged from the research. Each 
played a major role in the decision making and framing process for armed humanitarian 
interventions. The first is geography, meaning the ease of access by military forces into 
the area in which intervention is to take place. While the U.S. has an impressive array of 
land, sea, and air power, it prefers to utilize that power in certain ways. The preference is 
for interventions which can be reached by sea, since sea lift is a major U.S. military 
strength, and much larger logistical loads can be moved more effectively by ship than by
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air.22 Furthermore, the U.S. Navy is unrivaled in its medium, and control o f sea lanes 
where desired by U.S. forces is generally assumed, particularly in an era when the U.S. 
has less access to forward land bases than during the Cold War.23 An additional 
geographic consideration is nearness to friendly airfields. While U.S. aircraft can strike 
anywhere in the world, for logistical and pilot rest reasons, the preference is that aircraft 
not be forced to refuel in the air or launch their missions from CONUS.24 Finally, the 
U.S. Marine Corps, the military body most specifically tailored for sudden militarized 
boots on the ground intervention, is sea based, and each region of the world has Marine 
forces afloat which can respond nearly instantly to crises within range o f its embarked 
helicopters and amphibious vehicles.
How is this borne out in the case studies? Somalia was easy to reach 
amphibiously and by air from friendly locations. Marines could exercise their sea borne 
supply option, and aircraft carriers could have provided rapid support if  needed. In the 
case o f Kosovo, nearby Italy served as the base for the majority o f U.S. airstrikes, along 
with aircraft carriers in the nearby Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas. Ground forces could 
have been introduced from the forces already located in neighboring Macedonia, Bosnia, 
or readily deployed by helicopter or medium lift aircraft such as the C-130 from Italy or 
from ships at sea. Libya was the easiest o f all in this regard. There was never a question 
of ground forces in Libya, but since the overwhelming majority o f targets were coastal
22 Mullenbach, M. J. and Matthews, G. P. “Deciding to intervene: An analysis o f  international
and domestic influences on United States interventions in intrastate disputes.” International Interactions, 
3 4 ,2 0 0 8 ,2 5 -5 2 . 30.
23 Ignatieff, Michael. "The Challenges o f  American Imperial Power." Naval War College Review 56, No. 2. 
Spring, 2003: 9-18. 13.
24 A notable exception to this is the use o f  Strategic bombers, most particularly the B2, which the U.S. does 
not normally base outside its borders for security reasons.
25 U.S. Marine Corps 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. “About the 26th MEU.” 
http://www.26thmeu.marines.mil/About/MEU.aspx. Accessed on November 1, 2014.
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towns, deploying them by helicopter or amphibious assault would have been easy. 
Airstrikes were launched from nearby aircraft carriers and from the European mainland. 
Since NATO countries such as Italy, the UK, and France were involved in the airstrikes, 
access to nearby bases for U.S. forces was not in question.
Rwanda forms the outlier for geography, and it’s remoteness was touted at the 
time as a reason not to intervene. Landlocked, Rwanda was nowhere near the normal 
sources o f U.S. maritime power. None o f Rwanda’s neighbors were U.S. allies, so there 
was no way to get U.S. forces close enough to stage into the country, or in which to base 
U.S. tactical and logistical aircraft.26 Any U.S. military effort would have had to be 
staged in by aircraft, which would have generated their own requirements for escorts, 
ground support security forces, and supplies. This assessment is in no way meant to 
judge the decision not to intervene, but reflect part o f the Pentagon’s reasoning in 
resisting intervention.27
The second and third external variables in determining intervention involve the 
international community and the establishment o f legitimacy for militarized interventions 
which would violate state sovereignty. As a proponent o f international law and the 
concept of state sovereignty, the U.S. seeks to act within the legitimization o f an 
international mandate, as evidenced in its seeking of such legitimization in each o f the 
case studies. For Somalia, this was the U.N., and is evidenced by President Bush 
working directly with Boutros Boutros Gali to encourage passage o f UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973, specifically tailored for what would become the U.S. led coalition.
26 Albright. 153.
27 National Security Council o f  the United States. “Memorandum for Deputy Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs.” National Security Council. May 5, 1994. From Ferroggiaro, William, "The 
U.S. And Rwanda, 1994, Evidence o f  Inaction", George Washington University 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53. Accessed October 14 2014.
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Interestingly, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the wake o f the battle o f Mogadishu was 
not mandated or forced by the UN, but was a choice o f the Clinton administration. In the 
contrasting case o f Rwanda, the international community was working specifically 
against intervention from the start, as the UN pulled more and more o f its own 
peacekeepers out of the country. This proved to be yet another factor which led to the 
non-intervention there. In Libya, as well, pushing through a UN resolution, and rallying 
other international bodies such as the Arab League, the GCC, and NATO were all central 
both in the justification of the intervention and framing that justification to the American 
people.
Kosovo provides a more interesting case, in that the legitimacy which would be 
provided by UN support for intervention was distinctly lacking, in part due to Russian 
doubts about the operation, forcing the administration to rely on NATO as an admittedly 
lesser international legitimating body. That said, the Clinton administration saw both the 
strengthening o f NATO and its support in the operation as vitally important, along with 
mollifying Russia so that it would not actively oppose the intervention in the UN Security 
Council. Further, the future of NATO itself as a cohesive alliance seemed to be at 
stake, a factor which helped frame the intervention.
As a third factor, the role o f foreign actors turned out to be a critical factor in 
decision making for and against interventions. For Somalia, this influence was primarily 
provided by pressure from the UN and its Secretary General, Boutros-Gali. For Rwanda, 
French support of the Tutsis, and French and Belgian actions in the UN helped to 
influence the U.S. against intervention. Russian resistance would have doomed an effort
28 Talbot, Strobe. The Russia Hand: A Memoir o f  Presidential Diplomacy. N ew  York: Random House, 
2003. 348.
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to intervene in Kosovo, since Moscow viewed Serbia as a client state. By the same 
token, initial German reluctance to intervene was significant, just as British support for 
intervention was a strong motivating factor for the U.S. Similarly, for the Libya 
intervention, France and the UK strongly influenced the U.S. intervention, even 
providing the “ahead” as the U.S. led from “behind.”
U.S. domestic politics form an additional, if  coincidental, external factor which 
was revealed through examination o f the case studies. The imminence of presidential or 
mid-term congressional elections seemed to be a factor in all but one of the case studies, 
although the impact of those elections on the interventions is not consistent and may be 
minimal or irrelevant. Presidential elections, however, were much more obviously a 
factor. In 1992, the presidential election cycle was a major consideration. The 
challenger, Clinton, turned lack of action in Somalia into a campaign issue which 
influenced Bush’s decision making, leading to the approval o f the airlift in August, timed 
to provide a bump in approval before the Republican National Convention. Further, 
during the main electioneering season, from September to early November, the 
administration was completely absorbed in the campaign.29
1994 was a midterm election year for the Clinton administration’s first term, and 
this directly impacted the decision making on the Rwanda intervention, as specifically 
mentioned by then NSC staffer Susan Rice.30 Coming on the heels, as it did, o f the failed 
peacemaking effort in Somalia, the election was a significant factor in explaining the 
inaction o f the administration and the lack of congressional pressure for an intervention
29 Redd, Stephen B. “The Influence o f  Advisors and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: 




that might have proven to be as unpopular as Somalia had become. Elections also bore 
on the decision to intervene in Kosovo, with Clinton purposefully insisting on a discrete 
mission that would be over with before the 2000 election cycle got fully underway, so as 
not to saddle his chosen successor, A1 Gore with the burden of a potentially 
uncomfortable conflict.31 Like Bush during the election cycle, Clinton was also badly 
distracted by domestic scandals, most notably the Monica Lewinsky affair and 
subsequent impeachment.
Each of the four factors above combine with economics and history to suggest a 
fifth, national interest. U.S. national interest varies by region and subject, with the 
traditional conflict between moralistic and realist actions seen in each. At its core, 
national interest, as described by Alexander George, is more than “minimum objectives” 
which he states as survival, economic well being, and liberty.32 In the post Cold War era, 
the U.S. was more willing to take realist, i.e. militarized action, in regions o f the world 
where it had been directly attacked, where vital resources were at stake, where one o f its 
allies or alliances was directly threatened, and where it had historically had a role. 
National interest ultimately kept the U.S. out of Rwanda, but into the other examples, and 
it was the role of the dominant actor in each decision making process to make the case 
that U.S. interests were at stake. For Somalia, George H.W. Bush wished to lock his 
replacement, Clinton, into a series o f policies that did not include intervention in Bosnia. 
For Clinton, years later, intervention in Kosovo was couched in terms of avoiding war in 
Europe, and in strengthening the NATO alliance. Over a decade later, goals in Libya 
were similar, to back the play o f allies in the region and prevent the spread of instability.
31 Redd. 137.
32 George, Alexander. Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use o f  Information 
and Advice. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. 227.
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Decision Making Models
As stated in the methodology, this research sought to evaluate and validate several 
models of decision making. The first two are Graham Allison’s Rational Actor Model 
(RAM) o f government politics, decision making, and group dynamics, while the second,
•>-3
influenced by the first, is the Governmental Politics Model. To restate, the RAM’s core 
concepts include: The ranking of objectives, discussion o f alternatives, attachment of 
consequences to the alternatives, and a rational selection o f the alternatives to act upon 
based on required goal completion.34 Further assumptions include the primacy of unitary 
states as actors, and the perception of the international environment as a self-help 
anarchic world with no higher authority to moderate state action.35 In each of the four 
case studies, the RAM is evident in the decision making process, from the deputies level 
up through the president. For Somalia, that process brought about the August airlift, and 
led to the decision to intervene, but under strict guidelines that left out regime change or 
political involvement. For Rwanda, the discussion never got above the deputies, the 
same types of discussions took place, and the situation was deemed not worth of 
intervention. In Kosovo, a wide range of pressures were tried, including attempting to 
work diplomatically both with Serbia directly and through Serbian sponsor Russia, with 
intervention occurring when those efforts were seen to dramatically fail. For Libya, the 
decision to intervene was taken under some time duress, nevertheless, the compromise 
solutions presented by Gates, Biden, and others, were considered before intervention was
33 Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis. Vol. 2. 




selected as the course o f action. Seeking international legitimacy for armed humanitarian 
interventions also falls within the realm of rationality, as an effort to mitigate the effects 
o f the anarchical system.
The Government Politics Model (GPM), is less positively present through the 
case studies. In this model, these decisions are viewed as “outputs o f large organizations 
functioning according to standards o f behavior.”36 Outcomes will be influenced by 
organizational, not individual, dynamics and cultures.37 The various bureaucracies which 
make up the decision making process serve themselves first, then their higher authorities, 
which can cause the creation of gaps between the choices o f leaders and the 
implementation capabilities and priorities o f subordinate organizations.38 In the cases in 
which more junior leaders decidedly impact decision making, such as Libya, it is difficult 
to see the GPM, and its assertions o f hierarchy in play.39 Under this model even a 
paramount leader, such as the president, must seek consensus with his subordinates, if for 
no other reason than to prevent misunderstandings, and even presidential power may be 
curtailed by powerful subordinate bureaucracies.40
Looking at events through the prism of the GPM, it is seen to be partially relevant 
to the case studies. Regarding Somalia, each of the cabinet and interagency players stuck 
to their own institutional lines of interest. DOD resisted intervention, as contrary to its 
existing doctrine, until it perceived and acted on the president’s desires. Humanitarian 
aid-focused agencies argued for intervention from their own points o f view. Where the
36 Allison and Zelikow. 143.
37 Ibid. 255.
38 Ibid. 257.
39 Bendor, Jonathan and Hammond, Thomas H. "Rethinking Allison’s Models." The American Political 
Science Review 86, no. 2 (1992, June): 301-322. 306. The term they use is “Single Time Period” 
organization.
40 Woll, Peter. American Bureacracy. New York: Norton, 1977. 206-207.
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GPM breaks down, however, in the case o f Somalia, is in the nature o f the final decision 
to intervene. There is no evidence that Bush was influenced in any way by the 
organizational resistance o f the DOD toward intervention. Given his long career as a 
foreign policy practitioner, he did not need to be told of what and why the military 
resisted intervention. He also did not have to cut deals with any agency or player in order 
to give force to his directives. When he decided on intervention, the government acted. 
Because o f this decisive and unchecked action, the GPM cannot be credited with well 
explaining the Somalia decision making process. This is not to deny the power o f the 
presidency in all o f the cases, however, the central role that Bush played in the process is 
unique among the cases.
Rwanda may be the purest example o f the GPM in action o f the case studies, 
however, this is not helpful since a successful GPM would then appear to mean that the 
U.S. will not ever engage in armed humanitarian operations. The Rwanda example 
remains relevant, however, since it demonstrates one outcome that can occur when no 
dominant actor makes the case the president for intervention. Since the issue o f Rwanda 
was never seriously discussed at the highest levels, we must examine what did happen, 
which was interagency discussions at the deputies level and below. In these, the GPM is 
seen to function, with each agency making its arguments from its own bureaucratic point 
of view, and none being able to overcome an overall reluctance to act. Since none o f the 
major bureaucracies was motivated sufficiently to intervene, no recommendation to sway 
a president, who was not focused on the issue, to take place.
The Kosovo intervention saw the GPM in action, with each o f the key players 
arguing for or against intervention from an institutional point o f view, with National
265
Security Advisor Berger at the pinnacle o f the decision making process. Given the nature 
o f the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, the interagency community focused on food and 
medical aid was not a major player. The intelligence community did not play an 
advocacy role, but served its customary function of providing information, leaving the 
Departments of State and Defense as the two key players. As in the Somalia case, 
however, we see the GPM as only a partial solution, for several reasons. One is that there 
is no evidence that President Clinton had to bargain in order to implement his decisions. 
Once he decided, the key players, in this case Holbrooke at State and Clark at DOD 
acted. Furthermore, while the Department o f State acted as a relatively unified body in 
the decision making process, the Department of Defense was significantly divided, with 
an institutional bias against intervention on the one hand, and a powerful player on the 
ground in Europe, Wesley Clark, who was convinced of the need for intervention and did 
not hesitate to make that known outside o f his chain of command, or to work with those 
in other agencies outside o f his own bureaucracy, in this case the Department o f State, to 
push for and implement intervention.41
O f the three case studies which observed actual interventions, the Libya case 
study comes closest to an intervention which took place as the GPM would have 
predicted, with the caveat that U.S. allies, most notably in France and the GCC, provided 
powerful external catalysts for armed intervention. The players all spoke from their 
institutional points o f view. While Rice, as an Ambassador, technically worked for 
Hillary Clinton in her role as Secretary o f State, the reality is that the Ambassador to the 
UN has often served as a personal delegate and confidante o f the president, particularly in 
Democrat administrations, and this places Rice as her own power center. The institutions
41 Halbertsam. 433.
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which are customarily against intervention, most notably DOD, were against it in this 
case, while those whose mandate covered humanitarian issues were in favor. The 
negotiations which took place saw bargaining, particularly on the issue o f whether or not 
ground forces would be used in the operation. There is no memoir to suggest that Obama 
was personally against this, as Clinton openly was throughout the Kosovo Crisis. Based 
on polling data and Congressional statements, it appears that ground forces were not 
bargained away to please the DOD, but rather as an assessment o f the prevailing public 
opinion on the matter. Therefore, one key piece o f the GPM, bargaining from the top, 
does not appear to be present.
Noteworthy criticism of the GPM focuses on whether goals of leaders at the 
cabinet level are actually so disparate, and both whether and why a president would have 
to bargain with his own appointees.42 They posit that a president would try to avoid 
bargaining if possible, and that he would normally be in a paramount position to do so. 
In all three o f the cases where intervention took place, presidential decision making was 
final once the orders to intervene were given. Therefore, looking at the case studies 
through the lens o f the GPM is an inadequate vision of how the decision making for the 
examined interventions actually took place.
A third model, the Theory of Government Politics Model (TGM), posits that key 
leaders acted as “pied pipers” and brought others along with them through persuasive 
power, particularly if the outlook of and relationships among the group members were 
similar and strong.43 Given that this model was built around the first Bush administration
42 Bradford, Jeffrey P. "Political Aspects o f  Strategic Decision Making in British Defence Policy."
Cranfield University, 1999. 18.
43 Yetiv, Steve A. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision Making and the G u lf War. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004. 120.
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and their actions in the first Gulf War, it is unsurprising that the model works well in 
describing the actions which led to the Somalia intervention. Again, Bush himself was 
the chief engine for decision making who provided the central guidance which got DOD 
on board for intervention and made the actions of December 1992 possible. The similar 
outlook and close relations among the key leaders involved facilitated this, as it had done 
in the Gulf War. The TGM is also sadly predictive o f the non-intervention in Rwanda, if 
only, once again, in an unsatisfactory way, since the lack o f a strong spokesperson meant 
that the de facto mindset, against intervention, could take hold and prevent action.
The model turned out to be partially useful for explaining the interventions in 
Kosovo and Libya, in which powerful actors, although not always in paramount roles, 
formulated their positions and drug other key leaders along. In the case of Kosovo, and 
for reasons previously discussed, the Clinton team, which had a term and a half of 
working together under its belt, and which had a president who had become very 
comfortable in his role as international decision maker, comes close to the Bush model, 
and the TGM is useful in predicting the outcome that Madeleine Albright would be able 
to pull the decision making apparatus along to her point o f view. If one takes Wesley 
Clark, not Defense Secretary Cohen, as the leading player for the Defense Department, 
then the TGM fits the process even better. Indeed, it seems that the main competitor for 
Albright’s attention on the issue of Kosovo was not international, but rather Clinton’s 
absorption by the events o f the Monica Lewinsky case and his impeachment. When 
those two issues were resolved, decisions on Kosovo came quickly, and Albright’s voice 
found its full audience and impact.
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The TGM is very evident in the Libya case study, in which Rice and Power, 
neither o f whom were in traditionally dominant influential positions, exercised the pied 
piper role. With the help o f pressure from the international community, actions by 
France and other allies, and growing personal concern about reports o f violence and 
genocide, Hillary Clinton was brought around to a pro-intervention stance.44 Between the 
three o f them, they then convinced President Obama to act, in spite o f significant pressure 
against intervention by other powerful players. Where the model does not predict, 
however, is that this took place in an environment in which the key players had nowhere 
near the comfort level working with each other, and little commonality o f vision or 
understanding o f authority compared to the Bush administration, for reasons discussed 
previously. So Libya gives the result, but without what it predicts would be the necessary 
factors. Finally, Libya suffers somewhat from the same problem that critics such as 
Bradford raise with Allison, which is that he covered his subject too recently after its 
occurrence, and before all evidence was available in terms o f memoirs and classified 
documents.45 The world is a much more partisan place now than it was in the 1960s, or 
even 1990s, and the events in Libya are still central to a heated political debate which 
will likely continue as long as any of the players involved seek to run for elected office. 
Further, many o f the key players are still in government, and their testimony will not be 
available for some time. While the memoirs o f Clinton, Panetta, and Gates are available, 
the critical memories o f Rice, Power, and President Obama himself are not. Based on 
what is known about the Libya decision making process, the author does not expect
44 Clinton, Hillary R. H ard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 364.
45 Bradford. 20.
269
significant changes to take place in the story of how the intervention came about, but 
would be remiss in failing to note the possibility.
In summary, for decision making processes, the case studies bear out some o f the 
predictions made in the introduction and methodology sections o f this dissertation. The 
RAM turned out to be useful and more or less predictive, if  overly general. The GPM 
was the least useful o f the models, affirming criticisms of its assumption on the 
constraints organizations impose upon individuals.46 The TGM proved to be the most 
predictive in the three cases, although, again, it works best when the specific factors it 
needs to function are in place. Sadly, and unsatisfactorily, all o f the models, in one way 
or another, are useful in predicting the lack o f intervention in Rwanda in 1994.
Framing and Intervention
According to Entman, the purpose o f a frame is “to generate support or opposition 
to a political actor or policy.”47 This is what he calls the “Cascading Network 
Association Theory”. Since the government remains the primary source for 
information, this creates a system of asymmetric interdependence, but this can only be 
taken advantage o f if  there is unanimity in the message. Castells drew upon and added to 
this concept in Communication Power, positing that Network Power is the power to 
modify, change, or create networks.49 To Castells, power lies within networked systems. 
According to Entman, the government is generally successful in framing when it can call
46 Bendor and Hammond. 309.
47 Entman, Robert M. Projections o f  Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2004. 47.
48 Ibid. 17-21.
49 Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 45.
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on shared themes fitting the national mood and ideals and get its themes in “early and 
often.”50
In all of the cases examined framing played some role in the decision making 
process and in the justification of intervention to key audiences, generally the media and 
the American people, but also sometimes to allied nations and other audiences. In all 
cases, the government was the organization with the power and interest to establish, 
maintain, and capitalize on the power o f communication networks in order to frame the 
debate on armed humanitarian interventions, and to persuade stakeholders o f the need to 
intervene. Where the cases vary is the extent of framing, and on the ability o f highly 
placed, powerful individual actors who create the frames used to encourage intervention. 
Conflicting frames also exist in each case, provided not only by the media, but by the 
party out of power. Counter framing was also occasionally provided by the government 
o f the opposing power, meaning the country being intervened in. As stated in the 
methodology, a model drawing off the work of Entman and Castells would expect to see 
a concerted, planned effort by senior decision makers to set the terms of public discourse 
on a given issue, and to capitalize on the government’s unique position as a single source 
for definitive information on key foreign policy and defense issues. Influencers outside 
of the foreign policy decision making process would be counteracted and refuted in order 
to maintain information primacy. Narratives would attempt to draw simple parallels to 
historical examples, not always contextually relevant, but well known and inflammatory 
at times. Control or influence on information networks would be established and 
increased so that messaging could be enhanced.
50 Entman. 10.
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Entman’s theory is validated in the way in which the media were influenced by 
government information, and later, in the impact that media reporting had back up the 
information chain to President Bush during the Somalia decision making process. As 
noted, some of the key second tier players such as USAID and OFDA leaders used the 
media to facilitate their own efforts to force decisions on key issues, such as the airlift.51 
But there is no evidence that framing by the government was undertaken in a systematic 
way, or that such decisions were an implicit part of the decision making cycle for the 
decision to intervene. Instead, the framing that took place was a byproduct o f the 
primacy of the government as an information holder and broker, and because o f the 
unique nature, and high danger, o f the situation on the ground, which put the government 
in the position o f having a monopoly on the information needed by the media to generate 
accurate reporting.52
For Rwanda, public and congressional opinion was stacked heavily against 
another intervention on the African continent. The frame of the failure in Somalia was 
dominant, along with an even grimmer frame that accepted a certain amount o f death, 
mayhem and destruction in Africa as the norm. That frame deadened government 
officials to the crisis, officials who, had the same level of mayhem occurred elsewhere, 
would have been forced into action. Finally, and along with the Somalia frame, 
Yugoslavia, another crisis altogether, successfully dominated the national security 
establishment o f the U.S. Rwanda showed no framing, except in a negative way, in an
51 Livingston, Stephen and Eachus, Todd. "Humanitarian Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the 
CNN Effect Reconsidered." Political Communication  12, 1995,413-429. 424.
52 Ibid. 415.
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active attempt by the U.S. government to avoid use o f the term genocide so that
C l
intervention could be avoided.
In terms of the Kosovo intervention, the American public were, when focused on 
government policy at all, most interested in the scandals which surrounded the Clinton 
administration, as well as his ongoing struggles with Congress, which culminated in 
impeachment proceedings shortly before the intervention began. As a result of these 
factors, the White House was on the defense in terms o f messaging and framing, slowing 
both the U.S. response and the effort to justify that response through framing. Outside 
public and congressional pressure to intervene was minimal. As discussed, the 
construction of Slobodan Milosevic as the central villain o f the Kosovo crisis began some 
months earlier, in fall 1998.54 The failure o f the Rambouillet conference is the event that 
generated modest support for operations, as discussed in the case study.55 At this time, 
presidential statements increased in stridency and directly hinted at the air campaign 
which would follow if negotiations failed. A central part of the framing effort was to 
reassure the American people and allies and other great powers that the U.S. would not 
place troops on the ground as part o f the intervention. The result o f these efforts was that 
by the commencement o f hostilities, nearly half o f the American public saw Kosovo as a 
security issue o f vital interest to the U.S.56
The Libya intervention shows different framing challenges, in part because of 
changes in the media, but it also presents conflicting frames, in particular Gadaffi’s 
efforts to refute the U.S. frame, and the Iranian effort to frame the entire Arab Spring to
53 Power, 2001.
54 Butler, Michael J. Selling a 'Just' War: Framing, Legitimacy, and U.S. M ilitary Intervention. 




its benefit. Furthermore, unlike the previous case studies, the Arab Spring dominated the 
media in spring 2011, coming to eclipse even the ongoing economic crisis. This meant 
that the American people did not have to be familiarized with information on the crisis, 
and that the U.S. government had no monopoly on information, which was plentiful and 
readily available. Framing the intervention in Libya began in the second week o f March, 
2011, culminating with the decision to intervene a week later, and the ultimate speech 
act, the Obama speech to the American people, the week after that. In spite o f efforts by 
President Obama and the senior leaders of his cabinet to provide the moral imperative for 
the intervention, public support for the operation stayed relatively flat, and barely crossed 
over into the approval side o f the ledger, and even that only occurred because o f a strict 
adherence to a policy o f keeping ground forces out o f Libya. Correspondingly, 
Congressional support for the operation also hinged on a basic promise to avoid a ground 
invasion of Libya.
The Combined Decide/Frame Model
Based on the hypothesis that armed humanitarian interventions occur when a 
powerful leader or small group of leaders dominates the decision making and framing 
apparatus to force and explain such an intervention, it is necessary to construct a theory 
that explains the concurrence or nexus of the decision making and framing processes. 
Based on the literature review and a thorough examination o f the Allison, Yetiv, Entman, 
and Castell’s models, it could be suggested that when the foreign policy decision making 
process is dominated by powerful individuals with a motivation toward intervention, and
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the framing process is dominated by the same or similarly minded individuals, armed 
humanitarian interventions take place driven by this alignment. Such individuals become 
dominant actors due to a combination o f their holding o f a senior cabinet position, a 
personal connection to the president, and the personal quality o f willpower to motivate 
and explain decision making.
As noted in the methodology, this model would expect to see the decision making 
process dominated by key stakeholders with powerful interests in a given issue formed by 
their own experiences and pressures on them formed through their own participation in 
events, both in forcing a decision on a given issue (in this case, armed humanitarian 
interventions) and in framing that process and the associated decisions to the various 
stakeholders (in this case, the public, through the media).
Once again following the framework o f taking each case study individually, the 
Decide/Frame Model seems least relevant to the Somalia intervention. Framing, where it 
took place, was spasmodic, and centered around key events. One example o f this is the 
airlift o f August, 1992. The decision was made so quickly that the only public 
information available was the announcement of the action. Similarly, the actual 
intervention in December was not preceded by a major framing effort by the government, 
even in the intervening weeks between the Thanksgiving decision and the landing o f the 
Marines two weeks later.57 This is not to say that there was no awareness or support on 
behalf o f the American people, however, basic awareness o f the situation came from the 
media. While the case study demonstrated that the media got most o f its information 
from government sources, there is no evidence that the information given was developed
57 Klarevas, Louis J. "The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia." Public Opinion 
Quarterly 64, (2000): 523-540. 524-525.
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in such a way as to be anything more than informational, in other words, information 
provided was not done so in order to frame an intervention, but rather to increase 
awareness.
The model’s application to the Rwanda intervention is, as with many facets o f that 
tragedy, non-satisfying, but that perversely helps to prove the point o f the research. 
There was no order from the top ordering the non-intervention. Instead, the conversation 
remained at the Deputies level and lower, and focused more on how to justify the non­
intervention than any other factor. Careful and assiduous avoidance o f the term 
“Genocide” was the centerpiece o f the framing effort, and inasmuch as there was no 
intervention, this can be seen as a clear, if unhappy, success.
The Kosovo intervention showed perhaps the most systematic example o f a 
conscious effort to frame an intervention through the decision making process and to the 
decision to intervene and the actual intervention of U.S. forces. Statements made by 
Albright, Holbrooke, Clark, and others in the summer and fall o f 1998 were not 
successful at creating public motivation for intervention, but set the stage for convincing 
Cohen, Berger, and ultimately President Clinton o f the need for intervention, particularly 
after the end o f the Lewinsky affair as a public factor and increasingly violent atrocities 
in Kosovo itself in January and February 1999. By February, the administration was 
concurrently negotiating between the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, planning to 
intervene, and actively running a media campaign designed to frame Milosevic and the 
Serbs as genocidal, a national security issue, and needful o f a U.S. and western response. 
That effort continued through the end of the intervention, morphing to fit the changing 
needs o f the frame. This is seen in the change from adamant refusal to consider ground
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forces to open threats o f their use as the Serbian will seemed to crack from April 1999 
onwards.
The Libya intervention falls somewhere in between Somalia and Kosovo in terms 
of combined decision making and framing. The crisis had a much shorter lead up than 
any o f the others except for Rwanda. Events in Egypt and Tunisia had only been going 
on for weeks when Libya exploded, and U.S. intervention began about one month after 
the first major atrocities had taken place there. That said, the Arab Spring was a number 
one news event from nearly the moment that it started, so a long term effort to frame 
potential intervention may not have been necessary.58 In terms o f the decision making 
cycle, the main cabinet member to support intervention, Hillary Clinton, had to be 
convinced that intervention was necessary by a combination o f the pressure of growing 
evidence o f atrocities in Libya, a growing sense that the administration was taking the 
blame for mismanagement of the crisis, and the pressure o f advocates such as Rice and 
Power. That trio, supported by an outside, but important actor, Senator McCain, then 
brought about the pressure which led President Obama to decide on intervention.59 The 
week following that decision saw a media blitz by the foreign policy decision making 
leadership to justify the intervention that was coming, and to explain it after it began.
The premise of this research is that that by unifying the two key processes 
(deciding and framing) into a single model, and incorporating the role o f the powerful 
individual in the decision making and framing processes, the weaknesses of all o f the 
models can be overcome. This also helps to account for the impact o f external variables
58 Joumalism.org. “N ew s Coverage Index, February 29-March 6, 2011.”
http://www.joumalism.org/201 l/03/06/pej-news-coverage-index-february-28-march-6-2011/. Accessed on 
October 27, 2014.
59 Talev, Margaret. Samantha Power: The Voice behind Obama’s Libya action. M cClatchy Newspapers, 
March 25, 2011.
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on as well as the experience o f past interventions on current and future intervention 
decision making, since the decision and framing cycles do not end, and constantly feed 
each other in accordance with Entman’s theory. The research performed on the case 
studies led to several conclusions on the validity o f such a model, affirming its utility.
One major revelation of the research is that the decision cycle for interventions is 
significantly shorter than had been envisioned at the outset o f the research. For Somalia, 
while discussions had been ongoing for months, the decision cycle Bush to make choice 
to intervene took place over approximately two weeks, the time from the electoral defeat 
to Thanksgiving in 1992. The time from the decision to intervene to the actual landing of 
troops was another two weeks. For Rwanda, the time frame for an intervention decision 
was similar, as intervention would have been most effective from mid-March to mid- 
April, or a one month period after which the impact would have been minimal since most 
o f the killing had been completed by that time. Kosovo, as noted, had the longest lead 
up, with nearly a year of discussion and active framing before the intervention. Even the 
immediate decision cycle was longer, over about two months from January to March, 
than that for Somalia. Finally, the Libya intervention decision cycle took place over a 
three week period from late February to early March, 2011, with the broader Arab Spring 
crisis extending back another month.
The brevity o f the decision cycles revealed limited government opportunities for 
framing intervention. It cannot be said that any o f the interventions were bolts out o f the 
blue, and there was public awareness of all o f the events considered, with the exception 
o f Rwanda. But in most o f the cases, time to build support for operations was limited, 
and this is reflected in the relatively low public approval ratings o f the interventions,
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particularly the last two, Kosovo and Libya. This is in spite o f the long lead up for the 
Kosovo intervention.
The role o f the powerful individual is clearly seen in all o f the interventions, as 
well as being negatively demonstrated by the Rwanda example. In each case of 
successful intervention, a powerful leader, who was not, in all cases, the president, made 
the case for intervention both in the decision making cycle, and to the public. This is best 
demonstrated in the Kosovo and Libya cases. In both cases, it was the Secretary o f State 
who played the key role, with significant support. For Kosovo, that support came from 
Holbrooke and Clark, for Libya, from Rice and Power. But, in both examples, it was 
ultimately the Secretary of State who compelled the president to agree to intervention. 
Where there was no strong individual, there was no intervention, as was seen with the 
Rwanda example.
None of the models presented in the research provide a total, satisfying result 
when applied to the case studies, however, each provides a useful piece o f the puzzle. 
Rationality is an important foundation for all decision making. Bureaucracies matter in 
decision making, and sometimes the inertia created by them must be overcome in order 
for action to take place. There is some give and take in negotiating among decision 
makers. Powerful, motivated individuals are a key factor in interventions and framing. 
Useful parts o f each model have been shaped to attempt to provide a more encompassing 
model that covers both decision making and framing. Considering the timelines of 
intervention, the decision cycle, and the role o f the dominant actor in decision making 
and framing, the primary conclusion o f the study is that a Decide/Frame model based on 
the influence o f a dominant actor is a useful answer to the question o f how foreign policy
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decisions are made in terms of explaining U.S. armed humanitarian interventions in the 
post-Cold War period. In the presence of a powerful, motivated individual who sought 
armed intervention, such interventions took place, and were framed to the American 
people. In the absence of such leadership, such interventions did not take place.
Models in Action: The Decision Not to Intervene in Syria, August, 2013
"We cannot accept a world where women and children and innocent civilians are 
gassed on a terrible scale."
Statement by President Obama, August 30, 2013.60
“August 31st, 2013 - Obama says he had authorized the use o f military force to 
punish Syria, with military assets to carry out a strike in place and ready to move 
on his order, but he would first seek authorization from Congress. "Today I'm 
asking Congress to send a message to the world that we are ready to move as one 
nation," he said.”
Reuters. 2013. Timeline of U.S. Syrian Crisis.61
The second part of the findings will look briefly at a more recent intervention 
decision process to see if  the findings of the research are valid, or if  they represented non 
repeatable events. As each event of the Arab Spring unfolded, the next seemed to be 
even more violent, culminating, for now at least, with the Syrian rising against the Bashir 
Assad regime and the civil war which followed, and is still ongoing. The following 
section will examine Syria by the same process as the case studies. To date, there has 
been no armed humanitarian intervention in Syria, however, discussions of intervention
60 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f  U.S. Syrian Crisis. August 31, 2013.




followed a significantly different path than was the case in Rwanda, the other non­
intervention examined. The time period deals specifically with the period ending in 
August, 2013, with the decision not to intervene in Syria following a series of atrocities 
committed there involving the use of chemical weapons.
In Brief: The Syrian Civil War 2011 -2 0 1 3
In terms of general background, the Syrian Civil War was an outgrowth o f the 
Arab Spring, as described in the Libya case study. The introductory events o f the Syrian 
Civil War were concurrent with the Libya intervention and its aftermath, as well as the 
ongoing world economic crisis, which included the U.S. government sequestration crisis 
o f spring, 2013. Syria, however, was a very different case than other notable Arab Spring 
events, for several reasons. Ambassador Stephen Ford, the U.S. envoy to Syria and a 
noted Arabist in the Department o f State, was one o f a faction who predicted that the 
Assad regime would respond positively to the Arab Spring, and not react in a manner
/ a
reflective o f Gaddafi. That turned out to be nearly the opposite o f what actually 
happened. Initially, a careful silence in Syria contrasted significantly from each other 
and from other trends in U.S. Middle East policy.63 The administration dealt with each 
country in the Arab Spring on a case by case basis, with strategic interests and oil, not 
morality, as the key factors for policy making, and each case increasing in threat and 
violence.64 In March, 2011, while the administration was deciding to intervene in Libya,
“ Gates. 523.
63 Pinto, Maria Do Ceu De Pinho Ferreira. "Mapping the Obama administration's response to the Arab 
Spring." Review o f  Brasilian International Politics, 2012, 109-130. 109.
64 Ibid., 110.
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the first major Arab Spring protests were taking place in Syria, fueled by a release of 
political prisoners by the Assad government.65
Syria’s connections with terror groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and its 
meddling in Lebanon, as well as its enmity with Israel, are further factors which made it 
difficult to isolate the regime or push forward an intervention, and Washington’s 
response to the outbreak of rebellion was primarily rhetorical, in calls for regime change 
in the country.66 As early as April, 2011, the U.S. involved itself in Syria, with sanctions 
imposed as a result on the Assad regime’s attempts to quell the Arab Spring uprising.67
By the summer, President Obama and other western leaders were calling for the regime
* • 68 * • to relinquish power. Syria, o f course, did not involve oil, but it did involve Russia and
Iran, making intervention a difficult issue to justify and frame, particularly in concert
with the demonstrated capability o f the regime to resist efforts by social media-
augmented rebels to discredit the regime, a factor which had been central to the other
revolutions.69
In July 2012, Syria upped the ante in the conflict by announcing that it had 
chemical weapons with which to defend itself from aggression. This led to the infamous 
“Red Line” statement against their use by President Obama in August.70 His statement 
indicated that the “calculus” would change toward intervention if those weapons should 
be used or deployed. Further warnings in December did not prevent the use o f the 
weapons near Aleppo in March, or the follow on attack on 21 August 2013, in which
65 Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights. New York: Penguin Press, 2014. 410.
66 Ibid. 120.
67 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f  U.S. Syrian Crisis.
68 Ibid.
69 Lindgren, Simon. 2013. "The Potential and Limitations o f  Twitter Activism: Mapping the 2011 Libyan 
Uprising." Triple C. 2011, 207-220. 207.
70 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f  U.S. Syrian Crisis.
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1500 Syrians died, and which generated the intervention crisis which ended with the 
decision not to intervene in September o f that year. There was considerable discussion, 
and indications that the White House was willing to consider military strikes on Syria, 
with significant support from Senator John McCain. There was Little coordination 
between Syrian rebel groups, in contrast with the cases o f Libya and Kosovo, this made it 
unclear who was actually to be supported in the Syrian Civil War, and accordingly 
difficult to frame an intervention.71 In June, 2013, President Obama increased aid to the 
Free Syrian Army, however, knowing which groups to favor with support and which to 
ignore was problematic, and has become even more so since the rise o f the Islamic State, 
a radical movement with ties to al-Qaeda, in 2013. By the time key U.S. allies, the very 
allies who had pushed the U.S. into intervention in Libya, began to defect in late August, 
the frame for intervention was in shambles, and the president turned the matter over to 
Congress for approval, which was tantamount to backing down.73 In the end, resistance 
to intervention proved to be too great and the status quo was selected over the attack 
option.
The Obama Second Term: Some New Faces, Some Battered Egos
The Obama administration underwent some significant changes in between 2011 
and 13, most notably in the changeover o f the Secretaries o f Defense and State. Gates 
gave way to Leon Panetta, a strong Hillary Clinton supporter, but also a prominent 
Democrat who was far more in line with the administration’s goals than his predecessor.
71 Panetta. 410.
72 Clinton. 465.
73 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f  U.S. Syrian Crisis.
283
Panetta’s term lasted into the Syrian crisis, with his successor, former Republican Senator 
Chuck Hagel, assuming control of the Pentagon in February 2013. Hagel had originally 
taken a stand against the Libya intervention, but later changed that position during his 
confirmation hearings.74 Hagel’s appointment represented an effort by the administration 
to bring in a moderate Republican who would have cache with the armed forces while 
shaping the department along lines dictated by the White House.75
The most significant change in the leadership was the transition o f leadership of 
the Department o f State from Hillary Clinton to former Massachusetts Democrat Senator 
John Kerry in February, 2013. Clinton came to express her regret over the events in 
Benghazi, although not the overall intervention in Libya.76 The transfer o f office took 
place after Susan Rice, the former Ambassador to the UN, withdrew her nomination for 
the position following sharp criticism for her role in providing false explanations for the 
causes for the Benghazi riots and attacks which led to the death o f four Americans, 
including Ambassador Christopher Stephens, on September 11, 2012. Rice would go on 
to become National Security Advisor after the departure o f Donilon on 5 June 2013. 
Denis McDonough, in turn, moved from the Deputy NSC position to that o f White House 
Chief of Staff. Samantha Power, in turn, replaced Rice at the UN on 2 August, 2013, 
shortly before the chemical attack crisis in Syria later that month. Given that Rice and 
Power were already administration leaders, and that John Kerry had been Senate Foreign
74 Pollack, Joel B. “Hagel 2011: Obama wrong on Gadhafi, Libya was a mistake.” Brietbart, February 22,
2013. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/02/22/H agel-2011 -Obama-Wrong-on-Gadhafi-Libya- 
Was-a-Mistake. Accessed on November 28 ,2014 .
75 Walt, Stehpen. “Top five reasons Obama should pick Chuck Hagel for SecD ef.” Foreign Policy, 13 
December 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/top five reasons obama_should_pick_chuck_hagel for s 
ecdef. Accessed on 20 November 2014.
76 Riley, Mollie. “Hillary Clinton: 'My Biggest Regret Is What Happened In Benghazi'.” The Huffington 
Post, January 27, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.eom/2014/01/27/hillary-clinton-
benghazi n 4674529.html. Accessed on November 20, 2014.
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Relations Committee Chairman before he became Secretary o f State, Hagel was the only 
person truly new to the foreign policy team. However, President Obama’s role in 
decision making has also changed, in part because of the relentless partisanship o f the 
political environment in Washington DC. Obama maintained a preference to hear the 
direct opinions of interagency leaders, to hear the why and wherefore o f disagreements, 
in detail, and then make his decisions, a process which drew significant criticism as being 
slow and non-committal.77
In terms o f politics, 2012 saw Obama’s reelection, so that the Syria events of 
2013 fall within his second term. Given that fact, and the relative cohesion o f his cabinet, 
as well as the fact that they had agreed to intervene in Libya, one might expect that 
Obama would have gone for intervention in Syria, in a manner similar to that which 
drove Clinton to intervene in Kosovo. However, with some reservations, the Rwanda 
intervention provides a better model for what actually occurred, since several pre-existing 
frames competed against a frame for intervening in Syria. The major difference between 
the two is that, unlike Rwanda, Syria was an issue for discussion by the Principal’s 
Committee and the president, so that there was a conscious decision not to intervene at 
the highest levels.
77 Lizza, Ryan. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Barack Obama’s foreign policy.” 
The New Yorker, May 2, 2011. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist. 
Accessed on 10 November 2014.
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Deciding, Framing, and Public Opinion in the Syria Non-Intervention
“all hell broke loose on social media... it was ordinary citizens who reported all
o f these horrors”.
Secretary o f State John Kerry on the Syrian chemical attacks, August 22nd,
2013.78
In spite of flare ups o f interest in events in Syria, usually tied to high casualty 
incidents in its civil war, it never became the central media event that Egypt and Libya. 
But, by the time events in Syria truly rose to prominence in 2013, it had none o f the 
influence on U.S. policy makers that Egypt or Libya had previously, and the primary 
international influence on the revolution was coming from Iran and Islamist groups. This 
different international dynamic is one key to understanding why there has been to date no 
intervention.79 Unfortunately, the effort to frame the intervention in 2013 was not based 
on human rights per se, but specifically on the use of chemical weapons. It cannot be 
said with certainty, but the tepid U.S. and international response may indicate the 
weakness o f chemical weapons as a framing tool.
Of note is this contrast between those in less combative or force oriented positions 
favoring intervention, while military leaders opposed the effort. This is in keeping with 
past models o f armed interventions, such as in Kosovo and Libya, in which diplomats 
urged action while military leaders urged restraint. In contrast, Syria had no regional 
influence and did not threaten the Europeans directly, as Libya had done. Therefore, it
78 Hirsh, Michael. "How Social Media Could Help Obama Make his Case on Syria." The Atlantic 
Monthly, August 30, 2013: 1-2. 2.
79 Akder, Derya Gocer. “Theories o f  Revolutions and Arab Uprisings: The Lessons from the Middle East.” 
Istanbul: Ortadogu Etutleri, 2013, 85-110. 100.
286
proved to be impossible to form a valid coalition against them either within the U.S. 
government or outside o f it, as was seen in the summer of 2013 when the U.S.’s most 
reliable ally, the UK, publicly voted against intervention and against the stated will of its 
Prime Minister.80
The level o f domestic resistance to the intervention in Libya meant that the frame 
it supported may have been weak. Obama's "Lead from behind" strategy in Libya and the 
great emphasis on the small size o f the U.S. involvement reflected this.81 Competing 
frames in Syria were also too hard to overcome. War weariness, for example,
JOparticularly in the Middle East, was a heavily mitigating factor. The successful efforts 
of the Syrian regime and its allies to disrupt rebel and U.S. framing efforts was another 
factor. Domestic dissatisfaction with other administration policies was also a major 
consideration, as seen in the bitter partisan debate over the rival news story of the August, 
2013, the impending implementation o f the Affordable Care Act, which joined a list of 
other issues, including Benghazi and other scandals to fuel Republican resistance to what
04
seemed to be all White House initiatives. In terms o f foreign policy, the administration 
was facing an increasingly strident Russia, while still attempting to implement its so 
called “Pivot to Asia.” The efforts of Congressional Republicans to keep alive the 
Benghazi attacks, which were blamed on these specific policies, were another factor.
80 British Broadcasting Corporation. “Syria crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action.” 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783. August 30, 2013. Accessed on October 10,2013.
81 Wilson, Scott. “On Libya, Obama willing to let allies take the Lead. The Washington, Post. 
www.washingtonpost.com. 9 March, 2011. Accessed on 1 April 2013.
820 se , Erik. “War Weary Public Rejects Attacking Syria.” The Huffington Post. 12 September 2013. 
www.huffingtonpost.com. Accessed on November 10,2014.
83 Zennie, Michael. 2012. "Obama campaign website taken down by Syrian Electronic Army - the latest 
target o f  pro-Assad hackers." Mail Online. October 27, 2012. www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 
2478094/Obama-campaign-website-taken-Syrian-electronic-army-latest-target-pro-assad-hackers.html. 
Accessed October 24 ,2013
84 People-press.org . “Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Air Strikes.” September 3, 2013. Accessed on 
November 20, 2014. In the third week o f  August, 39% o f  respondents to the polling focused on Syria as 
the top issue, with 23% focused on the impending healthcare regulations.
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Other than the indefatigable John McCain, there was limited bipartisan Congressional 
support for intervention in Syria at any point between 2011 and 2013.85
R2P was never invoked in the case of Syria, and this could be a result o f its 
discrediting in Libya. Just as the Rwanda crisis suffered in its timing following the 
perceived failure in Somalia the year before, any further intervention in the Arab Spring, 
particularly after the events in Benghazi in 2012, would be viewed in light of what is 
increasingly perceived as a failure there. Other frames o f perceivably failed military 
operations plagued efforts to build a frame for Syria. In particular, Obama and the new 
Secretary of State, John Kerry had to fight an older frame, that o f the justifications for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.86 The Bush administration’s perceived folly in false 
intelligence reporting on Iraqi weapons o f mass destruction development overshadowed 
the Obama team’s efforts to frame the Syrian regime’s use o f nerve gas and chemical 
agents on its own population. Government statements, such as discussing “multiple 
streams o f intelligence” could not help but sound a lot like the testimony that Colin
87Powell gave to the U.N. concerning Iraq’s elusive chemical weapons.
Unlike the case in Egypt and Libya, the international media has had very little 
access to Syria, with a ban in place the beginning of the conflict in 2011.88 Without 
outsiders, and with the success o f the regime in counter-framing, a so called “unreliable 
narrative” has helped to mitigate against building a coalition for intervention as had been
85 Parker, Peter. “Obama seeks approval by Congress for Strike in Syria.” The New York Times, August




88 Parker, Emily. “Why Don't We Care About Syria.” Slate, February 14, 2012.
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/02/syria uprising twitter and social media r 
evolution fatigue .html
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done in Libya.89 The nature o f a post Assad regime and its potential Islamist character is 
unsettling, particularly considering the course that the Egyptian uprising took before that 
countries army restored order in the summer o f 2013.90
Another difference between Libya and Syria, but also dealing with the media, was 
the question o f social media. This is an issue of how a new technology can directly 
impact framing in a way not seen or planned for previously. With a dearth o f social 
media usage, the Libyan intervention was achieved through a variety o f methods and 
channels, most innovative and notable of which was the invocation o f the UN doctrine of 
R2P and the subsequent framing of the Libyan intervention in humanitarian terms. At the 
same time, Syrian threats and use o f chemical weapons failed to generate enough interest 
in an armed humanitarian intervention there. While U.S. and international leaders made 
successful use o f R2P as a framing tool to create an overwhelming need to violate 
Libya’s sovereignty to protect its citizens, they did not do so in the case o f Syria.91
Social media was not a major factor in the Libyan revolution, primarily because 
o f the backward state of technology in the country. Telephones, texts, and radio served 
as the primary ways to move information. In contrast, social media in Syria has served as 
an important source for information and intelligence to the outside world, and this is in 
line with conventional wisdom on social media utilization in other conflicts, particularly 
in Egypt, with citizen posted reports far outstripping conventional news coverage,
89 Parker, Emily. “Why Don't We Care About Syria.” Slate, February 14, 2012.
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/02/syria_uprisingtwitter and s o c ia lm e d ia r  
evolution fatigue .html
90 Keiswetter, Allen. "An Arab Spring Primer." Foreign Service Journal, 2012. 15-18.18.
91 Realists would posit that the Libyan intervention was undertaken in pursuit o f  power interests by the 
great powers. This could include control o f  Libya’s oil, its strategic position, or other, national level means 
power sources and would have nothing to do with its mode o f  leadership or the status o f  its citizens.
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especially early in a conflict. However, there are several reasons why the social media 
has not had the same impact in the Syrian Civil War. One is that the Syrian government 
has had a well-developed sense o f how to control and manipulate the media in general 
and social media in particular. That regime is, in effect, a “Neopatrimonial state,”93 in 
which it is profoundly difficult to organize any sort of protest or revolt, since discontent 
must spread to a very large group o f society in order to gain momentum and protect itself 
from retaliation.94 This has allowed the Syrian government to successfully dispute 
frames while establishing its own.
Facebook was banned in Syria almost from its inception in 2004, and although 
those who were very determined could find a way around the blockage, the government’s 
ability to interdict social media was and remains formidable. Assisted by tracking 
equipment supplied by Iran, this process continues to the present, with a new twist.95 The 
Assad regime has come to understand the value of social media for its own information 
operations, and currently allows Facebook to remain open as a tool for its own outreach, 
while countering and blocking opposition sites when and where it can. In theoretical 
terms, this amounts to a Syrian counter network powerful enough to disrupt U.S. efforts 
at the consolidation of networking and framing power. In cases where it cannot 
specifically target its enemies, or where volume is too high to controvert, the regime will 
still resort to simply pulling the plug on Facebook until interest dies down.
92Nanabhey. 575.
93 Comunello, 454. Such a state is defined by Comunello as being based on the systematic expansion o f  the 
power o f  an authoritarian leader or ‘Sultan’ who is able to control the fate o f  a country for a long period o f  




The “Syrian Electronic Army” may be the most well-known of the counter­
revolutionary elements who explicitly use social media tools for their political ends. 
Most famously, they hacked President Obama’s campaign website during the summer o f 
2012, however, their activities have been pervasive since they came into the spotlight 
during the Arab Spring.96 The “Army” claims to be made up of informed and cyber 
savvy citizens who support the regime, but their independence or lack thereof from the 
regime is uncertain. What is certain is their usage of the full range o f social media 
manipulation to cast doubts on the veracity both o f the rebel cause and their messaging.97
According to Information Wars “Every serious political or militant actor with a 
stake in what is happening in Syria has a presence on social media through some 
combination o f officially hosted websites and blogs, as well as Facebook, Twitter, 
Tumblr, YouTube, Flickr, online chat room forums, short message service platforms, and 
other venues”98 That said, the density of usage is not the same as it was in Egypt. Both 
Libya and Syria had far fewer tweets per day in the revolutionary period than did Egypt. 
The quoted report reinforces the view that social media has allowed the various rebel 
groups to perform at a somewhat more leveled playing field, but that the prowess of the 
regime in the social media field has prevented successes such as those in Egypt. It is, in 
effect, a tool that anyone can use, making anyone a potential journalist, or framer.99
Given the Assad regime’s lockdown on all types o f media, including traditional 
news outlets, the ever harried social media users within the country proved to be the most
96 Zennie, 2012.
97 Ibid.
98 Zambelis, Chris. 2012. "Information Wars: Assessing the Social Media Battlefield in Syria.” Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, July 24, 2012, 1-3. 1. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/information-wars- 
assessing-the-social-media-battlefield-in-syria. Accessed on June 10,2013.
99 Ibid.
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effective at getting the word on events out to the international community. Thus, social 
media outlets and vetting services, such as Storyful were used to break the central event 
o f the conflict, the August 21st chemical attack which killed over 1400 people. In the 
end, reports of missiles raining “chemical death” were reported by over a dozen separate 
locations on a variety o f social media.100 Platforms such as You Tube and other video 
sharing services were central in a self-journalism role which helped to get vital 
information and images to the west, and this proved to be true both in Egypt and in 
Syria.101
In summary, there was no strong support within the Obama administration for an 
intervention in Syria between 2011 and spring, 2014. In fact, the only factor which, 
over a year later, has finally driven the U.S. to intervene in Syria in a solely military way 
is the emergence o f the fundamentalist Islamic State in Iraq in Syria, and the threat that 
group posed to the world oil markets and overall stability in the region.
Models and the Syria Non-Intervention
Why did the U.S. avoid intervention in Syria in 2013? In accordance with the 
Decide/Explain model, there was no powerful actor in the foreign policy decision making 
apparatus with enough interest in the Syrian Civil War to force either the decision making 
process or to frame the intervention in terms which might lead to action. O f course there 
are other factors to consider, as discussed earlier in the findings section o f the study.
100 Panetta. 410.
101 Nanabhey, Mohammed. "From Spectacle to Spectacular: How Physical Space, Social Media and 
Mainstream Broadcast Amplified the Public Sphere in Egypt's 'Revolution'." The Journal o f  North African 
Studies, (2011): 573-603. 574.
102 Panetta. 410.
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According to Joseph Nye, geography can play a greater than expected role in the use of 
the cyber domain and internet based social media. This is true both in terms o f physical 
control of network systems, but also in the political control of the internet within national 
or geographic borders.103 This would be borne out in the great disparities in reaction and 
framing between the Syrian and Libyan cases, given Syrian adeptness at manipulating 
opinion through social media usage.
The direct influence of Iran in Syria, the lack o f oil, and Russian interests joined 
those above to defeat efforts to frame a Syrian intervention in the same way as succeeded 
in Libya.104 Pierre Atlas noted the dissonance in U.S. goals and framing efforts in U.S. 
Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests for the Digest of 
Middle East Studies. He points out that the inclusion of an idealistic strain into U.S. 
dealings with the Middle East is the incongruity, and represents an ideational change in 
U.S. policy toward the region. The struggle has been particularly apparent in the 
comparison of the Libyan response, which had a realist undertone (oil) but no security 
threats, and could therefore take on a moral character, and that in Syria, which had no oil, 
many regional threats, and an impossible moral dilemma to solve, that o f who to support 
and what the result would be.
Other important factors precluding an early intervention in Syria were its location 
and the presence of chemical weapons. Syria is not a primarily coastal country, as Libya 
was, and its location and terrain made the prospect o f operations there problematic.105 It 
was estimated that a ground force o f 75-90,000 troops would be necessary to effect a




humanitarian intervention in the country.106 Most importantly, however, is the impact 
chemical weapons and their use and potential use had on the efforts to frame the events. 
By September, 2013, with the failure of the British government to gain approval for 
intervention, Obama was backed into a comer, claiming that he authorized attacks, but 
turning to Congress for permission to attack which would never come.107 In the end, the 
Russians intervened politically in order to secure the destruction o f Syria’s chemical 
weapons, and the rise o f the Islamic State has rekindled interest in Syria, at least in terms 
o f interdicting supplies and troops moving from ISIL bases in Syria into neighboring
I AO
Iraq. There is still no signaled intent to place U.S. ground forces in Syria as of the time 
of this study.
A key factor, and difference, between the various revolutions, can be found in the 
diversity o f those engaging in them. For Libya, it was eastern and western ethnic groups 
struggling, for Egypt, a melange o f Socialists, Islamists, capitalists, and reactionary 
conservatives.109 In Syria, the makeup of the rebels is quite different, and includes pro- 
Iranian, Shiite, and A1 Qaeda supported elements. Unlike the others, the Syrian 
leadership come from a minority group, the Allawaite Christians, but are far more 
entrenched and capable, through the mechanism of the Ba’ath political party of 
centralized resistance to rebellion than in other cases.
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107 Reuters. 2013. Timeline o f  U.S. Syrian Crisis.
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Conclusion
A brief case study on the decision not to intervene in Syria in 2013 has been 
provided as a further check on the theoretical models and to assess the validity o f the 
proposed Decide/Frame Model and the findings of the case studies of this research 
project. There was no strong support within the Obama administration for an 
intervention in Syria between 2011 and spring, 2014.110 In fact, the only factor which, 
over a year later, has finally driven the U.S. to intervene in Syria in a solely military way 
is the emergence o f the fundamentalist Islamic State in Iraq in Syria, and the threat that 
group posed to the world oil markets and Iraqi government through its invasion of that 
country.
Like Rwanda, there was no intervention, and so the results are not satisfactory in 
that there has been no alleviation o f the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. However, 
the study does validate many of the models examined in the other case studies. Like 
other studies, one finds a sense of the Rational Actor Model, in play. The RAM stands, 
in this case, as one reason why no convincing argument has generated an intervention, at 
least until the eruption o f the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria became such a threat to Iraq 
in summer, 2014, that military intervention in Syria could be reframed in national 
security terms. The GPM and TGP models are both seen to be in play, with the various 
parts of the foreign policy apparatus, most notably, the departments of Defense and State, 
taking positions reflective o f their bureaucratic stances.
In terms of framing, too many competing frames, combined with the lack o f a 
U.S. spokesperson interested enough and decisive enough to overcome them, have
110 Panetta. 410.
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defeated frames linked to the desirability o f armed humanitarian intervention. Extremely 
effective use o f social media by the Assad regime to justify its own actions and discredit 
those of its opponents is a noted cause o f this failure, but geography, the lack o f an oil- 
threat narrative, such as existed in Libya, and the direct sponsorship and intervention o f a 
great power, in this case Russia, also help explain the failure of effective framing. As a 
result o f these factors, no cabal of leaders emerged with the clout and cohesiveness o f the 
Bush or Clinton teams, or the persuasiveness and connectedness o f the Obama team 
which generated the Libya intervention in terms of pushing the administration to 
intervene, and, more importantly, those leaders such as Kerry who appeared to want 
intervention did not have the political clout to be able to frame Syria in as favorable light 
in terms o f the need to intervene.
The graphic below summarizes the cases and the general explanatory power o f the 
various models used. Weak is the lowest rating, while Strong is the highest.
Figure 9: Utility of Models in Explaining Decisions on Armed Humanitarian 
Intervention and Framing
Som alia 1992 Partial Weak Strong Weak President
Rwanda 1994 Strong Strong Strong Strong None
Kosovo 1999 Partial Weak Partial Strong Secretary o f  State
Libya 2011 Partial Strong Strong Strong
Secretary o f  State/Junior 
Cabinet Officers
Syria 2013 Strong Strong Strong Weak None
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The decision to send U.S. troops into harm’s way is not an easy one. It is also not 
easy to frame such a decision to the American people. The findings o f this study are 
important because they show the power of individual leaders in convincing a given 
American President o f the need to act in cases where U.S. national interest is not 
necessarily clear. The power of the Secretary o f State, when used to persuade, is evident 
in many of the studies, and came as somewhat o f a surprise given the professional 
experience of the author, and the dominance of that experience by the DOD. In 
retrospect, the three cases and two mini cases examined were enlightening and useful 
since each showed the criticality o f decisiveness both in the president and his key 
advisors. O f course a president cannot be decisively engaged on every issue at all times, 
but must become so and be supported adequately in cases where U.S. armed force is to be 
utilized. But the cases used and the lessons learned apply across senior government 
decision making, whether it be foreign policy, domestic, economic, or other policies. 
While the cabinet position of the dominant actor will change based on the issue area, the 




Armed humanitarian interventions have formed a significant part o f the military 
and diplomatic history of the post-Cold War world. If it had not been for the 9-11 attacks 
and the U.S. military response to the, Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya might have been the 
main military actions o f the decades since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. As such, these 
interventions provide a useful tool for examining the foreign policy decision making 
process, the framing process, and the role o f the individual decision maker in those 
processes. This dissertation set out to explore those interventions in order to see exactly 
what role each of these processes had in the interventions, and to see if  it was possible to 
use lessons learned from such a study to make predictions on when and how future 
interventions might take place.
The fundamental finding of the research is that interventions took place when a 
dominant actor in the decision making apparatus, usually from either the Department of 
State or the National Security Council, becomes interested enough in an intervention both 
to use his or her influence to convince others o f the need to intervene, and to be able to 
frame that intervention to the public. This is not to detract from the ultimate decision 
making power o f the presidency in decision making, but to rather to describe how the 
president is convinced of the need to act by well placed, eloquent, powerful thinkers. 
Someone must make and sustain an argument that the need for intervention can be 
conflated to some national security threat to the United States or its allies, or that the U.S.
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is the only country capable of required actions to alleviate suffering. There is no attempt 
here to deny the power o f the President o f the United States in decision making. Indeed, 
that power is clearly seen in the case studies. The Somalia intervention is the most 
glaring example of presidential power, with Bush notably making the decision to send 
U.S. forces there after being briefed by his cabinet, but without the particular influence of 
any particular member.
Presupposing that armed humanitarian interventions are a good and useful thing, 
what factors can lead to them happening, at least in terms of U.S. foreign policy decision 
making? A unified national security cabinet is not critical, but does help. This is 
evidenced in primarily in the Bush cabinet and to a lesser extent in that o f Clinton. The 
cabinet of George H.W. Bush is well known as one of the smoothest functioning and 
synchronized in American history. Bill Clinton’s second term cabinet, while not as 
cohesive, was still seasoned both to each other and to Clinton’s governing style by the 
time of the Kosovo intervention. Barack Obama’s cabinet was sharply divided, by the 
rigors o f the electoral campaign and the rancor between the Obama team and the 
adherents o f the presidential challenger cum Secretary o f State, Hillary Clinton.1 That 
said, Clinton’s power, and her lock step, to that point, with Robert Gates, who was 
against intervention, was such that she had to be brought into the fold for the final 
decision for intervention to be made. Thus was the cohesiveness o f the earlier foreign 
policy teams reached.
Another important lesson is that the Department o f State must be on board for an 
intervention to occur. Why State? The answer to this lies in governmental politics. The 
Department of Defense was not in favor of a single one o f the armed humanitarian
1 Gates, Robert M. Duty, Memoirs o f  a Secretary at War. N ew  York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 287.
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interventions mentioned, indeed, in each case, it was ordered to act against its 
recommendation. In two of the three cases, however, it was the specific initial or 
converted support o f the Department o f State which proved to be the decisive influence 
toward intervention. The major non-intervention covered, in Rwanda, never got raised to 
the level of Secretary of State, and as a consequence was never a serious discussion point
■y
for the president.
International support is another critical factor, demonstrated by the case studies to 
be absolutely critical to an armed humanitarian intervention taking place. Usually, this 
support comes in the form of a UN resolution, and this was the case in Somalia and 
Libya. Where UN support is not unified, such as in the case o f Kosovo, other bodies, 
such as NATO, can provide the international top cover for an intervention to take place. 
This was even more important when NATO itself seemed to be at risk o f a major loss of 
credibility, as was perceived to be about to occur because o f Serbian intransigence over 
the issue o f Kosovo independence and the ongoing atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, 
particularly from 1998 onwards. In the period studied, the United States did not launch 
an armed humanitarian intervention without the implied authority o f the international 
community. Although there are other reasons, this stands as one leading cause for the 
failure to intervene in Rwanda.
Concurrent with the issue of international support is that there must be a lack of 
major international resistance to armed humanitarian intervention. Russia, therefore, 
became a key player in the Kosovo intervention, since its historical patronage of Serbia 
and its role as a great power seemed to be at stake with the NATO intervention. In
2 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary, a Memoir. New York: Harper Collins, 2013. 152.
3 Blair, Tony. A Journey: My Political Life. London: Knopf, 2010. 252.
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addition to international support, Russia had to be given assurances on Serb regime 
survival and its own national reputation in order to prevent its resistance to the 
intervention. In each of the other cases, there was little or no great power resistance to 
U.S. and coalition actions. In Somalia, no great power significantly resisted the push to 
armed intervention, and in Libya, as in Kosovo, Russia and China were satisfied enough 
that their interests would be met that they did not exercise veto rights in the UN Security 
Council. Notably, in the case o f Rwanda, there was significant resistance to intervention 
by key U.S. partners, notably France. This is not to assume that the U.S. was ever 
significantly motivated to intervene there, but even if it had been, the international 
community was not.
Domestic politics also play a key role in the question o f whether or not to 
intervene. The 1992 election cycle both deferred U.S. intervention in Somalia, but 
perversely, may have made intervention more likely after Bush was defeated. The 
Lewinsky affair certainly delayed significant action in Kosovo. Conversely, the domestic 
backlash against the perceived defeat in Somalia in 1993 virtually guaranteed that there 
would be no intervention in Rwanda. War weariness based on U.S. involvement in 
Afghanistan and Iraq did not eliminate the chance for an effort in Libya, but did ensure 
that the U.S. role would be limited to air support, and that even that effort would be 
lessened over the course of the air campaign and eventually turned over to NATO 
leadership.
The findings o f this research should be useful in predicting when and where the 
U.S. will engage in future armed humanitarian interventions. When powerful leaders, 
most often in the Department of State, can be convinced, and convince the president that
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intervention is necessary, and when there is international and domestic support for such 
an intervention, it will occur. When those factors do not exist, an intervention will not 
take place. An informed, cohesive foreign policy decision making establishment is 
important, but even more critical is an informed president with an understanding of and 
commitment to action in foreign policy.
An example of these principals in action provided by looking at the discussion on 
armed humanitarian intervention in Syria in August, 2013. The Obama team which 
generated the Libya intervention in terms o f pushing the administration to intervene, and, 
more importantly, those leaders such as Kerry who have made the push were not able to 
frame Syria in as favorable light in terms of the need to intervene. None o f the leaders 
who were so adamant about Libya and the concept o f R2P were public activists for an 
intervention in Syria, and neither was the Secretary o f State himself, so that, in 
combination with significant domestic turmoil, war weariness, and international 
resistance from Russia and China, meant that there would be no intervention.
Other cases also demonstrate how important it is for the intervention o f powerful 
leaders and the alignment o f the external variables examined in the study for an 
intervention to occur. The most notable o f current humanitarian disasters to suffer in this 
way is the continuing crisis in Darfur. Darfur, a largely Christian region in north- west 
Sudan, has been subject to drought, famine, and government sponsored oppression since 
2003, however, there has been no boots on the ground U.S. intervention there, in spite of 
the fact that the death toll rivals that of the Rwanda genocide.4 No senior U.S. official 
has taken on Darfur in the way that was seen in Libya and Kosovo. Significant
4 Tisdal, Simon. “Sudan fears US military intervention over Darfur.” The Guardian Online, January 15, 
2009. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/janyi5/sudan-unamid-obama. Accessed on 20 November
2014. There has, however, been delivery o f  supplies to the region, but no armed intervention.
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international resistance to intervention exists, not only from great powers such as China, 
but also from neighboring countries. There is no oil in geographically remote Darfur, and 
western interest in the plight o f the population seems to fall victim to the same 
acceptance o f a robust African death toll that was seen during the Rwandan genocide.
Framing o f armed humanitarian interventions by the foreign policy establishment 
is another significant focus o f the study, and the case studies demonstrate that it is tied 
into the decision making process, but only in those cases where a fairly lengthy decision 
cycle, measured in weeks and months, rather than days and weeks, are available for 
decision making and planning. In general the case studies showed that the U.S. public is 
averse to lengthy involvement in combat operations for humanitarian purposes. Only in 
Kosovo was a lengthy time period available to frame the intervention. In that case, too, 
one must look farther back than the immediate time frame of intervention to realize that 
by 1999, Slobodan Milosevic had been an international villain for nearly a decade.5 
Similarly, in spite o f his rapprochement with the west in the 1990s and 2000s, Muammar 
Gaddafi had multi decade history as a supporter o f terrorism and specifically as an enemy 
of the U.S. In spite o f this “free framing” in both cases, support numbers for the 
interventions against the two dictators rarely topped 50%, and ticked up slightly only 
when operations were actively underway. The point o f this finding may well be that 
framing is not that important to the implementation of armed humanitarian interventions. 
Only one of the interventions studies, Somalia, ended because o f a drastic change in 
public opinion, and that was tied directly to what was perceived as the defeat in 
Mogadishu. None o f the other interventions studied ended simply because o f public
5 Independent International Commission on Kosovo Report. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 38- 
39.
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opinion. In all cases they continued until either the mission was accomplished, UN 
mandate ended or changed, or the enemy gave in.
Having noted the results of the research, the question must be asked if the 
Decide/Explain model can be useful for other foreign policy activities. This is a 
significant question, which begs a weighter greater than “yes, if  someone wants to.” 
Clearly going to war, even in a limited way, is a task not to be undertaken lightly, if at all, 
and any model that predicts when and how a country might go to war would be 
welcomed by academics and policy makers alike. History provides us with several 
examples o f powerful leaders who had a goal and a voice. The most famous of these is 
probably Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, who famously uttered the phrase “Cartago 
Delendam Est”, in or out o f context, during Roman Senatorial debates over a period of 
years between the second and third Punic Wars, until finally Rome did attack and destroy 
Carthage in 146 BC, ending a major threat to its domination o f the Mediterranean.6 This 
simple and powerful framing shows how, over a period o f time, an argument for 
intervention can be made at multiple levels. A further example o f this is the year and a 
half long period after the September 11 attacks, which saw a steady framing campaign 
against Saddam Hussein which culminated in the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of 
the dictator in spring, 2003. In that case, a small group of committed and powerful 
leaders convinced a reasonably cohesive foreign policy team, and the president, that there 
was a national security threat, and that intervention was necessary. President Bush was 
already predisposed toward an armed intervention in Iraq by the history o f his father’s
6 Carthage must be destroyed.
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presidency.7 Even in the absence o f a direct attack on the U.S., by Iraq, the fact that the 
U.S. had been attacked made it easier to frame the invasion as well as other interventions 
which make up the Global War on Terrorism. Even in this example, however, the U.S. 
attempted to operate within an international mandate provided by the UN, and to go out if  
its way to frame the operation as a response to a national security threat.8
Armed humanitarian interventions stand out in a review o f modem warfare for 
two reasons. The first is that they are limited operations, usually not using combined 
arms, and have limited objectives. The second is that they are not framed in terms of 
occupation o f conquest, but rather as human security operations, establishing a principal 
o f human rather than national sovereignty as a paramount concern. While it was possible 
to argue both that Kosovo was a threat to the U.S., and that the U.S. must lead a response, 
there was very limited call for armed intervention in Georgia in 2008, when Russian 
troops invaded and occupied part o f the country. This is also true o f the Russian 
occupation o f Crimea in 2013, or China’s occupation o f Tibet in 1950. Here the size of 
the potential military and political resistance and the likely lack o f international support 
would predict that the U.S. will not intervene, and not perceive the actions taken as direct 
threats to its own national security. Kosovo, however, should serve as a warning to 
Moscow that the U.S. does take NATO seriously as an alliance and an international body, 
and will react strongly to any direct threats to it.
7 Haass, Richard N. War o f  Necessity, War o f  Choice: A Memoir o f  Two Iraq Wars. New York, Simon 
and Schuster, 2009. 198. Haas discusses the urging o f  Paul Wolfowitz to consider action against Iraq 
immediately after the September 11 attacks, urgings which grew into the decision to invade by 2003.
8 United Nations General Assembly Session 57 Verbatim Report 2. A/57/PV.2 page 6. Transcript o f  
George W. Bush speech from September 2 ,2002 .
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/57/PV.2. Retrieved 10 November 2014.
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Two questions remain to be discussed. First, whither armed humanitarianism? 
Following the Libya intervention, the idea o f R2P has faded from the forefront of 
political discussion. This begs the question of whether the whole idea o f armed 
humanitarians a product o f a combination o f UN triumphalism and U.S. uni-polarity after 
the Cold War? 2011 and the Libya intervention marked a watershed for several reasons. 
The turn o f the Arab Spring into a victory for non-democratic Islamic fundamentalists, 
combined with the rise o f China, the resurgence o f Russia, and the acknowledged failure 
of the last great intervention, in Libya, to secure its goals o f protecting the people of 
Libya could mean the end o f the phenomena. The transnational threat posed by criminal 
and extremist elements, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, may trigger a military or 
humanitarian response such as was seen in Libya, or Somalia, if  divisions on what to do 
in response can be overcome in the national security cabinet by a dominant actor who can 
influence the president decisively. Beyond the U.S., it may be that China, Russia, or 
other great powers may see such armed humanitarian interventions as a valid course of 
action should they choose to take on a greater burden in international security leadership. 
In either case, the findings o f this research on how armed humanitarian interventions are 
decided on, framed to the public, and implemented will be o f direct use.
Finally, what does this study mean for framing and decision making? A series o f 
models were discussed, with a proposal to combine the models in order to better explain 
the nexus between decision making and framing, as well as the role o f key individuals in 
each. A clear result o f the study is that the key leaders in the decision making and 
framing processes must be motivated by an issue in order for armed humanitarian 
interventions to take place. As wars o f choice, these operations must be carefully
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explained to the American people, something that works best with a long lead time for 
deciding on and framing intervention. Although many of the sources consulted for this 
study did not specifically discuss how they planned their framing efforts in each case, 
they all noted that such efforts did occur. In addition, the key deciders in each case were 
also the key framers, implying strong linkages between the two. Since armed 
humanitarian interventions were merely a prism through which to review the decision 
making and framing processes, and the role o f key individuals in them, the critical lesson 
of the study, one which applies across the various decision making realms o f the U.S. 
government, is that powerful leaders must be motivated to support decisions and frames 
which are not inherently popular or obviously vital to the U.S. public. Without a 
powerful leader to counteract the entrenched interests and bureaucracies behind every 
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March 10-13 Pew Research 
Center
U.S. Responsible to act? 27 63 10
Sanctions? 51 40 9
N o Fly Zone? 44 45 11
Bombing Libyan defenses 16 77 7
Troops to Libya 13 82 5
March 10-13 ABC/Washington 
Post Poll
U.S. force to create no fly zone? 49 45 6
March 11-13 CNN/Opinion 
Research Corp. Poll
N o Fly Zone? 32 62 4
Should U.S. lead a response? 23 74 4
March 14-16 Fox N ew s Poll
President Handling Situation Well? 43 35 21
U.S. military involvement? 25 65 9
March 18-20 CNN/Opinion 
Research Corp. Poll
N o Fly Zone? 70 27 3
Ground Forces? 28 70 1
Protecting Civilians an important policy goal? 83 10 7
March 18-21 CBS Poll
President’s Handling o f  the Situation? 50 29 21
Libya important to U.S.? 38 88 6
Approve Military Action? 68 26 6
March 21 Gallup Poll'
Intervention in Libya? 47 37 16
March 24-27 Pew Research 
Center
Remove Gaddafi Primary Aim? 46 43 11
March 25-27 USA Today/Gallup
President Handling Situation Well? 44 44 12
Should U.S. be in the lead? 10 87 4
March 24-28 AP Poll
President Handling Situation Well? 54 43 3
Approve o f  U.S. Involvement in Libya? 48 50 2
March 30-April 3 Pew Research 
Center
Intervention Right Decision? 50 37 13
Clear Goals? 30 57 12
March 31 -April 4 NBC/Wall Street 
Journal
1 http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/Americans-Approve-Military-Action-Against-Libya.aspx. Accessed  
on 27 October 2014.
330
N o Fly Zone 66 23 4
Intervention Right Decision? 52 41 7
April 15-20 CBS/New York 
Times Poll
President’s Actions 39 45 16
May 24-26 CNN Poll
President’s Actions 45 48 7
Removal o f  Gaddafi 68 26 1
Full key polling data on intervention in Libya, March-May 2011. Information taken from Polling Report, 
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